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Abstract 
This thesis originated from a research question created by a focus group of National 
Health Service (NHS) senior estates managers, who considered that the systems of 
internal control do not give adequate assurance that NHS healthcare building services 
engineering day-to-day maintenance activities conform to the national guidance. The 
initial aim of this research was to test their concerns against empirical evidence from 
NHS Trusts. This was achieved by identifying the gaps within the participating Trusts' 
maintenance managerial activities when assessed against national standards. Central to 
the methodology used to assess the level of dynamic risk being generated was the 
rejection of the NHS national standard 5x5 risk criticality grid in common use throughout 
the health service, in favour of a series of specific 'Utility Functions'. This has created 
greater transparency and robustness of the risk assessment process. To the 
researcher's knowledge, this is the first time that 'Utility Theory' has been used in such 
scenarios. The result of this analysis has shown their fear to be correct. And for each of 
the 31 NHS Trusts taking part, the multi-professional focus groups composed of their 
own senior managers confirmed that there are areas of non-conformance within their 
maintenance regime, which were previously unknown. In all cases the organisations 
considered that their failings were exposing their patients, staff, public and stakeholders 
to substantial/intolerable risk through a 'systematic' failure of the Trusts' governance 
systems. 
The aim of this research then expanded to design techniques that specifically assesses 
the resource needs to close these managerial gaps employing industry standard 
techniques. Then again employing 'Utility Theory' examined various revenue levels of 
directly employed maintenance artisan resource with respect to risk, via a specifically 
designed simulation model. This has proved that the historical NHS methodology for 
assessing workforce planning to be fundamentally flawed, as it seriously underestimates 
the resource need. This research then developed and designed a generic day-to-day 
monitoring assurance framework from reference to the research into High Reliability 
Organisations, Normal Accident Theory and managerial governance needs. 
The overriding recommendation from the research was that NHS Trusts must redesign 
their governance systems to ensure that they are aware of their estates department's 
non-conformances when assessed against national standards. 
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Preface 
A National Health Service (NHS) report (Department of Health 2000) suggested that an 
estimated 850,000 (range 300,000 to 1.4 million) adverse events might occur each year 
in the NHS hospital sector, resulting in a £2 billion direct cost through patients needing 
additional hospitalisation. Some of these adverse events will be inevitable complications 
of treatment but around half might be avoidable. As part of this thesis research due to 
the concerns raised within the report, a focus group was convened consisting of ten 
experienced NHS estate managers from England and Northern Ireland. The focus group 
discussed the Department of Health document and identified the main managerial 
systems within an estates department that they considered to be generating the greatest 
unaddressed perceived risk. The output from these discussions was apprehension 
relating to the level of conformance to national standards in relation to the engineering 
work controlled by these departments. This led to the following research question: -
'Do the managerial systems of internal control within the National Health Service 
(NHS) assure that the day-to-day building service engineering maintenance activities 
conform to their respective national guidelines? 
The results of this research conclusively show that of the 31 NHS healthcare 
organisations analysed as part of this research, not one conformed to these national 
standards. In all cases the organisation's senior managers considered that their 
governance failings were: 
Exposing their organisation, patients, staff, public and stakeholders to 
substantial/intolerable risk through a 'systematic' failure of their governance 
systems. 
During the year 2001 the author began to assemble detailed sample information of the 
actual engineering operational policies and procedures practised. This data was then 
compared against the national guidance that had been specifically developed by the 
NHS for such maintenance activities, and assessed the risk of any non-conformances. 
The data collection has continued up to the present day. This research created four 
research objectives to split the governance problem into fine detail. The research 
1 
instruments developed form robust and transparent research methodologies, that 
identified latent and dangerous conditions that were previously unknown; created 
assessments of the resource needs to close these managerial gaps; estimated the 
revenue consequences of keeping the gaps closed; and then developed a monitoring 
regime methodology to give assurance that the gaps remain closed. 
This thesis is composed of six chapters; a summary of each is presented below: 
Chapter One - Introduction 
This chapter traces the history of the National Health Service (NHS) from its creation in 
1948 to the present day, mapped in ten year timeframes. The fifth decade (1988 -1997) 
saw the introduction of the internal market within the Service. This split the NHS into 
'purchasers' and 'providers'. Purchasers were health authorities and some family 
doctors. These organisations commissioned medical services from the providers, where 
the providers were: the acute hospitals, organisations providing care for the mentally ill, 
people with learning disabilities and the elderly, along with ambulance services. 
Providers became NHS Trusts with their own independent organisations and 
management structures. 
Included within this Chapter is a discussion relating to the government's strategy to 
assess the performance of the NHS against its conformance to national standards. It 
was from this backdrop that the research topic was developed that questioned the 
managerial control and assurance systems then in use, to ensure that NHS Trust 
engineering day-to-day maintenance activities were conforming to national codes of 
practice. 
Chapter Two - Literature Review 
This Chapter begins with a short description of reliability and risk, and the balance that 
must be achieved between these two factors when designing a maintenance strategy. 
The Department of Health's national guidance relating to the formation of a Trust's 
maintenance strategy issued in the year 2002 is discussed, and compared to that 
published in 1973. From this assessment it is shown that there has been no change in 
policy over the 30 intervening years, and that Trusts are free to create their own 
maintenance strategy to reflect local conditions and budgets. 
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The term 'maintenance' is examined and it is shown that it includes the managerial 
activities as well as the physical artisan tasks, thus forming a total system. The artisan 
tasks are then broken down into the two categories of reactive and planned preventative 
maintenance, and examples are given for each type. 
The use of computers within maintenance departments is shown to be widespread 
throughout the NHS, and that the NHS has abandoned the development of a centralised 
form of software, forcing Trust's to purchase commercial packages to assist in the 
management of their data needs. Thus as a consequence there is no national data bank 
containing quantitative records relating to maintenance activity, or offering plant reliability 
statistics. The use of simulation models of the past is shown to be of little practical use to 
the NHS maintenance manager, even though there have been various attempts to 
develop such a system over the years. 
The type of maintenance strategy to be adopted is considered, and an argument formed 
that shows that actuarial analysis relating to the relationship between plant and 
equipment operating age and failure is of little use to the NHS day-to-day maintenance 
manager. This then leads to the conclusion that the maintenance strategy should be 
targeted towards the system known as Reliability Centred Maintenance. 
The assumption that plant and equipment failures are totally independent of managerial 
failures is discussed, as is the research which has shown that the vast majority of 
incidents are caused through managerial decisions, actions and failures to act. This has 
focused the thesis to consider the risks associated with the day-to-day activities of 
managerial systems, as opposed to those being generated from the physical plant and 
equipment. 
Normal accident theory is discussed and the section concludes with the observation 
from its founder Perrow (1999) that the supporters of high reliability theory believe that if 
we tried harder we could overcome the proposed inevitability of accidents, and have a 
virtually accident free systems. This is in total contrast to normal accident theory, which 
states that, there will always be accidents due to the complex interaction between tightly 
coupled systems. Perrow also suggests that we need to examine organisations and 
systems that have not yet had accidents, in a similar manner that we would following an 
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accident. He states this in his belief that one would conclude that the system may well 
be just waiting for an accident to happen. 
The creation of a suitable managerial system is then debated along with the two main 
techniques used to assess the risks associated with such a design. From this two 
themes have emerged relating to normal day-to-day activities (Le. non-emergency). The 
first is the identification of the tipping point, where an organisation eventually fails to 
cope with an ever increasing workload, and the second is the need for monitoring/audit 
programs to be designed and implemented. A research model relating to an inherent 
failure of a management system due to the quantity of non-novel interruptions during 
normal day-to-day activities is examined. The Chapter then makes a parallel between 
the model's outputs and that of a typical NHS estates department. The designers of the 
model concluded their findings recommending that:-
Future research could be profitably focused on helping organisations assess their 
capacity to handle interruptions and develop systems to signal when the level of 
unresolved interruptions reaches a critical level. 
(Rudolph & Repenning 2002) 
It is then stated that this thesis will test the concept of this theoretical model against 
actual data from an NHS estates organisation. 
Finally the need for, and development of, an assurance framework is discussed, along 
with the call for an integrated monitoring and audit programme to be implemented. 
Chapter Three - Methodology 
From reference to a focus group populated by ten NHS Trust estates managers, eight 
engineering topics were highlighted, as these were believed to be posing the greatest 
unaddressed perceived risks. Research instruments were then designed to assess the 
perceived risks being generated from these topics as an integral part of the first research 
objective which was to develop and implement a robust, transparent and repeatable 
methodology to assess if the managerial systems of internal control within the National 
Health Service (NHS) give adequate assurance that the day-to-day building service 
engineering maintenance activities conform to their respective national guidelines. 
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The methodology employed consisted of a number of Trust specific multi-professional 
focus groups assessing their managerial conformance to the relevant national 
standards. Use was made of a series of utility functions in place of the NHS 5x5 
criticality grids in order to achieve greater repeatability of the groups' assessed risk 
scores. The output from each of the Trust's focus groups was the development of a risk 
profile. 
Focus was then centred on the salient criteria that were considered to influence the risk 
profiles produced. The corresponding methodologies used to reduce the negative effects 
of these criteria were also presented. Although the criteria were discussed as individual 
topics, in practice they were all interacting to create a similar effect, that of reducing the 
negative impact of the criteria to an insignificant value. 
Following the development of the risk profiles this Chapter then completed the second 
research objective to develop and implement a robust, transparent and repeatable 
methodology to assess the resource needs to correct the existing managerial system 
deficiencies to that required by their relevant National Health Service standard .. To 
tackle this, again Trust specific focus groups were formed to assess the managerial time 
and budget costs associated with each of the managerial gaps identified. The tools used 
to assist in these assessments employed industry standard Gant chart and Monte Carlo 
simUlation software. 
This led the research to develop a simulation program to address the third research 
objective to develop and implement a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to 
assess the directly employed artisan revenue resources needed to ensure that the 
maintenance activities conform to the National Health Service standards. In response, 
reference was made to the Literature Review chapter which discussed the research 
model developed by Rudolph and Repenning (2002), relating to an inherent failure of a 
management system due to the quantity of non-novel interruptions during normal day-to-
day activities, and a similarity was drawn between the model's outputs and that of a 
typical NHS estates department. It is then stated that this thesis would test the concept 
of this theoretical model against actual data from an NHS estates organisation, in order 
to predict the 'tipping point' of the department caused through a reduction of resources. 
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Before work began to gather the data necessary from Trusts to test the Rudolph and 
Repenning model, a number of assumptions were made that allowed the development of 
a simple estates model. This simple model was simulated using actual data for the 
planned preventative maintenance system with synthetic data to represent the reactive 
workload, which was based on the research of AI-Zubaidi and Christer (1997). The 
outputs from the simulation of the simplified estates model produced observations 
comparable to those of the original Rudolph and Repenning model. This gave 
confidence to the researcher to move the project forward by enhancing the software 
design and simulating a Trust's 'actual data'. 
Finally the Methodology Chapter covers the creation of, an assurance framework under 
the fourth research objective to develop a robust, transparent and repeatable 
methodology to monitor the day-to-day activities of the maintenance department in line 
with the requirements of the National Health Service standards. As discussed within the 
Literature Review chapter, following a call for an integrated monitoring and audit 
programme to be implemented. 
Five criteria are outlined within the Literature Research chapter that created a framework 
around which the monitoring system had to be designed. In summary the criteria 
required that the system must conform to international and national standards, reference 
mainstream academic theory, employ existing hierarchal staffing structures, job 
descriptions and software, be applicable to a multi-professional team and be revenue 
neutral against existing budgets. 
The methodology presented for this fourth research objective conformed to all of the five 
criteria outlined above. This was achieved by the design of a 'driver' to push a common 
'generic framework', which employed standard operational performance management 
techniques. The output of the process was a qualitative assessment of the maintenance 
department's efficiency and quality towards supporting the Trust in achieving its 
objective goals. This was presented as a series of performance index profiles against a 
base period, showing the actual achievement against a target value. 
The introduction of the monitoring process into a department was designed to follow 
typical project management techniques. As each Trust and estates department differs in 
6 
their organisational structure, reporting arrangements and managerial systems, only a 
generic approach could be presented within this Methodology Chapter, as each project 
must be tailored to cater for each situation. 
Chapter Four - Results 
The methodology and subsequent results naturally split into the creation of four 
disparate research objectives each with an accompanying results section. From the 31 
Trusts taking part in this research the results from the first research objective created 
demonstrable proof that there was a systematic failure of these organisations to conform 
to the recognised NHS national engineering standards. The results uncovered previously 
unknown latent conditions that were exposing the Trust, staff, public, patients and 
stakeholders to substantial/intolerable levels of risk. 
The results from the second research objective identified in detail the resources (man-
power, costs and timeframes) needed to close the managerial gaps identified within the 
first research objective. This information allowed the 31 Trusts (in all cases) to allocate 
their limited resources to 'where they would do most good'; and to project manage the 
closure of the gaps against a pre-agreed timeframe and budget allocation. 
The results from the third research objective were created by simulating Trust specific 
data to assess the effects of varying resource allocations against subsequent 
estimations of generated risk. This allowed the senior managers within each Trust to 
judge what resources they considered appropriate to allocate to their local maintenance 
needs, when balanced against other cost/risk pressures within their organisations as a 
whole. 
Due to the time constraints imposed on this research programme there are no results 
presented from the fourth research objective, that show the effects of the development, 
design, implementation and maintenance of the monitoring regime developed as part of 
this thesis. 
Chapter Five - Discussion 
This Chapter considers the research cited within the Literature Search Chapter, the 
techniques employed as created within the Methodology Chapter, and the robustness of 
the outcomes as tested within the Results Chapter. Following the successful analysis, 
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discussion and conclusion of the procedures the researcher then summarises the 
findings. 
The output from the first research objective was shown to uncover previously unknown 
latent gaps within the managerial systems. In some cases these gaps were judged by 
the relevant Trust senior managers to be generating serious/intolerable levels of risk to 
their organisations, patients, public, staff and stakeholders. The output from this 
objective allowed the Trusts to refocus their limited resources to 'where they would do 
most good', Testimony to the value of this output was received by the Trusts requesting 
follow up studies to confirm progress in closing the gaps, and through national 
recognition and publication. 
The second research objective outputs estimated the resources needed to close the 
managerial gaps identified. This gave a budget expenditure and risk reduction profile 
against a time line with which to project manage the closure of the managerial failings. 
The third research objective outputs allowed the Trusts to determine what revenue 
resources were needed to keep the risks associated with maintenance to an acceptable 
level. As a direct consequence of this research, it is now possible for the first time in the 
60 year history of the NHS for evidence to be shown of the consequences of varying 
resource in terms of the effects on risk. 
The simulation model specifically developed for this shows that even for reasonably 
resourced organisation, peaks of risk naturally occurred within the red and amber zones 
with respect to time. This suggested that maintenance revenue budgets should be 
variable and not fixed year-on-year. The sensitivity of the simulation model was tested 
and this demonstrated that only negligible effects were experienced by: the use of 
interpolation in place of integration within the simulation software to speed its design; the 
sensitivity of the probability utility to the focus groups being particularly risk adverse; and 
the focus groups' judgement in assessing the ratio differences between the impact 
descriptors. 
This research instrument also questioned if the simulation models created could be 
'reverse engineered', to assess the trade group resource needs of a Trust if they had no 
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reliable raw data. This led to the development and use of synthetic data for available 
man-hours and reactive hours, and showed that it was possible to produce reasonable 
results from such information to within small tolerance limits of accuracy, when 
compared against actual values derived from original data. 
The fourth research objective output which was designed to monitor the day-to-day 
managerial activities was not discussed in depth within the Chapter, as it was not 
possible to implement the methodology into a Trust within the acceptable time scale of 
this research programme. 
Chapter Six - Conclusions 
In this Chapter the whole research programme is summarised by stating that the main 
research question of this Thesis has been answered, and that from the 31 healthcare 
organisations analysed the results of this research conclusively show that, not one had 
an adequate managerial system of internal control to identify their estate department's 
non-conformances to national standards, and in all cases each Trust's own senior 
managers arising from multi-professional focus groups considered that the previously 
unknown systematic failings of their governance systems were exposing their 
organisation, patients, staff, public and stakeholders to substantial/ intolerable risk. 
The Chapter then reviews the outputs from each of the research instruments specifically 
developed for each of the four research objectives, and discusses their novel academic 
contribution. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the history of the National Health Service (NHS) from its creation in 
1948 to the present day, mapped in ten year timeframes. Included within this is a 
discussion relating to the government's strategy to assess the performance of the NHS 
against its conformance to national standards. 
1.2 The first four decades 
The history of the National Health Service (NHS) within the United Kingdom began with 
its formation in the year 1948 (see figure 1 over page) (The National Health Service 
2009). Before this the poor went without comprehensive medical treatment, and relied 
on charity or home remedies. Some workers (but not their families) had access to 
doctors, but the great majority of hospitals charged for their services. In the 19th century 
social reformers tried to give free medical care to the poor, but the demand for these 
services outstripped the limited charitable resources. Local authorities of large towns 
created municipal hospitals as well as hospitals specializing in maternity, infectious 
diseases, care of the elderly, the mentally ill and those suffering from a mental handicap. 
The mentally ill were locked inside institutions and housed in appalling conditions. Many 
of the elderly who could no longer look after themselves were placed into Victorian 
workhouses. Following the Second World War, on the 5th July 1948, the NHS was 
created in a country where food was rationed, the economy was in crisis and there were 
shortages of building materials and fuel. The founding fathers of the NHS predicted that 
'expectations would always exceed capacity', and as such the Service must always be in 
a state of constant flux. Their foresight proved to be correct as in administration terms it 
was found to be impossible to predict the day-to-day costs of this new Service as the 
demand rose, along with medical technology and consumer expectations. Inevitably the 
cost of the NHS began to exceed the initial estimates. In the second decade of its history 
(1958 - 1967) the NHS began to improve its management systems. Data in the form of 
Hospital Activity Analysis was developed to produce patient-based information. 
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Figure 1 The six decades of the 
NHS 
1948 NHS formed 
1958 
Major 
rebuilding 
program 
Hospital 
activity 
analysis data 
created 
1968 
Rise in new medical 
techniques 
Strategic planning 
introduced 
Estmancode 
published 
1978 
Medical techniques 
outstripped resources 
Performance indicators 
introduced 
Overspends, wards closed , 
waiting lists increased 
1988 
Introduction of 
internal market 
Controls Assurance introduced 
Labour government 
elected, internal 
market abolished 
1998 
Information strategy 
developed 
Corporate governance 
adopted 
Publication of An 
organisation with a memory 
Health Care Standards Unit 
formed 
2008 
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Alongside this, various reports were 
produced that covered numerous topics 
within the Service, ranging from medical 
staffing structures to the creation of 
major rebuilding programs to replace the 
war-torn and outdated health care 
buildings. A common trait within the 
reports was the acknowledgement of the 
complexity of the organisation and the 
need for constant change. 
The third decade (1968 - 1977) of the 
NHS witnessed a continuing rise in the 
use of new medical techniques such as: 
endoscopy and CAT (Computerised 
Axial Tomography) scanning, kidney 
transplants and further developments in 
the field of drugs. New hospitals were 
brought into use to provide more 
centralised specialist services and local 
facilities . Debate continued to question 
how the NHS should be managed and 
organised. Managerial techniques such 
as strategic planning, long-range 
forecasts and reallocation began to 
emerge. 
It was during this decade that the NHS 
recognised that very few types of public 
buildings suffered the continuous 
occupation and high degree of wear and 
tear of hospitals and other healthcare 
buildings. 
This problem was compounded with the need for these buildings to be maintained with 
minimum effects on their occupants, and disruption to clinical procedures. Therefore 
during this decade the NHS published a document entitled Estmancode. This guidance 
for the first time gave a national framework around which maintenance could be 
systematically planned and introduced into the service (Department of Health and Social 
Security 1973). The document stated that the main objective of the maintenance 
organisation was: -
The efficient and economical conservation of the National Health Service estate, 
subject to the overall needs of the service and the social constraints imposed on 
the National Health Service.' 
Estmancode, 
Chapter 1, Section 1, paragraph 3.1.1, 
July 1973. 
The national code introduced the then new concept of reactive and planned preventative 
maintenance into the service for the first time. reactive maintenance was the repair of 
the random breakdown of plant and equipment e.g. the replacement of light bulbs, repair 
of dripping taps, etc. planned preventative maintenance on the other hand was the pre-
planned and agreed examination, checking and testing of a building's infrastructure. This 
preventative type of maintenance was developed with the specific aim of reducing 
random breakdowns and subsequent disruption to clinical activity, and to extend the 
working life of the installations. 
The guidance also introduced the concept of Quality Control into the maintenance 
management function. This inherently focused attention onto developing frameworks for 
reviewing maintenance performance. Bi-annual returns to the NHS Headquarters were 
required, that were designed to show the extent of the planned preventative engineering 
maintenance schemes, as an indication of the maintenance effectiveness being 
achieved in each health premises. In this way the performance of each 
Region/Area/District could be judged according to the workload covered by planned 
preventative maintenance and their relative position in a 'league table' (Estmancode 
1973 paragraph 2.2.1.1). Additional information relating to the maintenance function was 
accessed from reference to the national self financing engineering incentive scheme 
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(commonly referred to as the bonus scheme) operated across all NHS engineering 
departments (National Performance Advisory Group 1997). 
The fourth decade (1978 - 1987) acknowledged that medical techniques had outstripped 
the available resources and that the NHS could not do everything that was now possible 
or expected (The National Health Service 2009). The medical advances by now covered 
all areas of NHS activity. For example, genetic engineering was developing its first 
drugs, magnetic resonance imaging was provided, and the number of orthopaedic 
operations along with heart and liver transplants rose rapidly. 
Clinical budgeting was introduced with a realisation that better information was needed, 
therefore performance indicators were developed. Audit began to examine the rising 
costs following international concern over the costs of anaesthesia and surgery. By the 
close of the decade some health authorities had overspent their budget, hospital wards 
were being reduced, and waiting lists were increasing in length. 
1.3 The fifth decade 
The fifth decade (1988 - 1997) saw the introduction of the internal market within the 
Service. This split the NHS into 'purchasers' and 'providers' (The National Health 
Service 2009). Purchasers were health authorities and some family doctors. These 
organisations commissioned medical services from the providers, where the providers 
were: the acute hospitals, organisations providing care for the mentally ill, people with 
learning disabilities and the elderly, along with ambulance services. Providers became 
NHS Trusts with their own independent organisations and management structures. 
These organisations were in the main developed by splitting the former Areas and 
Districts into small independent statutory bodies. 
The internal market created competition between Trusts as they bid against each other, 
thus improving cost consciousness within the NHS. As the engineering workforce was 
now split into Trusts as opposed to large Areas/Districts, the national incentive schemes 
(bonus schemes) were in the majority of cases disbanded. From discussions between 
the author and a number of Trust estates managers they state that this was done as a 
cost cutting measure and because of the inability for each independent Trust scheme to 
be self financing, partly due to the small numbers of engineering staff within each Trust. 
This stopped at a stroke any form of cooperation between engineering departments in 
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Trusts to compare maintenance strategies, notes, figures etc. Trusts were left to manage 
their own affairs. 
Following the Cad bury Report (Cadbury 1992) a system called 'controls assurance' was 
introduced into the NHS in 1996. It was initiated to improve the internal controls 
(including the process of audit) throughout the organisation as a single initiative 
(Scrivens 2005 p95). In order to underpin these developments the Australian and New 
Zealand definition of risk management was adopted, which was defined as, 'the culture 
processes and structures that are directed towards the effective management of 
potential opportunities and adverse effects' (Standards Australia and Standards New 
Zealand 2004). Thus any control system should therefore focus on behaviour rather than 
on outcomes (Scrivens 2005 p 116). 
Following the British general election in 1997 a new government was formed that 
pledged to abolish the internal market, but to keep that which was seen to work well. The 
government of the day published a white paper through the Department of Health 
entitled 'The New NHS. Modern Dependable' (Department of Health 1997). This 
encouraged partnership driven by performance, thus moving away from competition to 
collaboration. The white paper was based on six key principles, these are listed below: -
1. To renew the NHS as a genuinely national service, offering fair access to 
consistently high quality, prompt and accessible services right across the 
country. 
2. To make the delivery of healthcare against these new national standards a 
matter of local responsibility, with local doctors and nurses in the driving seat in 
shaping services. 
3. To get the NHS to work in partnership, breaking down organizational barriers and 
forging stronger links with local authorities; 
4. To drive efficiency through a more rigorous approach to performance, cutting 
bureaucracy to maximize every pound spent in the NHS for the care of patients; 
5. To shift focus into quality of care so that excellence would be guaranteed to all 
patients, with quality the driving force for decision-making at every level of the 
service; 
6. To rebuild public confidence in the NHS as a public service, accountable to 
patients, open to the public and shaped by their views. 
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1.4 The sixth decade 
The decade (1998 - 2007) began with the publication in September 1998 of: Information 
for Health: An Information Strategy for the Modern NHS' (Department of Health 1998) 
(The National Health Service 2009). This document introduced a strategic approach to 
the use of information technology. These Trust Boards were now faced with information 
overload from their respective departments, and had to find ways to separate those risks 
that would affect the organisation as a whole, and those that were significant at a local 
(departmental) level. 
Documentation was issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants (The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 1999a), that related to 'Corporate Governance' and gave 
guidance for the internal control requirements of an organisation. It reinforced the 
principle that all controls should be subject to review. There have been various attempts 
to define the term Corporate Governance (Encycogov.com 2002), essentially it is 
intended to secure and motivate the efficient management of organisations for the 
betterment of its stakeholders and society as a whole. The Audit Office defines corporate 
governance as the bringing together of the topics of accountability, leadership, control 
and objectives (Audit Commission 2003). 
Turnbull expected that a Trust Board should have an organisational wide view of the 
effectiveness of their internal control and publish their findings to their stakeholders. 
From this concept risks would be managed throughout the organisation and the Board 
would be informed of these issues and their control in what has become known as 
organisation-wide or enterprise-wide risk management. For this to function, risk 
management and internal control systems have to be entrenched throughout an 
organisation. 
A further report observed that focusing on too many risks could hide the significance of 
the key risks. The report stressed that there needs to be a single integrated risk 
management system that combines both the operational day-to-day risks with those of a 
strategic nature (The Institute of Chartered Accountants 1999b). Also the cost benefit 
considerations of the managerial system must be considered during its design, to ensure 
that the system costs are in proportion to the risks that it is controlling. 
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In the year 2000 the Department of Health published a document (Department of Health 
2000) which was a report by an expert group chaired by the Chief Medical Officer, 
advising the NHS (and others) to learn from adverse events within the organisation. The 
report described the poor systems that were in place to prevent serious incidents or 
occurrences; and stated that the position was such that: -
.:. Some failures were avoidable . 
• :. Untoward events which could be prevented recur, sometimes with 
devastating consequences . 
• :. Incidents which result in lapses in standards of care in one or more health 
organisations do not reliably lead to corrections throughout the NHS . 
• :. Circumstances that predispose to failure, and which if addressed could allow 
risks to be minimised, are not well recognised. 
The report then listed the estimated cost of these failures within seven statistically based 
statements. These are reproduced below:-
1. Research suggests that an estimated 850,000 (range 300,000 to 1.4 million) 
adverse events might occur each year in the NHS hospital sector, resulting in a 
£2 billion direct cost in additional hospital days alone; some adverse events will 
be inevitable complications of treatment but around half might be avoidable. 
2. The NHS paid out around £400 million in clinical litigation settlements in the 
financial year 1998/99 and has a potential liability of around £2.4 billion from 
existing and expected claims; when analysed many cases of litigation show 
potentially avoidable causes. 
3. There were over 38,000 complaints about all aspects of Family Health Services 
during 1998-99, and nearly 28,000 written complaints about aspects of clinical 
treatment in hospitals alone. 
4. At least 13 patients have died or been paralysed since 1985 because a drug has 
been wrongly administered by spinal injection. 
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5. Over 6,600 adverse incidents involving medical devices were reported to the 
Medical Devices Agency in 1999, including 87 deaths and 345 serious injuries. 
6. Experience from the serious incident reporting system run by one of the NHS 
Executive's Regional Officers suggests that nationally at least 2,500 adverse 
events a year occur which should be serious enough to register on such 
systems. 
7. The costs to the NHS of hospital acquired infections have been estimated at 
nearly £1 billion a year, and around 15% of cases are regarded as preventable. 
These figures relate to failures within the secondary care sector (e.g. hospitals); the 
expert group did not know the frequency or nature of similar failings within primary care 
(e.g. community services, GP practices etc). The report produced various tables of 
information but concluded by suggesting that: 
.. ... nationally the costs to the NHS of extended hospital stays as a result of 
adverse events could be as high as a further £2 billion a year - five times the 
cost of clinical negligence litigation. 
This estimation of cost did not take into account the human cost of the pain, suffering, 
trauma (both physical and psychological) of patients and their families, nor trauma to the 
staff involved. The report draws a number of conclusions, three of which are reproduced 
below: -
1. Information on the frequency and nature of adverse events in the NHS is patchy 
and can do no more than give an impression of the problem. Information from 
primary care is particularly lacking; 
2. There is evidence of a range of different kinds of failure, and of the recurrence of 
identical incidents or incidents with similar root causes; 
3. Case studies highlight the consequences of weaknesses in the ability of the NHS 
as a system to learn from serious adverse events; 
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The report goes on to state that research within the non-health care sectors has shown 
that for most unintentional failures there is a complex interaction between numerous 
topics, including human behaviour, technology, socio-cultural factors, organisational and 
procedural weaknesses (Department of Health 2000). It further stated that similar 
studies in the healthcare field were sparse, but that the available evidence suggested 
that a similar pattern of cause and effect relationships existed. 
The report recommended a system approach as opposed to a person-centred 
methodology to analyse and reduce failure, not concentrating upon the human error as 
the main cause, but taking a holistic view of the elements surrounding an incident. This 
recognises that human error is influenced by 'upstream' systematic factors that include 
an organisation's managerial processes and culture towards risk management. 
The introduction of humans into a managerial system can generate either an active 
failure or latent conditions, (Reason 1990) where active failures are caused by people's 
actions or inactions in carrying out work. These latent conditions lie dormant until 
combined through a set of circumstances to create the condition for a failure to manifest. 
These latent conditions are created by organisational and managerial systems and 
strategies. Unlike active failures, latent conditions are always present, and can be readily 
identified and removed. Attempts to deal with these issues can go to the heart of an 
organisation's culture, and some managers' personal values, beliefs, etc. Included within 
the report is also criticism of the NHS in relation to its ability to remember lessons learnt 
from past failures (Department of Health 2000). 
1.4.1 Development and Conformance to National Standards 
In order to develop a common approach that would eventually lead to an equal quality of 
service to the patient across the country, as opposed to a 'post code lottery' of care, the 
government stated that it was their job to set national standards that the service must 
comply with. 
It was anticipated (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit Report 2002) that the focus on strategic 
risk would naturally evolve over time as the operational risks were identified, managed 
and reduced. In line with the Turnbull report the Department of Health required that 
Trusts sign a Statement of Internal Control that was to be produced alongside the 
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accounts of the Trust. To assist Trusts to complete their Statement of Internal Control 
the NHS produced two guides in the form of a framework (Department of Health 
2002)(Department of Health 2003) These gave guidance to Boards on a method of 
demonstrating that they have been correctly informed regarding the totality of their 
clinical and non-clinical risks. It is the Board that is responsible for a Trust's system of 
internal control. Therefore it is the Board that sets the appropriate policies, and it is the 
Board that must seek regular assurance that the systems are functioning correctly. 
Thus a Board must establish (and focus on) their main objectives in both an overall 
strategic direction and for each directorate. Then they must identify the main risks that 
could threaten their achievement. Having completed these tasks the design of their 
managerial system must be undertaken that would control and manage these main risks. 
After performing these high level tasks, the system of internal control must be embedded 
into the Trust's day-to-day operational activities and form part of the culture of the 
organisation. In this way behaviour is changed at all levels throughout the Trust, and 
there is less need for a plethora of controls to be forced onto operational managers (The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants 1999a p 19 and p 30). 
Regulation is important within any society or organisation as it provides the scaffold 
through statute or guidance, within which public sector organisations including the NHS 
operate. Inspection, audit and the day-to-day monitoring functions provide assurance to 
the organisations senior managers and the public at large that the minimum standards 
are met. As such these three methods provide information relating to the levels of 
performance of an organisation's processes. This knowledge in turn helps to inform 
managers at all levels of their process efficiencies and overall effectiveness towards 
meeting their organisation's strategic aims and objectives. By feeding this data back into 
the policy makers forum, it helps to influence and guide revisions to the original 
regulations. 
In 2003 the Audit commission published a further document discussing Corporate 
Governance. It stated that at the heart of many public service failures was poor 
corporate governance. The aim of the document was to investigate the relationship 
between the: 'quality of corporate governance arrangements in public sector 
organisations and the quality of services that they provide (Audit Commission 2003). 
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The report splits the elements of corporate governance into soft and hard systems. The 
soft areas are effective leadership and high standards of behaviour; whereas the hard 
areas are robust systems and processes. The commission goes on to argue that there is 
a direct relationship between organisations that have good corporate governance, and 
their ability to provide high quality services and deliver improvement. And that poor 
corporate governance creates serious service and financial failures. They then open the 
discussion into the areas of the social responsibility of organisations, the debate 
surrounding corporate manslaughter and the loss of public trust following an incident. It 
goes on to cite the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) where this organisation 
found that, in a third of the organisations CHI had reviewed, there was a 'Iack-of-
connection', between the policies that the board had approved. and what was actually 
happening in the wards, departments, etc. 
The report then considers how regulation, inspection and audit contribute to the quality 
of corporate governance, in terms of decision making and information management, 
particularly focusing (in part) on the NHS. Recognition is given that the NHS has issued 
numerous guidance documents and promoted a programme of controls assurance. But 
still there is poor quality in relation to the information available and remains one of the 
key governance risks that the NHS has to overcome, before it can provide a robust basis 
for decision making. And that this was compounded by Trust boards not asking the 
correct questions, as the vast array of data was not always presented in a way that was 
meaningful to the organisation. This lack of clarity underpinning the decision making 
processes was not assisting in achieving effective accountability. And that most auditors 
reported a lack of confidence in the reliability and accuracy of the information reported. 
The report claims that this was found to be so badly managed that in 2002 CHI urged 
that action was taken in 198 published clinical governance inspections, as they found 
(amongst other issues) that half of the boards did not receive information from service 
activities. 
1.4.2 Inspection 
The role of inspection is discussed as it provides a framework to help ensure that 
minimum acceptable standards are met. This is an important part of the accountability 
process as it provides information (evidence) to boards, public and stakeholders. One of 
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the problems that the NHS is facing is the plethora of external agencies requiring 
information for their audit/inspection needs, Hence the call for integrated audit 
approaches. Also counterproductive is the centralist command, control and target setting 
culture. But the report recognises that total delegation to the 'coal face' is unrealistic 
therefore a compromise must be reached. 
The report goes on to state that: 'Such assessments will become even more important 
as new organisations , such as foundation hospitals and children's Trusts are created 
and new public-private partnerships are entered into'. And that common governance 
challenges are the effective use of information together with the balance between local 
and national priorities, but that the infrastructure to deliver this is within a highly complex 
and taxing environment. Therefore, inspection needs to be integrated into a common 
coherent framework to create clearer accountability and greater assurance. These 
inspections must alert organisations not only to the judgments relating to past 
performance, but also to likely future events and the impact of problems that they will 
probably face. Together risk management techniques and internal control of managerial 
processes provide assurance to an organisation's managers that their objectives will be 
achieved (or not). These comments by the national audit office follow their observations 
that the financial position within the NHS is an area of great risk and that auditors 
continue to be concerned with the poor links between financial, management and 
service planning. Also performance management was identified as a risk for more than 
four in five health bodies. 
1.4.3 Monitoring 
Within NHS Trusts the creation of an audit committee is a statutory requirement. 
Underpinning this should be an assurance framework that allows for service 
commissioning, health inequalities, service provision, financial balance, partnership 
working, core standards, performance targets, developmental standards, workforce, 
patient involvement and effective governance. This should be complemented with 
escalation procedures for each performance level should they be breached. Thus a 
detailed assurance framework should be in place for each of the Trust's strategic 
objectives linked to a resource plan, with a named individual held accountable for its 
delivery. The Trust should also have in place a risk register for strategic and 
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departmental level risks leading to the creation of an overall Trust risk profile. This 
should be accompanied by action plans to manage these identified problems. 
All of the above should form part of a Trust Risk Management strategy that engages the 
service uses, which ultimately are the stakeholders. The strategy should describe how 
the risks are identified, evaluated and managed in a structured way. From the various 
processes and committees within the Trust, there should be a reporting line through to 
eventually the Trust board. 
1.4.4 Failure of good governance 
The Audit Commission document goes on to discuss various inquiry reports, which show 
that poor governance arrangements, systems and processes failed to detect or 
anticipate service failures. The report cites various, 'warning signs', and that it was from 
an ignorance of these alarms that a number of serious service failures have occurred. 
These warning were in relation to: 
.:. Poor leadership 
The leadership of an organisation sets the 'tone' of the governance culture be it 'bad' 
or 'good'. Bad leaders create an air of self-delusion and can sometimes deliberately 
misrepresent information . 
• :. Poor information 
Information was accepted as being correct and was not challenged by management, 
this led to flawed decision making . 
• :. Lack of clarity 
Accountability arrangements were unclear and therefore weak. Policies, staff 
performance, unprofessional practice, etc were allowed to persist unchecked . 
• :. Poor working relationships 
These were exasperated by ineffective communication between professional groups 
across organisations supported by poor organisational structures. 
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.:. Closed culture 
These consisted of inward focusing organisations with often hostile relationships with 
external departments/groups, which did not keep up-to-date with recent 
developments and did not adopt new working practices or techniques. 
Corporate governance has been described as the brain and nervous system of an 
organisation, which when working well receives and generates information, which in turn 
enables action to be taken to anticipate danger, move to a more secure environment, 
learn from the experience and to progress forward. Systems that are not working well do 
not survive in nature and are eliminated. In designing a Trust's internal control methods 
HM Treasury suggested an appropriate managerial tool was to firstly identify its risks by 
either commissioning a risk review or undertaking a risk self assessment (HM Treasury 
2004). 
The foregoing led to the founding of the Health Care Standards Support Unit in 2004 to 
provide support to the then new Department of Health initiative on standards. Ellie 
Scrivens (Professor of Health Policy at Keele University) was appointed as the Director 
of Health Care Standards Unit for the Department of Health (DOH) to advise the DOH 
and NHS on standards development and use. With the creation of the Health Care 
Commission a new set of standards was developed. These were unusual in that they 
described the elements of a health care system as opposed to specifying a set of 
processes. They focused on the key mechanisms for safe healthcare, e.g. clinically 
effective; patient centred healthcare; good governance and accessible and responsive 
care. The standards were developed to reflect policy but also to allow for local conditions 
and constraints to be considered in their compliance and delivery (Scrivens p 123). 
1.4.5 Creation of an Assurance Framework 
Therefore fundamental to improving care is the development of robust managerial 
systems designed, implemented and monitored (audited) by multi-disciplinary teams. 
This can only be achieved by project teams that have been specifically trained in the 
various managerial techniques needed for the task, and who are led by competent 
managers capable of operating across customary departmental boundaries. When this is 
done then errors (latent conditions) will be uncovered. When these gaps in the 
managerial systems combine, they can produce a catastrophic incident. Therefore these 
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gaps must be identified, graded for severity and systematically closed across the whole 
system for such events to be avoided. 
As control exists to reduce risk to an acceptable level, then it is necessary for an 
organisation's operational procedure to control its managerial systems. For assurance 
that these systems are adequate and working it is necessary that they are audited. The 
driving force behind the recent approaches to audit has been the desire to design a 
method that systematically appraises the whole system of an organisation. This includes 
both the formalised policies and procedures, and the informal norms of behaviour. 
Therefore Boards and their internal auditors are charged with establishing if their control 
systems are effective in order to give the required assurance to their stakeholders (NHS 
Audit Committee 2005). 
In complex organisations such as NHS Trusts, the senior managers of a Board cannot 
know all of the processes and procedures practiced by the various departments. 
Therefore robust and transparent managerial systems (controls) must be developed, 
implemented and audited so that the Board can demonstrate that they are achieving 
their objectives to the required national standard, in a robust and continuous process. It 
is these systems that provide the assurance that a Board is doing its 'reasonable best'. 
In attempting to define the statement 'reasonable best' this thesis recommends that 
reference could be made to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007 that came into force on Sunday 6th April 2008 (Parliament 2007) Currently there is 
much discussion within the legal profession and industry itself concerning the impact that 
the new Act will have, and the way the courts will interpret what is reasonable. It is too 
early to quote any case law as guidance; therefore discussion must rely on past 
experience with existing legislation. 
The new Bill significantly departs from the old law relating to corporate manslaughter; it 
looks at the collective responsibility of Trust's senior managers in place of attempting to 
identify a single individual responsible for the killing; thus overcoming some of the major 
failings of the old legalisation. Also it focuses on the governance of the day-to-day 
operational practices of the Trust's managerial systems. 
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The problem for the NHS is that (from its own figures) as an organisation it is 
responsible for approximately 15,000 deaths/year associated with an annual bill of £2b, 
most of which is considered to be preventable if good managerial systems of 
governance were in place (Department of Health 2000). As the responsibility for a 
Trust's managerial systems rests very firmly on the shoulders of its senior managers, it 
is probable that these people will be at direct risk of prosecution. 
1.4.6 Need for reform 
In the past, in order to prosecute a large company with complex management structures 
it was necessary to identify an individual at the top of the company's management 
organization that could be shown to have a 'directing mind', i.e. a person who embodies 
the company in their actions and decisions. This was known as the 'identification 
principle'. Only when this person could be identified and were themselves guilty of 
manslaughter, could a company be successfully prosecuted. It has been the 
identification principle that has led to the lack of successful prosecutions against large 
organisations. 
The new Bill removes the need of the 'identification principle' to secure a conviction, by 
replacing it with a focus on the collective management failures at a senior level within a 
company. The new offence relates to the failures in the way that the organisation has 
been managed or organised, referred to as 'management failure'. This places the 
spotlight on the working policies and practices of the company as opposed to an 
individual acting negligently. The offence is designed to reflect the corporate failings by 
the senior managers (either individually or collectively) in relation to risk across the 
organisation as a whole, rather than concentrate on local issues. 
As the offence is based on what an organisation has failed to do, the Bill gives a 
framework that allows it to be assessed against national standards, and a decision taken 
regarding the actions of its senior managers. It is this management failure that lies at the 
core of the Bill. This is interpreted as meaning that organisations are not liable under 
these proposals for the unpredictable rogue activities of its employees, or operational 
negligence causing death, but in the way that particular activities were managed and/or 
organised. 
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Where an organisation is found guilty of corporate manslaughter, individuals could also 
be prosecuted under existing health and safety law. 
1.4.7 The offence 
Section 1 (1) of the act states that a Trust would be would be, guilty of an offence if the 
way in which its activities are managed or organised: 
(a) causes a person's death, and 
(b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to 
the deceased. 
The offence is targeted at the most senior managers of an organisation who play a 
strategic role as opposed to those managers at the more junior levels as defined within 
the Act in section 1 (4) (c). The definition of a senior manager relates to a person that 
makes decisions regarding the organisation as a whole or substantial part of it, and 
plays a significant role. The word 'significant' captures those in a decisive or influential 
position, rather than a minor or supporting role. This research regards an Estates 
Manager as such a senior person, as they have managerial authority and take decisions 
over multi-million pound budgets, and are technically responsible for their departments. 
A major contributor to this definition when applied to an individual would be from 
reference to their job description (McShee 2007). 
The offence is only to be applied in cases where 'gross failure' that causes death is 
proved. The term 'gross failure', is defined in terms of conduct that 'falls far below' what 
can reasonably be expected in the circumstances. It is not the intention of the bill to be 
used against organisations that are making proper efforts to operate in a reasonable 
manner where appropriate standards have not quite been met. This meaning is 
addressed within section 2 of the Act and explicitly includes reference to the subject of 
'construction' or 'maintenance operations'. 
In deciding if the breach of a 'duty of care' was a gross breach and that an organisation's 
conduct fell far below what could be reasonably be expected in the circumstances, a jury 
would be expected to consider two main issues. Firstly, how serious the failure was, and 
secondly, how much of a risk of death the Trust's failure posed. The jury may also 
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consider the culture of the organisation and its policies and working practices from 
reference to section 8(3) of the Act. McShee (2007) argues that the definition within the 
Act causes concern, as it leaves the jury to assess corporate culture which is subjective 
and not definitive. 
1.4.8 NHS standards/working practices 
The Healthcare Commission has issued a series of core and developmental standards 
that NHS Trusts will be assessed against. These audits are designed to act as an annual 
health check to assist in answering two questions: -
1. Is the organisation getting the basics right? 
2. Is it making and sustaining progress? 
At first sight, it would appear that if a Trust were charged with corporate manslaughter, 
then a reasonable defence would be to cite the Healthcare Commissions audit results. 
The problem with such an argument is that: the two questions are (by necessity) part of 
a very high level assessment of an organisation that is a statutory body in its own right. 
A Trust's results form part of a nation wide exercise to inform central government 
agencies in relation to strategic NHS policy at a national level. 
Thus; they do not probe deeply into the detailed operational policies and procedures that 
are actually being practiced on a day-by-day basis by the Trust's staff. In order to 
answer the Healthcare Commission's two questions their approach is based on the 
central principle that (quote): "it is the responsibility of Trust boards to satisfy themselves 
that they are meeting the core standards and, where this is not happening to take 
appropriate steps to correct the situation". 
In a similar way, the NHS Litigation Authority has issued a set of clinical standards that 
Trusts should follow (NHS Litigation Authority 2008). Whilst these standards tend to be 
more operationally biased in their structure, they are never the less still generic 
overviews of what is desirable. Therefore in a similar manner, relying on the defence of 
conformance to these clinical requirements on there own will still not demonstrate the 
detailed day-to-day actual operational practices and culture of an organisation. Similarly 
the now redundant Controls Assurance Risk Management Standards were only a high 
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level guide, that needed detailed assessments to unpin there respective levels of 
compliance statements. 
This Thesis suggests that citing either/or both the Health Commission's and/or NHS 
Litigation Authority's audits as a defence would be unacceptable, as they are not 
designed to uncover the latent conditions within a Trust's day-to-day managerial 
systems that are generating unacceptable levels of risk. The only true measure of 
compliance is the detailed review of the operational systems when compared to the 
national codes of practice for each task or group of related tasks within each 
department. It is this type of evaluation that managers of all grades are fundamentally 
employed to undertake, not as part of an annual audit, but on a constant day-to-day 
basis. 
Any gaps within the managerial systems must be assessed in terms of severity as part 
of a multi-disciplinary approach, resource needs estimated to close the gaps both 
immediately and ongoing revenue consequences and, the results conveyed up to the 
senior managers of the Trust, on a periodic basis. Accompanying this must be 
reasonable proof that: given the deficiencies within the management systems, the 
operational and senior managers are putting their existing limited resources to where 
they are doing most good. 
If an organisation cannot demonstrate this level of commitment to the identification, 
prioritisation, management and audit to this level of detail then, this Thesis suggests that 
accusations of both 'gross failure' along with conduct that 'falls far below' what can 
reasonably be expected are likely to be made against the organisations senior 
managers. Therefore section 8 would appear to be indefensible in these cases. 
Assuming that a Trust was following the national standards of good governance as 
promoted by government and NHS stakeholders (the general public), the Board and 
other senior managers within the organisation should: know of the organisation's failure 
to comply with legislation or guidance, and be aware of the impact posed by the failure 
to comply. Scrivens openly implies throughout her book, 'that there is still much work to 
be done before the NHS can with comfort and confidence state that it is conforming to 
systems of good governance' (Scrivens 2005). Within her recent book, for which she has 
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received the internationally recognised Baxter Award (Keele University 2005) for an 
outstanding publication and/or practical contribution to excellence in healthcare 
management in Europe, her closing sentence calls for greater research into audit and 
inspection (Scrivens 2005 p164). The remainder of this thesis will serve to uphold this 
view. 
In February 2006 a handbook was published by the Department, to ensure that the basic 
building blocks of integrated governance were in place for implementation and roll-out 
between 2006 and 2008 (Department of Health 2006). The handbook confirmed that 
integrated governance did not supersede clinical, financial or any other governance but 
highlighted their importance, inter-dependence and inter-connectivity by acting to co-
ordinate all governance domains. The thrust of the handbook is to define the rolls of 
executive and non-executive directors of Trusts, and the various committees that serve 
the Trust Board. Central to the strategy is the design, implementation and management 
of a robust and transparent Assurance Framework. 
1.5 The research question 
The Department of Health issued a report that highlighted the inadequacies of the 
systems of internal control within the NHS (Department of Health 2000). Although the 
report did not make direct reference to any managerial failures within NHS maintenance 
departments, the document was published against a backdrop of the research work of 
Perrow into why managerial systems fail and the numerous high profile engineering 
managerial system failures he cited (Perrow 1999), and the studies of Reason into the 
failure of managerial systems (Reason 2000). 
Following the publication the researcher undertook a series of informal discussions with 
a number of experienced estates managers to discuss the possibility that there may be 
unknown latent conditions within the managerial systems of NHS maintenance 
departments that could affect patient safety. Ten participants agreed to attend an 
unstructured meeting to discuss the issue, which was chaired by the researcher who 
acted in a process consultation role to the group (Schein 1997, Schein 1998, Belton and 
Stuart 2003). There were three outputs from the meeting. The first was the development 
of the research question that this thesis addresses, which is: 
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'Do the managerial systems of internal control within the National Health Service 
(NHS) assure that the day-to-day building service engineering maintenance 
activities conform to their respective national guidelines?' 
The second was the collective agreement to the question, 'Which areas under the direct 
control of the Estates Department are believed to be currently generating the greatest 
unaddressed perceived risk?' To answer this second question a generic structure of an 
estates department was designed by the researcher using his +30 years experience as 
an NHS estates manager, and presented to the group. Through face-to-face discussion 
the group 'informed the generic structure' and created a unanimous answer; it was those 
systems that have never been scrutinised by a managerial and technical audit during the 
normal course of events. These were the policies and procedures of eight engineering 
topics forming the very core of their activities. 
The eight engineering managerial systems identified by the focus group as probably 
generating the greatest latent potential for developing into major risks are presented 
below: 
1. Medical Gas Pipeline Systems 
These installations feed directly to patient areas via distribution pipe work from 
central plant rooms. They normally supply oxygen, nitrous oxide or generate a partial 
vacuum. Prior to 2006 the NHS termed these systems as Piped Medical Gas. 
2. Water 
All water for use and circulated within a hospital distribution system is potable and is 
susceptible to water borne organisms including Legionella. 
3. Lifts 
Under this categorisation are all patient and goods lifts, including patient bed hoists. 
4. Ventilation 
Ventilation systems range from normal ducted air ventilation through to fully 
conditioned air and theatre quality air and extract systems. 
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5. Building Management Systems 
These are computerised systems that monitor and sometimes control various 
building services plant. 
6. Pressure Systems 
A pressure system is defined under statute and governed by the Pressure Systems 
Safety Regulations (Health and Safety Commission 2000). In the case of a hospital it 
is not unusual to find main steam raising boiler plant and calorifiers. 
7. Fire 
This includes all fire detection devices, alarms, smoke control mechanisms, 
extinguishers, etc. 
8. Electrical (LV) 
It is common for hospitals to be fed via an 11 KV (high voltage) supply, transformed 
down within the hospital site and distributed at 415/240V (low voltage) to the point of 
use within buildings. 
In all cases the management system surrounding the high voltage supply was never 
seen by the focus group as posing a major problem because of the well trained and 
competent engineers in charge of the installation, coupled with the intense 
maintenance regime governing the plant and equipment. This was in stark contrast 
to the low voltage distribution system. 
The third output formed as the participants discussed what should be done if the answer 
to their initial research question was: 
The managerial systems of internal control within the National Health Service 
(NHS) do not assure that the day-to-day building service engineering 
maintenance activities conform to their respective national guidelines.' 
The meeting agreed that they needed to know as senior managers what managerial 
tools should be applied to: assessing the resources needed to close the identified 
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managerial gaps, what would be the revenue consequences of keeping these gaps 
closed, and finally how could they give assurance that the gaps remained closed. 
Following the development of the research question and the identification of the most 
probable topics believed to be generating the greatest unaddressed risk; the researcher 
disbanded the meeting and began the research project by undertaking a detailed 
literature search. 
Although the methodology employed to create and manage this initial meeting was 
totally informal, it did lay the foundations for this research project. The results and 
conclusions drawn during the following years have shown that their initial concerns were 
valid. 
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Chapter Two Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter mapped the history of the NHS to the present day, where the 
service is now assessed against its conformance to national standards. It concluded by 
suggesting that the majority of NHS Trust estates' day-to-day maintenance strategies do 
not conform to these standards. 
This chapter begins with a short description of reliability and risk, and the balance that 
must be achieved between these two topics when designing a maintenance strategy. 
The Department of Health's national guidance relating to the formation of a Trust's 
maintenance strategy issued in the year 2005 is discussed, and compared to that 
published in 1978. The term 'maintenance' is examined along with the use of computers 
within maintenance departments. The type of maintenance strategy to be adopted is 
considered, and the assumption that plant and equipment failures are totally 
independent of managerial failures is discussed, 
The creation of a suitable managerial system is then debated along with the two main 
techniques used to assess the risks associated with such a design. A research model 
relating to an inherent failure of a management system due to the quantity of non-novel 
interruptions during normal day-to-day activities is examined. 
Finally the need for and development of an assurance framework is discussed, along 
with the call for an integrated monitoring and audit programme to be implemented. 
2.2 Reliability and risk 
The use of the word reliability was first recorded in 1816, and was used by Samuel T. 
Coleridge in a letter to a friend (Saleh & Marais 2006). Since this date the word has 
come into general use. Its popularity to-day can be shown by entering the word into the 
search engine Google; this will produce over 9 million hits on the World Wide Web. With 
the extended use of statistics and adoption of mass production the discipline of 
Reliability Engineering was formed. 
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Society expresses its reliability 'wants' in the form of environmental standards and 
regulations, which reflect international, national and organisational needs. Most 
industries are complying with these requirements by designing and installing plant and 
equipment (assets) that match these needs. However it is not sufficient just to ensure 
that the assets are compliant at the point of commissioning and bringing into use. 
Managerial systems must be implemented to ensure that the assets continue to comply 
with their performance specification throughout their operational lifespan through to 
eventual disposal. Therefore the reliability (Le. the probability of failure) of these 
managerial systems and assets is of profound importance, as failure is inherently linked 
to risk. 
Risk is the product of the probability of an event occurring and the impact that that event 
will cause. There are basically two ways of discussing risk, classical or Bayesian. The 
classical view is a positivist view. This claims that risk can be measured and therefore 
recognises only that which can be scientifically verified. Alternatively the Bayesian view 
is a way of expressing uncertainty and therefore lies between the two extremes of 
positivism and relativism (where knowledge is not absolute) (Aven & K0rte 2003). The 
risk relating to managerial aspects does not have a history of quantitative data collection 
in the classical sense, leading to quantitative risk assessment, but is assessed by a 
multi-disciplinary approach adopting qualitative techniques that take the assessor's 
judgements into account. The balance between reliability and risk for the physical 
assets of an organisation will directly influence the maintenance strategy adopted. 
2.3 National guidance for maintenance within the NHS 
As stated within Chapter One, the first comprehensive guidance documentation relating 
to a maintenance strategy within the NHS was published in 1973 by the Department of 
Health, and entitled Estmancode (Department of Health and Social Security 1973). 
It provided a framework for regularly reviewing maintenance performance at all levels, 
preferably by a multi-disciplinary team. The guidance called for the development of 
'acceptable local standards of efficiency and safety' whilst seeking 'the advice of medical 
and other interests', in order to determine the local acceptable standards. It also 
recognised that reasonable flexibility must be employed to reflect the available annual 
budget in deploying limited resources to where they would do most good. 
34 
The framework developed called for the assessment of priorities, comparisons of costs 
between NHS staff and contract labour, investigations into the cause of plant and 
equipment failures, etc, All this work was to be under a continuous review of budget and 
performance conducted at local and national levels, and various points' in-between e.g. 
regional, area, district and sector levels. Horner termed this approach as a 'maintenance 
strategy'. (Horner, EI-Haram & Munns, 1997). 
Throughout the entire 1973 guidance documentation the word 'risk' was never used, as 
this did not begin to be applied within the service until the mid 90's. However from 
studying 'Estmancode' the basic building blocks for modern healthcare maintenance 
management practices were laid, as the document called for a combination of 
maintenance systems and managerial tools to be used that best suited local needs. 
2.3.1 Maintenance strategy 
In the year 2005 the Department of Health issued a set of national standards that 
emphasised local actions, local ambition and local innovation. Healthcare organisations 
were expected to be creative and innovative in forming new local solutions by 
challenging past practices when complying with these standards (Department of Health 
2005) The use of standards has moved the NHS away from a service motivated by 
national targets to one where standards are the main driver. These describe the level of 
quality that health care organisations will be expected to meet, be they NHS Trusts, 
based in the voluntary sector or privately funded. An organisation's performance is now 
assessed against these standards and all judgements on performance are evidence 
based. The standards are split into seven domains: 
1. Safety of patients 
2. Clinical effectiveness and cost effectiveness 
3. Governance 
4. Patient focus 
5. Accessible and responsive care 
6. The care environment and amenities 
7. Public health 
Each domain is split into two categories defined as: -
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Core standards: which bring together and rationalise existing 
requirements for the health service, setting out the minimum level of 
service patients and service users have a right to expect; and 
Developmental standards: which signal the direction of travel and 
provide a framework for NHS bodies to plan the delivery of services that 
continue to improve in line with increasing patient expectations. 
The core standards do not create any new guidance material for departments to follow 
but are based on standards that already exist. The national standards documentation 
states, 'Meeting the core standards is not optional. Health care organisations must 
comply with them from the date of publication of this document', (Department of 
Health 2005 p 24). This statement sets the maintenance strategy for all health care 
organisations, and takes account of both the safe operation of the physical engineering 
infrastructure when assessed against national codes of practice, and also provides an 
assurance framework to control and monitor the managerial activities associated with 
maintenance. 
The statements above suggest health care organisations are placed in a 'strait jacket' in 
terms of the design of their technical and managerial systems, as compliance to the 
national standards is compulsory. This appears to be at odds with the previous 
statements made in 1973, where they were allowed to design their own maintenance 
strategy. This assumption is incorrect. 
The national technical standards are flexible, in that local conditions are allowed to 
influence any guidance recommendations. It is for the local organisation to determine the 
maintenance necessary to comply with the sprit of the national guidance, so long as the 
basic premise is held that the systems are 'fit for purpose' and that the Health & Safety 
at Work Act 1974 is complied with. This requires that engineering systems are 
maintained to a reasonable standard. Therefore health care organisations are free to 
explore and adopt the various technical and managerial techniques that have been 
developed over the years to maintain their plant and equipment. Thus each organisation 
can develop their own maintenance practices to reflect their particular local environment. 
The issue of the National Standards by the Department of Health in 2005 has not altered 
36 
the 33 years of pre-existing guidance in relation to the maintenance strategy of the 
engineering infrastructure of the NHS healthcare buildings. 
The Department of Health's section charged with developing, updating and issuing 
engineering guidance for use within healthcare premises is known as Estates and 
Facilities Management. The relevant national guidance is produced as a series of Health 
Technical Memoranda (HTM's). 
2.3.2 Type of maintenance 
Maintenance within the NHS estates function is categorised as either backlog or day-to-
day maintenance. Backlog maintenance relates to the planned need for a major 
replacement of a healthcare building's 'as fitted' infrastructure due to normal wear and 
tear over the years, e.g. the replacement of 40 year old corroded steam pipes. 
The scope of this thesis is concerned with the day-to-day maintenance of the 'as fitted' 
engineering infrastructure of a healthcare building. It does not address the specification, 
design and process of installation, commissioning, modification or replacement of these 
systems. The areas under examination are the day-to-day maintenance activities. These 
are defined as: 'The combination of all technical and administrative actions, including 
supervision actions, intended to retain an item in, or restore it to, a state in which it can 
perform a required function' (British Standards Institution 1993). 
The activity undertaken in relation to day-to-day maintenance within an NHS healthcare 
building since 1973 was split into two distinct categories. Within the service these have 
been known as reactive and planned preventative maintenance. These categories are 
still in use to-day and are described below. 
2.3.3 Reactive Maintenance 
Reactive maintenance relates to small day-to-day breakdowns, where in the main the 
impact associated with an item failing is considered negligible. This type of maintenance 
strategy is associated with phrases such as, 'don't fix it till it breaks'. Research 
conducted by AI-Zubaidi into reactive maintenance within the NHS gives examples of 
this type of work (AI-Zubaidi 1997), and includes repairing blocked sinks, and leaking 
taps, or replacing failed lamp bulbs, etc. All healthcare buildings generate a reactive 
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maintenance profile. The larger premises create a day-to-day reactive workload that 
requires a team of staff from various trades and support managers to respond to these 
needs. 
2.3.4 Causes of and degrees of reactive maintenance failure 
An engineering item can fail in many ways, and is classified in terms of cause, time, 
degree and/or combinations of failure. The relative sub-classifications of failure are self 
explanatory and are: misuse or inherent weakness failure; sudden or gradual failure; 
partial or complete failure; catastrophic or degradation failure (Drummer and Winton 
1974). 
How often these failures occur is defined in two ways: mean time between failures 
(MTBF) and mean time to failure (MTTF), where the former relates to repairable items 
and the latter to those that are non-repairable. 
The time-honoured view was that a batch of like items would have a high rate of failure 
early in their use (known as the burn in period), followed by a steady low constant rate of 
failure, ending with a wear-out period where the failure rate increases. This simplistic 
picture formed the traditional 'bath tub curve'. With the modern-day designs 
incorporating pneumatic/electro/mechanical devices manufactured to tightly controlled 
tolerances this curve is no longer applicable (Moubray 1997). 
2.3.5 Planned Preventative Maintenance 
This type of maintenance was designed to give assurance that plant and equipment was 
functioning to its design intent, and that some plant and equipment breakdown could be 
prevented, thus causing less disruption to the service provision. In 1973 technology was 
not as advanced as it is to-day. There were no desk top computers, calculators or hand 
held diagnostic devices; slide rules were the norm! Estmancode introduced a basic 
planned preventative maintenance system into the NHS for local officers to adapt to suit 
their specific needs. This used a system of regular inspections at set frequencies of time, 
for example - weekly, three weekly, six weekly and their subsequent multiples, through 
to multi-year frequencies (Department of Health and Social Security 1973). 
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Over the intervening years since this form of planned preventative maintenance was first 
practised within the NHS, industry has adopted other maintenance systems in an 
attempt to reduce overall costs and disruption to production. These systems have 
evolved two main themes, condition monitoring and total productive maintenance. 
Condition monitoring is sometimes known as 'predictive maintenance', and uses 
technology to monitor the 'health of plant' on a continuous basis to detect any 
abnormalities in an attempt to prevent breakdown or malfunction. Total productive 
maintenance (TPM) encourages a team working approach to the subject of maintenance 
and brings together the various stakeholders. However both themes follow the basic 
principles that were outlined within Estmancode back in 1973. 
Due to a combination of suitable skill shortages, the increasing costs of repair and loss 
of production through equipment/plant failure, the reliability of equipment/plant 
(availability) is now more important than its maintainability (Sherwin 2000). Technology 
has responded to this need. Now it is common for plant and equipment to be designed 
so as to require minimum invasive maintenance. Also with the progression of 
computerisation, self diagnostic and/or remote monitoring/sensing systems have 
become the norm. Therefore since 1973 the need for dismantling parts of the equipment 
infrastructure to ensure that it is performing to the required standards is much reduced, 
and the tasks performed have nowadays mainly been condensed to examination and 
testing activities. 
2.4 Computers 
The use of computers within NHS maintenance departments is widespread and is now a 
central component of their managerial systems. In the 1980's the NHS began to develop 
a national computerised system for the management of its maintenance activity. This 
was known as Works Information Management System (WIMS). But after a number of 
years this was abandoned, and now there is no standard NHS maintenance software. 
Now each Trust must purchase its computerised maintenance management system 
(CMMS) from various specialist commercial organisations. These systems give 
managerial support across a number of topics namely: -
.:. Records reactive maintenance data 
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.:. Produces pre-planned schedules of tasks (planned preventative maintenance 
and Monitoring) 
.:. Budgetary accounting of the maintenance function 
.:. Movement of spares 
All of the CMMS programs give facilities for data collection, with some expensive 
systems allowing for real time data logging. Yet despite the complexities of analysing 
this information in terms of plant availability and reliability, virtually all of the 
commercially available CMMS's lack any decision making capability to assist the 
maintenance manager to reduce costs and/or risk, and in some cases the systems 
function as no more than a diary (Labib 2004). 
2.4.1 Maintenance simulation models 
The overall aim for a maintenance manager is to optimise the maintenance function 
against set criteria applicable to an organisation's stakeholders. From the application of 
scientific techniques to determine this optimum level of maintenance, the field of 
Operational Research was born, and applied to maintenance during the Second World 
War. During the intervening years various mathematical models have been developed in 
an attempt to determine the optimum maintenance level that could guide an organisation 
towards this in effect theoretical target. The words 'lead towards' were used by Sherwin 
to emphasise that the optimum level was a moving target continuously influenced by 
new data/environments (Sherwin, 2000). 
A modern acute hospital contains many thousands of different assets each made up of 
various different components, which between them exhibit differing reliability behaviours. 
Although the size of the NHS as a whole is extremely large, the sample size from which 
to conduct any form of actuarial analysis is small and restricted to individual hospitals 
only. This is due to past government policies that were discussed earlier within the 
introductory chapter, which discouraged the sharing of information between Trusts, and 
the abandonment of a centrally controlled national maintenance software programme for 
day-to-day maintenance. 
In order for these mathematical models to function they must have access to a large 
data base of historical information relating to critical and non-critical failures. But as a 
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critical type of failure has serious consequences e.g. loss of life, then this body of data 
will not exist as preventative action would be taken immediately after the first incident. In 
the majority of cases if any non-critical data was available it would reflect minor 
consequences only. From this situation Moubray (1997) argues that it would not be cost 
effective to subject this information to actuarial analysis and detailed preventative 
maintenance action. Conversely this final point is argued against by Sherwin (2000), 
who states that savings however small all add up and therefore should not be ignored. I 
suggest that an open mind should be taken by the maintenance policy designer and that 
environmental conditions must dictate what is important and what is not, rather than 
following the wide sweeping statements of either Moubray or Sherwin. 
Simulation models for maintenance need copious amounts of reliability data before they 
can be applied to a given situation. Unfortunately there is more often than not a 
complete lack of such suitable information. Thus although these models are 
academically sound, in the majority of cases they are of no practical value when placed 
within a normal working environment (Rausand 1998, Moubray 1997, Sherwin 2000). 
2.4.2 Simulation of workload 
The day-to-day maintenance demands for an acute hospital have been analysed and 
found to be random in nature (AI-Zubaidi 1997). This research was later used to develop 
a simulation model of a hospital maintenance department's day-to-day activity (AI-
Zubaidi & Christer 1997). The model succeeded in showing the benefit and applicability 
of using simulation modelling to assess differing management policies, but their work 
developed a complex program requiring very detailed information for it to operate. They 
state that they had to make subjective assessments as there was little useful historical 
data available. 
A similar study was undertaken within manufacturing industry but this time both 
preventative and breakdown (reactive) work orders were simulated in an attempt to 
analyse the various factors affecting the personnel capacity requirement (Mjema 2002). 
The model produced showed that for a decentralised maintenance organisation, (such 
as that now created by recent Trust reorganisations), then by allowing staff to work 
across the boarders of their decentralised department greater utilisation of staff is 
possible and throughput of work orders increases. The main reason for this increase in 
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utilisation and throughput is the stochastic nature of the work order demand for 
maintenance activities. As Mjema points out, although preventative maintenance work 
orders are predictive, the combined preventative and reactive work orders must be 
considered as stochastic. From my experience I agree with Mjema, and as will be seen 
later within this thesis this is an important statement. 
Within the simulation studies cited, all were analysing the day-to-day work load and by 
default assumed that the technical and managerial practices were being performed to 
the required standard. Also they have not investigated the effects of reduced manpower 
availability and the risk this generates from the reduction in capability to undertake 
planned preventative maintenance duties. Therefore from a practical viewpoint whilst the 
studies have succeeded in terms of their own objectives, the scope of their simulations is 
too narrow to be of any practical use in the study being undertaken within this thesis. 
From the forgoing and the historical evidence reviewed by this research, actuarial 
analysis relating to the relationship between operating age and failure is of little use to 
the NHS day-to-day maintenance manager. Therefore a system is needed that focuses 
on the future rather than the past. Historical information relates to past events, as 
opposed to the concepts of anticipation and prevention which attempt to gaze into the 
future to control organisational risks. Consequently any decision analysis tool for the 
NHS day-to-day maintenance manager must be based on a projected assessment of 
risk and supported by a planned maintenance methodology that is a forward looking 
system as opposed to a historical perspective. Such a system was developed in the 80's 
and is known as Reliability Centred Maintenance. 
2.5 Reliability centred maintenance 
This concept originated within the aircraft industry and has been applied throughout 
other organisations as a whole for more than 20 years Rausand relates a system to be 
the overall managerial and technical actions of the maintenance activity, and goes on to 
reference a number of reports/textbooks and military/non-military standards that have 
been developed over the years using the reliability centred maintenance philosophy 
(Rausand 1998). If implemented correctly the reliability centred maintenance system will 
ensure that the 'inherent reliability' of the system is realised. It will not improve the 
inherent reliability of a system as this is only possible by its redesign. Moubray 
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summarises the reliability centred maintenance methodology by stating that it is: 'A 
process used to determine what must be done to ensure that any physical asset 
continues to do what its users want it to do in its present operating context' (Moubray 
1997 p 7). As such the reliability centred maintenance method provides answers to the 
following seven basic questions: 
1. What are the functions and associated performance standards of the asset in its 
present operating context? 
2. In what ways does it fail to fulfil its functions? 
3. What causes each functional failure? 
4. What happens when each failure occurs? 
5. In what way does each failure matter? 
6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? 
7. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found? 
To develop the answers to these questions a sequence of steps must be followed that 
have at their core the Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis system of interrogating 
a planUequipment item and associated management activity (British Standards 
Institution 1991). The reliability centred maintenance process in its totality forces a 
structured analysis of the consequences of each failure mode and integrates the 
operational, environmental and safety objectives of the maintenance function. As such 
the system relies on data that is developed in a descriptive and qualitative way, as 
opposed to quantitative historical information. 
Following the output of such a reliability centred maintenance exercise, a system of 
planned maintenance is formed. This consists of tasks carried out at a set frequency to 
either prevent planUequipment from failing and/or to monitor the performance against 
preset criteria (tolerance limits). Within the NHS this planned maintenance can be further 
subdivided into three parts: 
Insurance inspections 
These are undertaken for such items as steam pressure boilers, lifts, etc. From 
the work undertaken they are strictly planned preventative maintenance tasks as 
they all involve dismantling various components of the planUequipment so that a 
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through inspection can be undertaken of the parts hidden from view during 
normal operating conditions. The aim of the inspection is to prevent any 
catastrophic failure of the plant/equipment and subsequent loss of life. This type 
of activity accounts for approximately 6% of the planned activities for a Trust's 
maintenance department. The frequency and activities required for this part of 
the programme are dictated to the Trust by external specialist engineers 
employed by the Trust's insurance company. 
Other planned preventative maintenance activities 
In the main these relate to large plant items such as ventilation systems, which 
would effect patient throughput or comfort if failure occurred. This type of activity 
accounts for approximately 8% of the planned activities for a Trust's maintenance 
department. These tasks are governed by the local plant and equipment's 
design, age and operating environment. 
Monitoring 
This activity records the performance of plant/equipment against their set points 
and tolerance limits. Examples are the recording of domestic hot water flow and 
return temperatures, to ensure that Legionella does not breed within the system 
and contaminate/kill vulnerable patients. This type of checking accounts for 
approximately 85% of the maintenance programme. The frequencies for 
monitoring are recommended by NHS national standards with an allowance for 
small deviations to account for local situations. 
Although the reliability centred maintenance process presents a framework to build the 
planned preventative maintenance system around, it does not account for why 
incidents/accidents occur due to the failure of good governance as described within the 
introductory chapter which cited the Audit Commission (2003) page 22 findings. 
Therefore this research explored the concepts of Normal Accident Theory 
2.6 Normal Accident Theory 
Heimann (2005) observes that managerial problems are often more complex than a 
simple two state theory of good (operating), or bad (not operating). As often 
organisations create two types of errors, I) implementation of the wrong policy or, II) 
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failure to act when action is warranted. The cost/benefit ratios associated with each type 
of failure vary from organisation to organisation and the circumstances at the time, for 
each decision. Therefore it has been important to develop a general approach to 
studying these two types of failure that affect an organisation's reliability and the 
resulting consequences. He goes on to state that controls to contain the reliability of type 
I errors often come at the expense of the reliability of type II errors. Put simply 
organisations struggle between efficiency and effectiveness, and those concerned with 
effectiveness will aim to reduce type I errors, while those concerned with efficiency will 
reduce the likelihood of creating type II errors. 
A series managerial structure is more effective at preventing type I errors, as each 
component must agree to the action before it takes place. An example within the NHS 
would be that a Trust would pass a draft policy through various committees for 
agreement, before accepting the document as a definitive statement of its intentions of 
how to proceed. But such a structure whilst going a long way to prevent type I errors 
relating to the adoption of the wrong policy, actually (as Heimann pointed out) creates 
type II errors of non-action whilst waiting for a suitable policy to be accepted (Heimann 
2005). 
2.6.1 Reliability through better components 
High-reliability organisations promote a 'culture of reliability' which comes from a desire 
to improve decision making at the component level. Thus the structure of an 
organisation must be considered if reliability is to be improved. Heimann (2005) splits an 
organisation's structure into two separate camps, the systems strategy and the 
component strategy. The systems strategy modifies or changes the location of the 
number of components. A components strategy on the other hand needs a greater 
performance from its components while keeping the basic administrative system intact. 
However it should be noted that these are not mutually exclusive and an organisation 
could employ a mixture of the two systems. 
It is not uncommon for a Trust to be faced with budget constraints, such that 
departments may be subjected to cuts in their revenue budgets. In such a case the Trust 
may reduce the number of components in series, thereby increasing the likelihood of a 
type I failure. To compensate the Trust may implement a component strategy to increase 
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the reliability of the remaining components. The choice between strategies depends on 
the tasks that the organisation conducts. 
Organisations that handle repetitive simple tasks tend to adopt a component strategy i.e. 
increase the reliability of the components. Here repetitive tasks follow well laid down 
rules and operating procedures. In a perfect world Trust estate maintenance 
departments should be working within these environments. Adverse incidents would be 
from a direct infringement of/or derived from deviation from, these well defined and 
agreed rules. That stated, incidents will always occur according to Normal Accident 
Theory as proposed by Charles Perrow in 1984. (Perrow 2004). 
Gephart (2004) observes that Perrow's work has influenced research in a diverse 
number of areas including: sociological study of risk analysis, the management of risk at 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the safe management of nuclear 
weapons, sense making and control in organisations with complex technology, the 
nature of technology, and the management of industrial crises. 
Normal accident theory has had a major influence on the way of thinking about complex 
organisations operating within hazardous environments (Sagan 2004). He claims that 
Perrow deliberately sought to shake the discussions around the safety of hazardous 
technologies, and to bring 'organisation theory' into the debate. As he stated, "The world 
is not becoming smaller; it is becoming more complex and interconnected". The breadth 
of Perrow's influence can be assessed by the number of citations of his work, coupled 
with the wide ranging journals across numerous subjects within which his research is 
cited. 
The term Normal Accidents was coined by Charles Perrow in 1984 in his now famous 
book wherein he discusses the risks and dangers in society. Due to the book's popularity 
it was reprinted in 1999 (Perrow 1999). He states that his research was motivated by the 
desire to better manage these high risk systems (ibid p. 3); although he concludes with 
the observation that accidents within these systems are inevitable, and that we cannot 
effectively manage these systems. And those serious accidents are a result of the 
systems, and not the individual components. Thus by better understanding of these 
systems we may at the least stop blaming the poor operative, and start to question the 
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system that allowed the problem to occur in the first place (ibid p. 4). Normal Accident 
theory carried a warning: 'in high-risk technologies where the systems are complex and 
tightly coupled, catastrophic accidents are inevitable over time'. 
It was this realisation that catapulted Perrow to the initial attention of the world, and his 
belief that: "new dangers were rooted in the organisational structure of organisations". 
He focused on two fundamental points in his argument. These were the interactive 
complexity and tight coupling of these organisations that confound the simple minds of 
humans in their attempt to envisage, assess their hazards and manage the risks that 
they collectively pose. The use of the probabilistic risk assessment system by the 
nuclear, petrochemical, aerospace, etc, industries bares witness to this (NASA 2002). 
Probabilistic risk assessment examines the way seemingly unconnected simple 
components and incidents can combine to create a catastrophic and previously 
unimagined failure or as Perrow predicts: normal accidents. 
2.6.2 Linear and complex interactions 
Perrow (1999) asks, "What kinds of systems are most prone to system accidents?" (pp. 
72). To answer this question he put systems into one of two classes, linear and complex 
interactions. The most common are linear interactions where their failures and effects 
are well known. A typical example would be an expected production sequence that was 
recognized by the operators. To put it another way, where there are linear interactions 
from one component within the design, equipment, procedures, operators, supplies and 
materials and the environment of the system, with one (or more) components that 
precede or follow it. He goes on to suggest that say within a linear system only one 
percent of components could lead to a complex interaction and cause an accident. 
Whereas that figure would be increased to ten percent of components within a complex 
system would create the accident. If there are only four components within a complex 
system the possible number of interactions is 12. But in a system of 400 components 
where ten percent (40) could network in a complex way, anyone could interact with the 
other 399 in millions of configurations, since the potential interaction pathways increase 
exponentially. Thus the danger lies not in the individual components, but within the 
system that allows them to interact. 
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Interactive complexity is explained as arising from a number of components in a given 
location interacting, either deliberately or not, with others. In these situations 
unintentional interactions can develop that were not seen as part of the design, which 
are baffling to the observer and are non-linear. However when these systems are 
transformational they have greater complexity and are more prone to accidents. 
Complex interactions would in the main, be those not intended within the original design. 
Perrow attempted to define these two types of interaction as shown below, but was not 
completely satisfied with the result: 
Linear interactions (linear interactions in an expected sequence) are those in 
expected and familiar production or maintenance sequence, and those that are 
quite visible even if unplanned. 
Complex interactions (complex interactions in an unexpected sequence) are 
those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned or unexpected sequences, and 
either not visible or not immediately comprehensible. 
Perrow 1999 p. 78 
With all of the problems associated with complex systems the obvious solution would 
appear to be simple, design all of our systems to be linear. Unfortunately complex 
systems are inherently efficient, as they have less slack, less tolerance of low quality 
performance, and allow for more multi-function components. Therefore complexity is 
desirable. Also when operating within a healthcare environment there is little choice in 
the design of the overall system in terms of complex or linear. 
The major dimensions of a system have been described as complex or linear, but there 
are two other characteristics envisaged that are reasonably independent of the former 
two, and are split into tight coupling and loose coupling. 
Tight coupling is described as the situation where system components having no 'slack', 
'buffer' or 'give' (Ibid pp. 89 - 94). As an example, within a hospital operating room the 
surgeon's ability to perform the operation is tightly coupled to the decontamination of the 
surgical instruments. Any delay in the decontamination process subsequently delays the 
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operation because there is no slack in the system, no buffer in the form of a spare 
instrument pack due to the high costs of this equipment. Thus tight coupling is time-
dependent, and intolerant of variations, as only one methodology can be employed to 
complete the job, as all tasks must be completed sequentially. Resources cannot be 
substituted for each other and failed equipment creates a shutdown. 
Loosely coupled arrangements are the reverse of tightly coupled systems. In these 
systems time delays are tolerated, and little (if any) dilapidation occurs. Sub-quality 
components can be substituted to make-do, and tasks can be completed out of 
sequence. 
The recovery situation after a failure has occurred from each of these two different 
structures is also different. In the tightly coupled system the system redundancies and 
buffers must all be built into the initial design, and thus be thought through well in 
advance of the inevitable accident occurring. In loosely coupled systems, again the 
reverse is true, substitutions can be made and off-the-cuff solutions found that can 
bodge the system until the correct processes are re-established. 
Perrow describes how normal accidents are created as a result of, 'unanticipated 
interactions of multiple component failures'. He then goes on to demonstrate and 
describe through numerous examples, how high risk systems that were tightly coupled 
and experiencing unanticipated interactions have caused catastrophes, particularly in 
poorly run organisations. In these cases of poor regulation, poor quality, poor training, 
etc, there is more chance of failure within the areas of: design, equipment, procedures, 
operators, suppliers and materials, and environment components. Therefore in these 
cases there are two causes of failure, the component type and the managerial type. 
Such failures can interact in unexpected ways particularly in badly run organisations, as 
the rate of such failures would be much grater than would normally exist. 
From studying the arguments made by Perrow (1999 pp.88 table 3.1) relating to the 
differences between linear and complex systems the researcher reconstructed parts of 
his work to form Table 1 to highlight these when applied to the field of maintenance 
within a health care environment. 
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Table 1 Complex vs. linear systems relating to a maintenance environment 
within a healthcare setting. 
Complex Linear 
Proximate maintenance tasks Segregated maintenance tasks 
Many common-mode connections of Limited common mode connections 
components not in sequence 
Limited isolation of failed components Easy isolation of failed components 
Personal specialisation limits awareness of Less personal specialisation 
interdependencies 
Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops Few unfamiliar or unintended feedback 
loops 
Many control parameters with potential Control parameters few, direct and 
interactions segregated 
Indirect and influential information sources Direct on-line information sources 
Limited understanding of some processes Extensive understanding of all processes 
Perrow defined the act of maintenance as following a linear interaction with its 
components. Although there exists a crossing of interpretation boundaries when 
analysing a particular function between complex and linear, the researcher disagrees 
with his suggestion when applied to the healthcare environment. Within a hospital the 
departments operate in a complex interaction with other departments, in a tightly 
coupled high risk environment, where one section of the organisation depends on the 
output of another in a timely and controlled manner to exacting pre-described and 
agreed standards. Failure of any department (component) to perform can lead to 
catastrophic accidents. 
As previously discussed, where departments are tightly coupled, failures and/or delays 
in one section of the organisation can spread throughout the wider system in a domino 
effect, as independent time dependant processes and tasks that rely on specialised staff 
or equipment are compromised. These inevitable failures can be affected by the extent 
of the organisations potential to transform what is a risky business, into a catastrophic 
failure, i.e. a normal accident as defined by Perrow. 
To better understand where engineering maintenance sits within the healthcare 
environment, and' how it can contribute to a catastrophic failure with loss of life, a 
description of an operating department is presented to aid the discussion. 
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2.6.2 Operating Department 
This is a designated area where the planning, preparation and provision of an 
environment is created for surgical care within an operating theatre. The building design 
and engineering services create a space within a hospital that is unlike all others. It 
relies on its own specialist lighting, electrical supplies, air conditioning, piped medical 
gasses and extract ventilation. It is supplied with specialist drugs, equipment and 
instrumentation, used by highly trained clinical and surgical staff and is the designated 
place for surgical procedures. 
In order for a theatre to function it relies on the complex interaction of communication, 
exchange and transfer of resources with a number of other hospital departments. These 
in turn form close tightly coupled interactions with other departments both within and 
external to the hospital, all undertaking a series of specialised tasks. Some of these 
departments (but certainly not all) are described below. 
Surgical wards are where patients are prepared before surgery and are attended to 
afterwards. The sterile services unit wash, maintain, decontaminate and prepare the 
surgical instruments. Histopathology analyse biological specimens at the pre, inter and 
post patient operation. Radiology takes images of the patient, again pre, inter and post. 
operation. The High Dependency Unit is where high risk patients receive immediate post 
operative intensive care. 
For the operating theatre to be effective and safe all of the departments must function 
satisfactorily, both with regard to their designated tasks, and in their ability to interact 
with the theatres. Waring, McDonald and Harrison (2006) found that a major role for the 
managerial support team within the operating theatre departments was to co-ordinate all 
of the activities delivered by the support departments for each surgical procedure. They 
observed that each day the team would communicate via the telephone or in person with 
the other departments, to ensure that all of the necessary supplies information and in 
some cases even the patient was available in readiness for the surgical team. This 
despite weekly meetings with these departments to schedule their activities in relation to 
the man-power resources, information needs, equipment requirements, etc, for the pre-
planned theatre lists for the following week. The aim of these weekly meetings was to 
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anticipate the various needs and constraints, and devise strategies for overcoming any 
shortfalls. 
From reference to Normal Accident Theory the system surrounding a typical hospital 
operating theatre just described is typical of a complex interactive, tightly coupled, high 
risk structure. By combining the concepts of Perrow and the findings of the organisations 
employing the probabilistic risk assessment system, there is great potential for even 
seemingly insignificant failures to combine, escalate through the organisation and disrupt 
the theatre in unexpected and catastrophic ways. From viewing the theatre this way the 
next question to ask is, "how can the maintenance department affect the smooth running 
of the theatre?" 
As the theatre depends on the engineering services and equipment to be correctly 
maintained any sudden failure or deviation away from the recognised tolerance limits 
would seriously disrupt its services. However within such an environment of 
interdependence with other departments, any similar maintenance problem could/would 
create a knock-on effect and be transmitted through the organisation and eventually to 
the detriment of the theatre unit. 
A typical example of such an incident that the researcher has had personal experience 
of (and which is not unusual) is for a surgical instrument decontamination plant to fail. 
These machines are expensive and therefore it is rare for there to be spare capacity 
(redundancy) within the Sterile Services Unit department to cope with such a vital piece 
of equipment to be out of action for more than a few hours. Again through cost it is rare 
for spare instrument sets to be available; therefore the pressure is on the maintenance 
department to bring the machine back into service as rapidly as possible. 
The modern day decontamination units are a complex electro/mechanical/pneumatic 
device, which inject steam at high pressure into a chamber in a series of pulses, then 
clears and dries the chamber and its contents by drawing a vacuum. The sequence of 
operations is programmed by the automatic devices within each machine, and must 
control the temperatures, pressures and timeframe of operations to within strict tolerance 
limits laid down by rigorous national standards. Any deviation outside of these accepted 
limits fails the machine, and it must immediately be removed from service. 
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To repair the machine takes the work of a specifically trained maintenance technician 
who has the necessary nationally recognised academic decontamination qualifications, 
and competency assessed practical skill levels for that specific machine. As the 
machines are complex sometimes it takes many hours to trace and repair a fault, 
particularly if it is intermittent. Once repaired the equipment must be re-commissioned 
before being brought back into use. The cycle times for these units run into hours (not 
minutes), therefore the total down time from the fault originally occurring to the machine 
finally being brought back into use could be considerable, that is if all goes well. Delays 
in waiting for a suitably qualified technician to arrive, problems tracing the fault, or 
trouble obtaining a spare part all add to the total machine down time. The longer the 
SSU is without access to the machine the greater the probability that the theatre will be 
affected. Such a sequence of events was termed an 'operational breakdown' by Waring 
(2006), where one department fails or steps out of sequence with another, due to the 
inadequacies of another department. He divided these breakdowns into three 
categories, delays where items were delivered at the wrong time, miscommunications, or 
missing transactions where items failed to be exchanged. (Waring, McDonald & 
Harrisson 2006) 
The example above describes the risk generated from a highly visible equipment failure. 
Other failures occur that are not so highly visible (latent conditions). The failure to 
undertake planned preventative maintenance tasks in accordance with the nationally 
agreed inspection and test frequencies and standards are an example of such failure. 
Such defects can (and do) lay dormant for long periods without being discovered and 
are managerial failures. These managerial failures combine with normal component 
failures to create an even greater potential for a catastrophic failure. 
Nothing is perfect, in the areas of design, equipment, personnel, procedures, supplies or 
the environment. Much can be done to make these systems safer, however accidents 
can never be totally eradicated. To improve safety, managers and designers create 
safety buffers, alarms, redundancies in systems, etc. But small failures are a natural part 
of life and go on regardless. Occasionally these failures combine in unexpected ways, 
overcome the system defences and an adverse incident occurs; now thanks to Perrow 
we term this a 'normal accident'. If the system is tightly coupled the speed of the incident 
escalating through the organisation can be incomprehensible to the operator(s). The way 
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universal views are created from 'sense making', and are then accepted is a central 
feature of Perrow's normal accident theory; where sense making relates to the 
perception that an operative has of the situation. Different operatives and groups can 
have conflicting interpretations of events using diverse methods. It is the act of sense 
making that attempts to converge these views into one all embracing acceptable 
interpretation. Problems with such sense making create further errors, such that these 
lead to or exacerbate existing accidents. 
2.6.3 People problems 
One of the central themes in Perrow's work has been the relationship between power 
and risk. He claims that: 'the issue is not with risk but power; the power to impose risks 
on the many for the benefit of the few' (Perrow 1999 p.306). Risk assessments have 
always been purchased by the people in power, as important decisions are always 
accompanied with risk assessments, which assess the likely benefits against the risks 
incurred. But as power became more centralised so did the knock-on effects of any 
decision. This growth in centralisation in the private sector and the technological 
revolution meant that more and more of society were affected by the decisions of the 
few. This led to the need for government to step in. The necessity for this was because 
personal control was being eroded by a small number of people in powerful positions. 
This was from the realisation that accidents are not only the result of system failure but 
also from organisational failure. It is wrong to continually blame 'operator error' as the 
problem, as capitalism and human greed play their part. But why would managers not 
put safety first? In answer to this question Perrow argues that it is because the 'harm 
and consequences are not evenly distributed' (ibid p.370). 
As an example, the career span of a senior manager is relatively short compared to the 
gestation period of a normal accident, and few managers are punished for putting profits 
ahead of safety. The difficulty of proving the case against this culture is witnessed by the 
low number of corporate manslaughter charges that have been successful and the need 
to introduce a new act of Parliament. Also managers learn that it is unusual for a major 
incident to occur, therefore it is highly unlikely that their misdeeds would be discovered. 
Thus the personal risk to them is very small whilst the risk to society as a whole is large. 
This problem of 'learning the wrong thing' is not confined to the board room of an 
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organisation (the elite), but cascades down to those at the sharp end, the operators. 
They learn to cut corners for their own benefits, and more-often-than-not this works. It is 
not often that corner cutting 'bites back'. 
People that follow an accident investigate what happened and what was the likely cause. 
If A followed B then they recommend that procedures are put in place to ensure in future 
that B follows A. What should happen is that they should investigate if this reversal could 
have occurred 'before' the incident by comparing the actual operating practices against 
the nationally and locally recommended and agreed operational procedures 
(Ramanujam & Goodman 2003). 
2.6.4 Defence in depth 
Sagan (2004) describes how Redundancy Theory can assist in designing an increase in 
overall system reliability by using components arranged in parallel, even if these 
components were themselves unreliable, i.e. a system that is more reliable than its 
parts! (Sagan 2004). Perrow 1999 states that the addition of parallel systems has been 
the main line of defence (p.73). The difficulty comes not in the design of the parallel 
systems but in ensuring the complete independence of the components. He goes on to 
explain three ways the employment of redundancy can 'backfire' to create a system of 
low reliability. Firstly, the system can become more complex and as such introduce 
hidden errors. Secondly, with the introduction of additional safety components human 
nature can dominate, and a lackadaisical attitude can develop that leads to attitudes 
(cultures) that assume, 'the other guy will spot if there is a problem', creating a diffusion 
of responsibility. Thirdly, the sense of inbuilt safety no-matter-what leads managers to 
push up production levels to produce unsafe conditions. 
As an organisational theorist himself Perrow states that, 'time and again warnings are 
not heeded, risks are taken unnecessarily, inadequate workmanship allowed and 
dishonesty and outright lying are all not unusual' (ibid p.10). From his work he calls for 
more research into the redundancy concept in organisational theory, citing that 
engineers have shown the way by designing parallel systems to improve the 
independence of components in highly complex technical systems. The 'baton' thrown 
down by Perrow to the academic world has been picked up by many, one of whom is 
Sagan (2004). 
55 
2.6.5 The redundancy problem 
In engineering terms it can be easily shown that designing safety systems in parallel 
greatly increases the reliability of the safety system, due to the employment of redundant 
components. This is also the case when parallel defensive systems are in built into a 
managerial system. But when the 'people problem' is brought into these parallel 
managerial defensive systems it creates a 'redundancy problem' (Sagan 2004). Sagan 
split the problem into three parts, these are: 
a. Catastrophic common mode error 
b. Social shirking problem 
c. Overcompensation problem 
a. Catastrophic common-mode error 
Sagan argued that adding redundancy increases complexity, and goes on developing 
this observation further by stating that the addition of additional components to create 
the desired redundancy can unknowingly create a catastrophic common-mode error, i.e. 
a fault that causes all components to fail. Just because the architect of the system 
designed the redundant components to be completely independent, does not necessarily 
mean that in reality they are. Sagan demonstrates this by reference to the aircraft and 
nuclear power industries. Aircraft designers successfully argued that putting two engines 
instead of three on a Boeing 777 would result in lower accidents, as the ability of a failed 
engine to interfere with the others would decrease. Then in a nuclear power plant, where 
a safety device added at the last minute broke away and caused a pipe blockage. Sagan 
goes on to argue that in complex systems it is difficult to predict probabilities of failure, 
and as such it is hard to know when to stop adding redundancies. The argument ends 
up in a discussion of, "who guards the guards? and "who audits the auditors?". 
b. Social shirking problem 
This is where the reliability of the system is compromised by the diffusion of 
responsibility through what is termed, 'social shirking'. Again Sagan (2004) develops this 
observation further by looking at the 'translation problem' which he states is rarely 
examined within technical writings. The translation problem is when the pure mechanical 
theory of redundancy is attempted to be converted into the managerial systems of 
complex organisations. Redundant components within a mechanical system are 
56 
inanimate objects with no personal feelings or aspirations; they are thus totally unaware 
of the other components within the design. But in organisations the theory has to cope 
with people that consist of individuals, groups or departments that form the back-up 
system, and that are totally aware of each other. 
Intuitively one would assume that increased redundancy within a managerial back-up 
system should lead to greater reliability, but in practice it has been shown in many cases 
to fail. Sagan (2004) presents examples where this has occurred. This failure is due to 
the individual or group being aware of the other redundant systems and shirking off 
unpleasant duties, or just becoming less observant assuming that someone else will 
spot any problems. 
c. Overcompensation problem 
The addition of additional safety devices can cause managers to assume that they can 
push the system to ever increasing levels of output or to take chances that all will be 
well, when otherwise they would have halted the process/task. This 'sweating' of the 
organisations assets, pushing the system to its limits, actually reduces the reliability as 
the system is now operating within an entirely different scenario than was originally 
intended. Again Sagan presents a number of high profile examples where this has 
occurred with catastrophic results (Sagan 2004). 
2.6.6 Lessons to learn about redundancy 
The forgoing has shown three problems that can occur when designing redundancy into 
a complex system. The common 'knee-jerk' reaction to an incident, of increasing the 
safety systems, based on the proposition that this will increase the systems reliability 
has been shown to be false in some cases. This must be viewed in parallel with the 
realisation that low probability adverse events will occur from time to time, as this is 
natural and normal. Once it is accepted that there are limits to how reliable a complex 
tightly coupled system can be, it should be accepted that these systems are not perfect 
and that accidents will eventually happen, and that no matter how hard one tries, this 
fact will not alter. Knowledge of the ways that redundancy is effected by common-mode 
errors, social shirking, and overcompensation will not lead to a definitive set of equations 
to calculate how many and what type of redundancy systems to employ for a given 
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system and situation. But this awareness should help in their initial design and in-post 
incident investigations. 
It has just been described how a healthcare environment is a complex tightly coupled 
interactive system, and previously how from its own reports it is wasting approximately 
£2 billion per year and causing 30,000 to 40,000 needles deaths per year. In recognition 
to this the National Patient Safety Agency and health care organisations are looking 
towards high reliability organisations to enhance patient safety (Fear 2006). The 
understanding of high reliability organisations as systems as opposed to the person 
centred approach is in line with the thinking of Reason (1990) and others. 
2.6.7 High Reliability Organisations 
When describing high reliability organisations it is common to cite nuclear powered 
submarines and aircraft carriers as typical examples. Fear (2006) describes and 
compares the key points defining high reliability organisations with a health care setting 
as: 
.:. High reliability organisations work to high levels of safety despite operating in 
high risk environments . 
• :. Healthcare systems have many features of an high reliability organisations 
they are complex; they require distinct disciplines to work together; they often 
have to make decisions quickly in the absence of adequate information; and 
errors can have significant human and financial costs . 
• :. The main reason why healthcare organisations fall far short of being 
classified as high reliability organisations is that high reliability organisations 
do not fail. 
.:. For an high reliability organisations to succeed, its processes (which include 
sensitivity to operations, preoccupation with failure processes and strong 
commitment to resilience) and its process elements (which include auditing, 
avoiding quality degradation, risk perception) must be consistently applied at 
all times. 
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+:+ Another part of high reliability organisations is having the 'big picture' - in 
other words not everyone knows everything so communication between staff 
is vital. But more work is needed to understand how exactly high reliability 
organisations achieve reliability. 
+:+ Healthcare organisations are applying high reliability organisations processes 
to develop reliability checklists. This may be able to bring about 
improvements in both safety and performance. 
High Reliability Organisations 
and Safer Health Care 
National Patient Safety Agency 
Fear 2006 
Even though Fear (2006) published in a peer reviewed document, he has made a 
fundamental mistake in his key point relating to the reliability of high reliability 
organisations, they 'do' fail. This is amply demonstrated by Roberts and Tadmor (2002). 
In their article they describe the catastrophic failure of the USS Greeneville nuclear 
powered submarine, which when quickly surfacing hit a local fishing vessel and killed 
nine people. To quote Perrow (1999 p. 330): "accidents cannot be entirely avoided". 
Fear should have stated that "high reliability organisations rarely fail". That stated, the 
lessons that can be learned from these high reliability organisations are being applied 
into other less glamorous industries, even where the effects of failure are not so 
catastrophic. 
Communication is a main theme running throughout a high reliability organisation, as it is 
recognised that no one person can possibly know all of the actions that are taking place 
within such a complex and dynamic system. Therefore staff groups are not only task 
focused but appreciate the need to continue feeding the big picture. The system is 
fragile when resources are reduced, and as soon as key communications are lost, the 
high reliability organisation fails. Fear (2006) states that health care organisations are 
applying the lessons from high reliability organisations, but from the researcher's 
experience this approach is only in the early embryonic phase of development. He goes 
on to cite the work of Roberts and Tadmor (2002) and their work of applying lessons 
from the non-medical industries (Roberts and Tadmor 2002). 
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Perrow discusses the work of other researcher's that have contrasted Normal Accident 
Theory with High Reliability Theory. He argues that the supporters of high reliability 
theory believe that if we try harder we can overcome the proposed inevitability of 
accidents, and have virtually accident free systems. This is in total contrast to normal 
accident theory which states that there will always be accidents due to the complex 
interaction between tightly coupled systems. He also suggests that we need to examine 
organisations and systems that have not yet had accidents, in a similar manner that we 
would following an accident. He states this in his belief that one would conclude that the 
system was just waiting for an accident to happen. 
2.6.8 Managerial System 
From analysing a selection of the major incidents that have occurred throughout the 
world, one can determine that these illustrate the mistake of assuming compliance to 
'good industry' and/or 'national standards'. In the majority of cases the disasters resulted 
not from quantitatively calculated risks occurring, as statistically they always can, but 
from inadequate standards of operational management, e.g. Bhopal, Three Mile Island, 
etc, as referenced by Reason (Reason 2000). They stand as evidence against the 
assumption that plant and equipment failures are totally independent from managerial 
failings, as the collapse of managerial systems can lead to hazardous conditions quite 
separately from the type and condition of the infrastructure. This has been recognised 
throughout the world in the Healthcare industry. There has been a rapid increase in 
National Patient Safety type organisations throughout the world in recent years. They 
emphasis, either in whole or in large part, the need to focus attention towards 
managerial system design, organisation and operations in relation to assessing the risk 
that can be generated from these systems (Emslie 2005). 
As a result this thesis concentrates upon the managerial systems in place rather than 
the inherent reliability of the plant infrastructure and its engineering design and 
components. As such the research is operating from the hypothesis that the majority of 
the risks inherent within a Trust's maintenance regime lie within the management 
system, whose origins can be traced to decisions taken some time before an accident. 
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2.6.9 Managerial system failures 
These can be classified as either active or latent. Active failures are actions committed 
by those operatives at the 'sharp end'. They are the immediate cause of the incident; but 
they inherit the accident sequence as opposed to being its instigators. Latent failures are 
the result of decisions taken by senior managers within the organisation. These latter 
failures lie dormant within the managerial system for long periods, seldom producing 
adverse consequences by themselves until triggered by an active failure (Ramanujam, 
Goodman 2003). At this point they combine to breach the system's many defences. 
Major managerial decisions are formed from a combination of economic, political and 
financial constraints, in the same way that engineering designs are always a 
compromise. Hence it can be taken that these types of decisions will include some 
negative safety consequences for some part of the management system. Thus we 
cannot prevent all latent conditions but we can expose their existence before they 
combine to breach managerial systems' local defences (Reason 2005). 
The technological and design advances made since the birth of the NHS, particularly 
with regard to the engineered safety features have made the majority of installations 
proof against single failures, either human or technical. For a serious incident to occur it 
requires an unlikely combination of a number of contributing factors. Therefore instead of 
concentrating on the last incident and trying to develop local fixes the focus of risk 
managers is now being directed towards identifying and eliminating the worst latent 
problems. To avoid inconsistency when reviewing a managerial regime, the 'worst 
credible' case must be considered. By adopting this approach the aim of assuring that 
patients, staff, contractors and others would be safe in the event of the worst credible 
incident would be achieved by the implementation of a suitable assurance framework 
(Tweeddale 2003). 
2.6.10 The design of a Management system 
A managerial system must be designed to cope with both the steady state normal day-
to-day activity and to adequately respond to an emergency situation (disaster planning). 
This thesis only researches the estates' managerial systems for the normal day-to-day 
activity. 
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The joint Australian/New Zealand risk management standard shows a common graph 
that depicts the rise in risk as the available budget decreases for a steady state situation 
(Standards New Zealand 2005). This approach is complemented by that of Tweeddale 
as he argues that if there is a change in resource availability and costs are cut with 
subsequent drastic reductions in maintenance, supervision and training, the risks are 
likely to rise in a manner that cannot be totally predicted (Tweeddale 2003 p 205). He 
goes on to argue that any changes to the design of a managerial system must assess 
the probable increase/decrease in relative risk, and the assumptions made from such a 
study must be verified before, during and after any such action. 
Risk within an NHS Trust estates' engineering department arises from two sources, the 
as fitted engineering infrastructure and equipment, and human error. The latter topic of 
human error itself can be split into two sub-topics; these are the person approach and 
the system approach. The person approach focuses on the actions of people 'at the 
sharp end' and the respective errors of individuals, targeting their forgetfulness, 
inattention or moral weakness. The syst~ms approach centres upon the managerial 
systems surrounding their activities and attempts to build defences to avert errors or 
reduce their effects (Reason 2000). 
This thesis excludes both the inherent risk that is being generated from the engineering 
plant and equipment, and that created by the person approach, but it does investigate 
the risk created from the managerial system governing the estates' actions in relation to 
some engineering topics. 
Within process plants some equipment is fitted with very reliable shutdown systems for 
safety reasons. These are designed to activate in the event of a given condition(s). 
Within the specification these systems are required to be periodically tested to ensure 
continued safe operation of the installation, as an untested system cannot be relied 
upon. This thesis recommends that this philosophy must be duplicated when designing 
and operating a managerial system. It is well known that people are not machines; they 
have lapses of attention and do not follow rules precisely, they do not make important 
decisions well when under stress, they are emotional, etc. Therefore the managerial 
systems must be designed to account for such human behaviour. Kletz makes remarks 
to the effect that to blame human error for an accident is about as helpful as 'blaming 
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gravity for falls' (Kletz 1997). The principle that should be adopted where any single 
human error could lead to a catastrophic incident is that sooner or later it will happen, as 
the people involved will be nothing more than human (Tweeddale & May 2001). 
Differing tools are available for the assessment of risk in relation to a management 
system. Therefore managers must be aware of these tools, when to use them when 
assessing risk, and what the limitations are of each methodology. Aven and K0rte point 
out that 'engineers in general are not familiar with the details of alternative risk theories' 
(Aven & K0rte 2003) They also go on to argue that it is not sufficient to find fault with a 
particular technique and reject it, but that an alternative must be found that is less 
defective and can be seen as useful by the decision makers. This statement is also 
supported by Backlund and Hannu (2002) who go on to observe that a study must 
develop a detailed specification with the need to analyse and interpret the data produced 
before any management action is taken. But all agree that risk assessments should only 
be undertaken by those with experience based on the technology and managerial 
systems in use, and the environment that the systems will be operated within. 
2.6.11 Risk assessment of a managerial system 
Qualitative risk assessments are not precise, but the actual process of collectively 
questioning and analysing the system, develops a detailed insight into the separate 
components that create the risk. This in turn allows the team to concentrate on those 
areas of concern, and to develop risk reduction measures where they are most needed. 
However equal attention must be given to both the high-risk and low-risk components. 
This statement is supported by the work of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. employs risk assessment techniques for their engineering and 
managerial systems on a daily basis. For many years they relied on the Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis methodology for the identification and assessment of risks, until 
the Challenger disaster on 28th January 1986 (NASA 2002). From this period onwards 
they began to use a system known as probabilistic risk assessment. 
The failure modes and effects analysis approach begins with a process to be 
investigated, whereas the probabilistic risk assessment starts with an adverse outcome 
and employs a 'top down approach' that first models the outcome, and then investigates 
all combinations of process failures that could create this event. The probabilistic risk 
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assessment system was developed within the nuclear industries and is now used in 
other fields such as petrochemical, offshore platforms and defence. The system is now a 
mature and credible method, and has repeatedly proven its ability to uncover design and 
operational weaknesses not found by other means. The process has showed the 
importance of not only examining low-probability and high-consequence events, but also 
high-consequence scenarios that emerge as a result of a combination of high-probability 
and almost trivial events. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration states that 
'contrary to common perception, the latter is sometimes more detrimental than the 
former'. 
Marx and Sionim (2003) reported that the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organisations has required (since July 2001) that each accredited hospital 
develop at least one proactive risk analysis at least annually. The Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations recommended that Failure Mode Effects 
Analysis was one tool that could be applied to the task (Van der Schaaf, T. 2002). The 
National Patient Safety Agency has recommended a range of tools to assess risk within 
a managerial system; amongst these are Failure Mode Effects Analysis and probabilistic 
risk assessment (National Patient Safety Agency 2005). 
2.6.12 The disruptive role of non-novel events 
Marx and Sionim (2003) have incorporated both engineering equipment and human 
components into probabilistic risk assessment within the healthcare environment, thus 
transforming the approach from an equipment probabilistic risk assessment to a 
sociotechnical probabilistic risk assessment. Thus it has been recognised that 
probabilistic risk assessment has the potential to improve patient safety in healthcare, 
and can build on the results of Failure Mode Effects Analysis and other systems, but 
further research must be undertaken particularly in the area of human probability data 
(Wreathall and Nemeth 2004). However both the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and Marx at al state that whilst probabilistic risk assessment is an 
advantage, it is a very complex system to attempt to employ. 
Major disasters such as Chenoble and Three Mile Island have long interested 
organisational theorists as they provide the opportunity to study managerial processes 
that are not in equilibrium. Insight that has emerged from the literature over recent years 
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is that major disasters do not have proportionally large causes. It is now recognised that 
small events can link together in unexpected ways to create disproportionate and 
disastrous events. It is suggested that as production technologies become more 
sophisticated, interconnected and interdependent then the likelihood of chain reactions, 
where one event can reverberate throughout a system and cause numerous 
malfunctions, greatly increases the chance that a minor everyday event will lead to a 
major disaster. 
The analysis of disasters often focuses on the novel as opposed to the non-novel events 
that are sensed and resolved. Rudolph and Repenning state that in many cases both the 
novelty and quantity of interruptions to existing and established routines play a 
significant role in precipitating disaster, yet the role of quantity has received little 
attention (Rudolph & Repenning 2002). To investigate the interconnections of the 
quantity of small non-novel events and organisational crises, they constructed a dynamic 
mathematical model to simulate an ongoing stream of interruptions. They go on to cite 
the 1977 air disaster at Tenerife and the downing of a passenger jet by USS Vincennes, 
as in both cases these incidents were considered to be caused by such a stream of non-
novel interruptions. 
2.7 Rudolph and Repenning model theory 
The model was developed by building on in-depth analysis of a number of existing case 
studies and relevant psychological theory. But unlike formal models they developed the 
system from grounded theory, whose creation in the 1960's has been credited to Glaser 
and Strauss (1968). In their words, "The model synthesised the causal processes found 
in existing analyses of disaster and experimental studies of human performance under 
stress, to create a laboratory for studying and theorising about the connections between 
quantity and disaster." 
The simulation and analysis provided a new characterisation of how organisational 
systems respond to an ongoing stream of non-novel, survival threatening interruptions. 
The purpose of their research was to develop a general explanation of how small events 
can create a crisis. Central to understanding the role of quantity in organisational crises 
was the use of the Yerkes-Dodson Law that posits the relationship between stress and 
performance as an inverted 'U' shape. The result of their research is a theory explicitly 
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linking stress and performance concerning the role of interruptions in organisational 
collapse. 
The model was based on a number of key assumptions. One of these assumed that the 
organisation was faced with a continual (and potentially varying stream) of non-novel (as 
opposed to novel) interruptions. This is very similar to an estates department's reactive 
and planned preventative maintenance workload, as this consists of small risk tasks 
arriving in a random order. Their focus on non-novel did not imply that all such events 
were created equally or that they could be resolved without significant cognitive effort. 
Therefore they varied the number of mental steps that must be undertaken for various 
interruptions. This is again similar to the reactive maintenance problems that are 
generated within healthcare premises. Although made up of small individual and 
unrelated tasks they all require varying degrees of management time and engineering 
skill to complete them. 
They also assumed that resolving the pending interruptions was required for the 
organisation's survival. This is also equivalent to an estate department's need to close 
all reactive and planned preventative maintenance tasks, not always immediately but 
within a reasonable time span. Thus it is natural for there to be a constant source of 
tasks pending and waiting for action. 
To define the net interruption rate, a distinction was drawn between interruptions and 
errors. Interruptions were treated as exogenous inputs as they were created outside the 
system, and errors were classified as endogenous i.e. created inside the system. As 
errors arose then more effort was required to resolving the interruptions. As the number 
of interruptions increased then the probability of errors arising also increased. This is 
very similar to the activity to be found within an estates department, where because of 
the varying nature and quantity of the day-to-day maintenance work that is generated, 
errors are created by the operatives under stress. 
This approach created a simple 'stock and flow' structure for the Rudolph and 
Repenning model that simulated the ebb-and-flow of the interruptions that were being 
experienced. This developed a feedback mechanism from which past performance could 
be linked into the Yerkes-Dodson Law, which suggests an inverted U-shaped 
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relationship between stress and performance. Rudolph and Repenning recognise the 
controversial history that this law has attracted, but accept that the curve is an 
appropriate depiction of the relationship between stress and performance within the 
scope of their model. The historical vicissitudes of the Yerkes-Dodson law have been 
traced by Teigen (1994) and an introduction into stress/performance research is 
presented by Mendl (1999), who describes the law as 'a general description of the 
relationship between stress and cognitive function' (Mendl 1999; Teigen 1994). 
When their model is ran forward under varying conditions it shows the point where the 
performance of an organisation decreases and the stress levels increase, as the non-
novel interruptions increase. This research will show that their model very closely mirrors 
the activities experienced by an estates department when subjected to varying levels 
and rates of interruptions. Rudolph and Repenning conclude their findings by 
recommending that:-
Future research could be profitably focused on helping organisations assess their 
capacity to handle interruptions and develop systems to signal when the level of 
unresolved interruptions reaches a critical level. 
(Rudolph & Repenning 2002) 
This thesis will apply the findings of the above theoretical model to an estates 
department's actual data and determine this critical level. 
From the forgoing, an integral part of any managerial system must be the topics of 
monitoring and audit to give assurance that the agreed maintenance strategy was being 
adhered to and that the critical level was not close to being breached. That in turn would 
form the overarching assurance framework of the total management system. 
2.8 Assurance framework 
Monitoring is part of the day-to-day activity for a manager, for without monitoring issues 
are not being controlled. Therefore the monitoring role (internal governance control) 
must be subjected to the same performance criteria as any physical engineering safety 
device and must follow the same reporting structure as financial or production 
performance. Thus internal control is explicitly linked to risk management (Spira & Page, 
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2003). The national guidelines for NHS Trust Boards recognise this in the Integrated 
Governance Handbook 2006. An audit should be the second check on the monitoring 
activity and not the only backstop (Tweeddale 2003 p 295). 
The variables to be monitored within a managerial system must be department specific, 
and be based on specific hazards and hazardous scenarios of the working environment, 
as well as the more generic requirements of national good practice guidelines. These 
variables will by default include both qualitative and quantitative assessments of 
performance. However not everything needs to be monitored (Dobson, Lock & Martin, 
2006). 
It is a fallacy to assume that if an organisation has a low rate of accidents and incidents 
that these figures can be used as an indicator that the managerial system is sound. 
Tweeddale (2001) claims that there is sufficient evidence to support this observation, 
and goes on to cite Flixborough and its low level of lost time through injury figures. He 
then states that this is not an isolated example and that numerous other cases could be 
quoted. Also it must be recognised that the limitation of historically determined risks is 
that the computations may not be relevant for future predictions. The management 
system requires a range of decision support tools and indicators to continuously assess 
risk against agreed levels, and give assurance as to the stability and robustness of the 
managerial system, i.e. audits must be undertaken (Tweeddale 2001). 
2.9 Audit 
The need for audits arises when accountability cannot be continued by informal 
relationships of trust alone, but must be placed on a formalised footing, made visible, 
transparent and be subjected to independent validation. Audit is generally only visible 
following a failure, and has become the central plank to ways of discussing the 
administrative control of an organisation. This in turn usually leads to calls for more 
policing (audit), but rarely for a detailed analysis of why the system had failed. The 
traditional style of such audits concentrated on basic tasks and employed engineering-
based quality control techniques with statistically grounded methods of analysis. But 
these systems based audits could become rituals governed by a mentality that created a 
mind set concerned only with compliance against a pre-agreed process. 
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In contrast the modern audit looks at the systems of control in relation to corporate 
governance issues. As such they indirectly act on the systems of internal control, as 
opposed to the first order activities. Thus audit has become a 'control of control', where 
what is being assessed is the quality of the internal control systems, rather than the 
tasks themselves. Therefore this style of audit assists in demonstrating the excellence of 
control and not the quality of the output. As inbuilt into the audit would be questions that 
related to the relevance and efficiency of the system, "o/k you are doing it, but why are 
you doing it?", "is it the correct thing to do?", and finally, "could it be done better?" 
The transparency of the audit process, how the audit was conducted, by whom and into 
which areas is an integral part of the quality of the audit process itself. Just as 
importantly is the need for transparency of the audit findings within a government body 
such as the NHS. This has now been created through the Freedom of Information Act. 
Whatever the merits of the act, it has exposed the NHS managerial systems to the gaze 
of the public. 
One of the objectives of a modern audit relates to continual organisational improvement. 
Russell (2004) states that: very few top quality managers have received an adequate 
level of quality management training. He goes on to argue that even now (the start of the 
21 st Century) quality management principles are not normally taught to university 
business students, and that the same could be said for other students going into other 
professions e.g. safety, health and environment (Russell, 2004). 
There is a distinct difference between the tasks of monitoring and audit. The former is 
associated with what should be normal managerial day-to-day activities of checking that 
various tasks have been completed to a pre-agreed timeframe and output standard. The 
latter relates to a periodic (normally yearly) in-depth examination conducted at two 
levels, strategic and operational (Donaldson & Armstrong 2000). Strategic level audits 
investigate whether the key organisational requirements are being met, such as financial 
and budgetary constraints, service levels to be achieved and key performance 
indicators. Operational audits confirm (or otherwise) compliance with topics such as the 
agreed planned maintenance regime, procurement methods, staff competencies, etc. In 
order to audit these topics clear statements of procedures and the methodology for 
assessing outputs need to be developed. These assessments can be qualitative and 
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quantitative. From the audits conducted by BSRIA (BSRIA, 2000) into a sample of 
organisations other than NHS estates department's common failures were found across 
a range of headings such as: 
+!+ Maintenance organisation and resourcing 
+!+ Planning and management of operation and maintenance 
+!+ Health and safety issues 
+!+ Financial management control 
+!+ Records 
They also investigated different types of audit regimes to establish if business critical 
systems were being addressed. Within their research they investigated different types of 
business, and reported that each required a unique focus and criteria for determining 
business critical aspects. Therefore one of the purposes of an audit is to give assurance 
that the relevant standards are being achieved. As a managerial system may appear 
satisfactory, the only means of really knowing how well it is understood and operated is 
to test it. There are numerous standards and guidelines issued that organisations should 
be complying with. Much information has been published discussing the integration of 
these standards, but there is comparatively little documentation relating to how to 
actually build up such an audit system (Beckmerhagen et al. 2003). 
Within the NHS there are two types of audit; the first is an internal audit that is 
undertaken by a specialist department, the second is an external audit where this activity 
is contracted to an independent company. The latter is normally commissioned to 
undertake work where a high degree of technical speciality is required. 
Karapetrovic and Willborn (2000) have recognised that specialist standards and 
corresponding management systems have many critical characteristics in common. 
Thus a generic integrated management system should be able to be designed that could 
offer guidance to all managers of an organisation to present them with a clear view of 
the complex managerial tasks which they should be performing to identify and manage 
risk. This is also applicable to auditors, where from the design of a systematic, well 
designed and executed integrated audit, all participants would be aware of the overall 
goal of the audit. A short history of the problems that organisations are facing due to the 
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lack of such an integrated system has been written by Karapetrovic and Willborn (1998). 
Beckmerhagen et al. (2003) cites a number of examples where organisations have 
benefited from such an integrated audit approach. They go on to state that to undertake 
such integrated audits, auditors must learn new skills and adopt a new kind of audit, to 
one that "assists management to integrate function-specific management systems". The 
design of the new audit must be developed from a multi-professional team. Thus a truly 
integrated audit would be one where the organisation is assessed via a group, as 
opposed to an overall audit based on a number of separate audits undertaken by 
individual specialists. (Karapetrovic & Willborn, 2000; Karapetrovic & Willborn, 1998) 
In response to the need for an integrated audit system ISO 19011 :2002 was produced 
which replaced six previous ISO standards. It gives guidelines for quality and/or 
environmental management systems auditing (British Standards Institution, 2002). The 
standard is presented as a generic process as opposed to a procedure, which can be 
applied to other types of audits such as other management system audits. 
2.9.1 NHS Trust audit committees 
To promote the modern role of audit committees the NHS has published an updated 
handbook that makes explicit reference to the assurance framework that has been 
specifically designed to shape the local audit committee's responsibilities in relation to 
risk assessment and management activities (NHS Audit Committee, 2005). Reference 
within the document has also been made to the strands of governance that bind together 
the financial and clinical risks, thus emphasising that today's audit committees have a 
responsibility for analysing the risks and controls that affect all of a Trust's aspects of 
business. They must focus on the risks, controls and related assurances that deliver the 
organisation's objectives (the assurance framework), in particular the Statement of 
Internal Control that is included within the Annual Report and Accounts. The handbook 
recommends that the committee concentrate their efforts where the inherent risk is high 
and their control mechanisms are critical, and also where the residual risk is high and 
the situation needs monitoring. 
Part of the audit process is to ensure that when senior managers make decisions that 
affect the available resource levels for maintenance, they do so with the demonstrable 
understanding of the effects their decisions will have on the risk to the organisation, be 
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these positive or negative in nature. However as the Healthcare Commission is charged 
with auditing the national standards, any maintenance strategy adopted must be 
'evidence based'. In this way assurance can be demonstrated, and arguments presented 
as to why certain actions (or non-actions) were taken when assessed against the 
relevant standards. 
In order to practice good governance it is necessary for managers to be constantly 
appraised of the performance of their organisation when assessed against measurable 
output targets. This information must show the history of performance over the years, 
and the progress trends against projected aims. This necessitates the design 
implementation and maintenance of a day-to-day monitoring system, or more correctly 
termed: an assurance framework. The creation of such a framework in relation to this 
thesis must by necessity conform to the five criteria headings shown below: 
a. International standards 
b. National standards 
c. Existing systems 
d. Multi-professional 
e. Revenue budget 
a. International standards 
The inherent design of such a system must match the recognised international 
standards through to locally set values and principles. The international standards would 
be in the form of ISO 9000 series which is a family of principles for quality management 
systems, and ISO 19011 which relates to the integrated audit of systems. As the 
structure is dealing with processes within the NHS then reference must also be made to 
the Australian/NZ Risk Management standard, because the NHS risk management 
process is based on these guiding principles. All of which must be underpinned by 
reference to mainstream academic theory. Without compliance to these criteria then 
whatever system was developed could not be regarded as 'fit for purpose'. 
b. National standards 
These begin with the national codes of practice issued by the NHS. For the eight 
engineering systems analysed within this research, and take the form of Health 
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Technical Memorandum issued by the Department of Health. These in turn are closely 
linked to the national standards issued by the Healthcare Commission and those 
published by the NHS Litigation Authority. 
c. Existing systems 
Use must be made of the existing staffing structures and job descriptions, as there would 
in all probability not be the resources to employ additional staff for monitoring purposes. 
In addition any computerisation of the monitoring system should use existing hardware 
and software. 
d Multi-professional 
Although this research is dealing with engineering systems the 
electro/mechanical/pneumatic processes form part of a complex interactive tightly 
coupled managerial system that affects either directly or indirectly the delivery of patient 
care. As such the need for monitoring spans much further that that of the engineering 
management team. Therefore the monitoring system must be applicable to a range of 
professions within the service. 
e Revenue budget 
The researcher has set the criterion that the final design must achieve a zero revenue 
impact on the Trust's budget. If the monitoring system failed to attain this then the 
researcher considers that there would be great difficulty in persuading Trust's to adopt 
such a system. 
2.10 Discussion 
This research programme began with the publication by the Department of Health that 
outlined the severe managerial failings within the National Health Service, that were 
creating unacceptable conditions of patient safety (Department of Health, 2000), this 
was followed by an informal meeting chaired by the researcher, which consisted of ten 
experienced NHS estates maintenance managers, as discussed in section 1.5. The first 
output from this meeting was the following research question: 
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'Do the managerial systems of internal control within the National Health Service 
(NHS) assure that the day-to-day building service engineering maintenance 
activities conform to their respective national guidelines?' 
The literature search showed that no study had been published that could adequately 
answer this question, Therefore the aim of this research is to determine if unknown 
latent conditions exist within the NHS maintenance department's managerial systems 
that could cause intolerable/substantial harm to patients; and if the managerial systems 
do not give such adequate assurance, determine how this could be achieved. From this 
aim the following four research objectives were formed: 
First research objective 
Develop and implement a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to 
assess if the managerial systems of internal control within the National Health 
Service (NHS) give adequate assurance that the day-to-day building service 
engineering maintenance activities conform to their respective national 
guidelines. 
If the response to this first research objective was positive, and that the managerial 
systems do give adequate assurance then the research was to cease. However if the 
response was negative and that it was shown that the managerial systems were 
inadequate and do not give suitable assurance then the second, third and fourth 
research objectives were to be undertaken: 
Second research objective 
Develop and implement a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to 
assess the resource needs to correct the existing managerial system deficiencies 
to that required by their relevant National Health Service standard. 
Third research objective 
Develop and implement a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to 
assess the directly employed artisan revenue resources needed to ensure that 
the maintenance activities conform to the National Health Service standards. 
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Fourth research objective 
Develop a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to monitor the day-to-
day activities of the maintenance department in line with the requirements of the 
National Health Service standards. 
2.11 Chapter Two Summary 
This chapter began with a short description of reliability and risk, and the balance that 
must be achieved between these two topics when designing a maintenance strategy. 
The Department of Health's national guidance relating to the formation of a Trust's 
maintenance strategy issued in the year 2002 was discussed, and compared to that 
published in 1973. From this assessment it was seen that there has been no change in 
policy over the 30 intervening years, and that a Trust is free to create its own 
maintenance strategy to reflect local conditions and budgets. The term maintenance was 
examined and it was shown that this included the managerial activities as well as the 
physical artisan tasks, thus forming a total system. The artisan tasks were then broken 
down into the two categories of reactive and planned preventative maintenance, and 
examples were given for each type. 
The use of computers within maintenance departments was shown to be widespread 
throughout the NHS, and that the NHS had abandoned the development of a centralised 
form of software. This has forced Trusts to purchase commercial packages to assist in 
the management of their data needs, and as a consequence there is no national data 
bank containing quantitative records relating to maintenance activity or reliability 
statistics. The use of simulation models of the past was shown to be of little practical use 
to the NHS maintenance manager, even though there have been various attempts to 
develop such a system over the years. The type of maintenance strategy to be adopted 
was considered, and an argument developed that showed that actuarial analysis relating 
to the relationship between operating age and failure is of little use to the NHS day-to-
day maintenance manager. This led to the statement that the maintenance strategy 
should be targeted towards the system known as Reliability Centred Maintenance. 
The assumption that plant and equipment failures are totally independent of managerial 
failures was discussed, as was the research that showed that the vast majority of 
incidents are caused through managerial decisions, actions or inactions. This focused 
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the chapter into the risks associated with the day-to-day activities of managerial 
systems, as opposed to those being generated from the physical plant and equipment. 
Normal accident theory was discussed and concluded with the observation from its 
founder Perrow (1999) that the supporters of high reliability theory believe that if we try 
harder we could overcome the proposed inevitability of accidents, and have a virtually 
accident free systems. This in total contrast to normal accident theory which states that: 
there will always be accidents due to the complex interaction between tightly coupled 
systems. He also suggests that we need to examine organisations and systems that 
have not yet had accidents, in a similar manner that we would following an accident. He 
does this in his belief that one would conclude that the system was just waiting for an 
accident to happen. 
The creation of a suitable managerial system was then debated along with the two main 
techniques used to assess the risks associated with such a design. From this debate two 
themes emerged relating to normal day-to-day activities (Le. non-emergency). The first 
was the identification of the tipping point where an organisation eventually fails to cope 
with an ever increasing workload, and the second was the need for monitoring/audit 
programmes to be designed and implemented. 
A research model relating to an inherent failure of a management system due to the 
quantity of non-novel interruptions during normal day-to-day activities was examined, 
and a parallel was made between the model's outputs and that of a typical NHS estates 
department. It was then stated that this thesis would test the concept of this theoretical 
model against actual data from an NHS estates organisation. 
Finally the need for and development of an assurance framework was discussed along 
with the call for an integrated monitoring and audit programme to be implemented. 
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Chapter Three Methodology 
3.1 The research methodology 
The literature search chapter showed that there were no comparable studies undertaken 
or relative data available to address the research question: 
'Do the managerial systems of internal control within the National Health Service 
(NHS) assure that the day-to-day building service engineering maintenance 
activities conform to their respective national guidelines?' 
As discussed within section 2.10, in order to address this research question four 
research objectives were formed, for each a separate research instrument methodology 
and process was designed. 
Central to the methodology of each research instrument was the use of 'Expert 
Elicitation' techniques and 'Expert Judgement'. In cases where there is a lack of suitable 
information or data, (as in this case), and/or the creation and collection of the data 
needed is prohibitively expensive and/or time consuming to collect, (as in this case) 
then, 'Expert Judgement' is employed as it characterises the 'state of knowledge' (Meyer 
& Booker, 2001). This term is also referenced as expert opinion, subjective judgement, 
expert forecast, best estimate, educated guess or expert knowledge; where an expert is 
regarded as a person who has a specialist understanding of a particular subject by 
his/her peers (Meyer & Booker, 2001). The extraction of the expert's knowledge is via 
the use of expert elicitation techniques, this has been defined as: 
'Expert elicitation refers to a systematic approach to synthesize subjective 
judgments of experts on a subject where there is uncertainty due to insufficient 
data, when such data is unattainable because of physical constraints or lack of 
resources. It seeks to make explicit and utilizable the unpublished knowledge 
and wisdom in the heads of experts, based on their accumulated experience and 
expertise, including their insight in the limitations, strengths and weaknesses of 
the published knowledge and available data.' 
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Expert Elicitation 
RIVM letter report 63000400112008 
Although the origins of expert elicitation can be traced back to the 1950's, the research 
work undertaken by Meyer and Booker discuss at length the difficulty of choosing the 
correct elicitation technique and components for a particular project. They state that, 
'unfortunately, there is little comparative literature on the methods, and the few sources 
that exist may provide conflicting advice'. They suggest that the standard methods and 
components should be listed, compared and reasons for their final choice be recorded 
and agreed with the project sponsors and participants before undertaking the study, 
particularly if these are to be tailored to suit a particular situation (Meyer & Booker, 
2001). Following their advice, an overview of the elicitation process is presented below 
with particular reference to this research project. 
3.1.1 Overview of the elicitation process followed 
The methodologies employed for the elicitation of expert judgements are either formal or 
informal. With the informal approach experts are asked to provide opinions off the 'top of 
their heads'. This is subject to bias and skews the judgment from a given reference 
point. Formal methods for gathering the responses from experts involve the selection of 
the experts, designing the elicitation methods and determining the mode in which expert 
is to respond. This latter approach has two major advantages. Firstly more time can be 
spent in gathering the information in a controlled environment. Secondly documentation 
and records are developed showing how the judgements were created for future auditing 
and analysis. 
There are a range of elicitation processes that differ in areas such as: interaction 
between experts, number of meetings and their frequency, time spent preparing for the 
meetings and the time each meeting takes and the response modes used. Meyer and 
Booker state that even with the variety of the elicitation processes there are only three 
basic situations, these are: 
Individual interviews 
In this case each expert is interviewed alone in a face-to-face situation, this can 
extend to a series of meetings over a period of months where the interviewer 
travels to each expert. The advantages of this methodology are that it is regarded 
as the best method for gathering detailed data, and avoids the problems with 
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group dynamics. The disadvantages relate to the extended length of time it takes 
to gather the data, labour intensive, expensive and it suffers from the lack of 
interactivity with other experts. 
Interactive groups 
In these situations the experts meet in a group with face-to-face interaction. The 
meeting can follow the traditional unstructured approach or can be structured to 
prevent spontaneous interaction. The advantages to this type of approach are 
that it gives a more accurate data set, and generates a greater quantity of ideas. 
The disadvantages are that it creates the potential for group think bias and the 
logistical problem of scheduling the meetings between the experts. 
Delphi situations are where the experts operate in isolation from one another 
and submit their responses to a moderator, who then redistributes them to the 
other participants but keeping the authors identity secret. The experts are then 
allowed to revise their own judgments if they wish in the light of this new 
information until (if possible) a consensus is reached. The advantage of this 
system is that it avoids the potential of group dynamics influencing the outputs. 
However the main disadvantages are that there is less synergism created 
between the participants and is normally the most time consuming of the three 
systems. 
3.1.2 Modes of communication 
In combination with each of the three elicitation processes above communication can be 
face-to-face, telephone and mail (either post or e-mail). However it would be common for 
the face-to-face mode to be used for the individual or group interactions and telephone 
and/or mail for the Delphi system. 
The face-to-face mode being time consuming, labour intensive and expensive but with 
the advantages of eliciting detailed information. This, whilst the telephone method can 
be used to discuss limited amounts of information it, is normally less expensive than 
face-to-face interaction and quicker than the mail mode. Alternatively the mail mode is 
frequently used within the Delphi method to extract simple data from a large sample 
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population and is cheaper than the face-to-face mode but has the lowest response rate 
of all of the modes. 
3.1.3 Choice of Elicitation process 
The data to be collected consists of a substantial amount of detailed technical responses 
across a range of eight specialist topics. Also the subject matter directly influenced 
patient safety therefore the timescale for the process had to be kept short, and costs had 
to be minimised. Therefore an interactive group (focus group) via a series of structured 
meetings with the researcher acting in a process consultation role (Schein 1997) was 
chosen as the vehicle for the data gathering exercise as opposed to other expert 
elicitation methods (Meyer & Booker, 2001; Ayyub, 2001) as speed of response and 
face-to-face interaction amongst the group were high priorities for the researcher. 
3.1.4 Selecting from the response modes 
There are various response modes relating to each of the three elicitation methods of 
individual interviews, interactive groups and Delphi. A brief outline of these is given in 
table 2 which highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each. 
Table 2 Differing response modes and examples showing their advantages 
and disadvantages. 
Response mode Example Advantages for Disadvantages for experts experts 
Physical quantity Temperature, Little difficulty in Decomposition of the 
Pressure understanding question is needed 
Probability estimate 15% of an Commonly used in Very time consuming 
event conjunction with and most experts are 
occurring established analysis not good at 
techniques estimating 
probabilities 
1 chance in Convenient form of Small sample of 
Odds ratio 10,000 of an estimating rare events effect the 
event events estimates 
occurring 
Min 15, mean Same as probability Same as probability 
Probability 20, max 45, estimate estimate 
distribution from a triangular 
distribution 
Continuous scales End points Most people appear Requires time to 
represent reliable when using develop the scales to 
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Response mode Example Advantages for Disadvantages for 
experts experts 
extreme these scales fit a particular 
values application 
separated by 
linear divisions 
Comparing A Most people reliable Time consuming to 
Pairwise to B is as only two discuss all 
comparisons reciprocal of B quantities are comparisons and toA discussed comparing more than 
seven things is 
difficult 
Either or both Experts find ranking As above 
Ranks or Ratings numerical or easy to use 
descriptors 
Combination Can combine various Requires 
Bayesian updating of different sources of data assumptions about 
sources of distributions 
information 
3.1.5 Designing and Tailoring the Elicitation 
Tverskyand Kahneman (1974) have extensively researched the inability of people to 
accurately predict the percentage probability of an outcome. The effect that this problem 
has had on various projects and situations has been the subject of much critiCism and 
research (Conrow, 2003). Therefore the response modes relating to the assessment of 
percentage probabilities were rejected. As there was a lack of information relating to 
these topics then the Bayesian methodology was also rejected. The timescales needed 
to undertake a comparison or rank and rating study eliminated this method. These 
arguments reduced the response modes to: physical quantity and/or continuous scales. 
3.1.6 Selecting the type of Aggregation 
In order to form a single answer to a question from the responses of various experts 
then an aggregation process must be employed. The types of process fall into one of 
two methods; behavioural or mathematical. The former relies on the experts reaching a 
consensus during the elicitation session. The latter employs mathematical processes to 
form the single consensus output. As the choice of elicitation process was an interactive 
group, the aggregation system employed was the behavioural process. In this case the 
averaging of the expert's responses was taken to obtain a single output. Averaging in 
this way gives equal weight to each participant's expertise (Ortiz, Hora, Meyer & 
Keeney, 1991). 
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3.1.7 Designing the individual questions 
The proposed accomplishments of the project were stated at the end of chapter two by 
defining the research purpose (goals). This in turn dictated the topics to be analysed and 
from the literature search it was shown that the issues could have an intolerable! 
significant impact on the patient; and that related sources of information from 
experimental, observational or validated computer models were not reliable and!or not 
available (Ortiz, Hora, Meyer & Keeney, 1991). 
The questions under each topic have to be designed to reflect the overall purpose (goal) 
of the research project. They have to be sufficiently specific to allow the expert to answer 
without ambiguity if possible, and the magnitude and level of detail of the data required 
to answer the question must be assessed. In addition the ordering of the question sets 
must follow a logical pattern and they must be phrased in a non-leading way (Ortiz, 
Hora, Meyer & Keeney, 1991; Meyer & Booker, 2001; Ayyub, 2001; 0ien, 1998). 
3.1.8 Selecting the experts 
If the study is to focus on the experts answers then a different type (and usually number) 
of experts are needed compared to the type of study that focuses on the experts 
problem-solving techniques. For applications studying risk/reliability and decision 
analysis the former type of expert is needed. This type of expert needs two types of skill. 
The first being substantive expertise that comes from knowledge and experience in the 
question field. The second relates to the type of response required from the expert to 
answer the question known as normative expertise, e.g. percentage compliance to a 
national standard. Also to ensure that the question (problem) is viewed from a number of 
angles it is advisable to employ experts from a diversity of backgrounds. As the selection 
schemes used to chose the participants could skew the final result, careful consideration 
must be given to the composition of the expert group, their motivation for participating 
and their accessibility (Meyer & Booker, 2001) (Ayyub, 2001). 
3.1.9 Designing and Tailoring the Elicitation 
The forgoing paragraphs have summarised the main parts of the expert elicitation 
process and reduced them down to the design suitable for this research objective, this 
being both the adoption of a structured multi-professional interactive group (focus group) 
and individual interviews, both generating single answers of physical quantity and!or 
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continuous scales to a series of detailed questions via a consensus agreement. Where 
the topics under investigation are divided into a number of discrete questions, each is 
specifically designed to be easily answered, by experts with substantive and normative 
knowledge. 
3.2 Development of the first research instrument 
The first research objective is a similar problem to that faced by Ramanujam and 
Goodman (2003). In their research they collected data from 80 organisations, which had 
undergone numerous mergers and reorganisations, but where their core operating 
policies and procedures had remained the same. This is very similar to the situation of 
NHS Trust estates departments. Their research assessed the quality of internal control 
as evidenced by the organisation's compliance with rules and regulations. Following 
their lead, critical elements (questions) were developed based on the respective NHS 
codes and the eight engineering topics identified by the initial focus group (see section 
1.5). Each critical element represents a major discrete component within the guidance in 
the form of a question. Three examples of the critical elements developed are shown 
below: 
a. Water temperature control It is essential to check the temperature settings 
and operation of all water mixing devices routinely, at least half yearly. 
b. Ventilation fire containment Regular tests, at intervals agreed with the local 
fire prevention officer, will need to be carried out in order to demonstrate the 
continuing efficiency of the fire detection and containment systems. Records 
of these tests should be kept. 
c. Lightning protection Where lightning protection systems are provided they 
shall be subject to a yearly planned preventive maintenance inspection and 
report. 
The critical elements were formed from the 'exact wording' (i.e. copied) from the relative 
standards where possible, in order to avoid misinterpretation of the actual meaning of 
the standards. 
Following the formation of a series of critical elements, it was necessary to determine a 
Trust's actual managerial activity against these critical elements, in this way any gaps in 
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managerial performance would be identified. In the words of Ramanujam and Goodman 
(2003) these gaps are the: 'uncorrected deviations from procedures and policies that 
have no direct adverse consequences', i.e. they are latent conditions. In order to capture 
the expert's response mode to the question of conformance to national standards, a 
series of utility functions were developed. 
3.2.1 The need for and design of Utility Functions 
The normal method within the NHS of assessing risk from reference to the standard 
NHS 5x5 criticality grid shown below in table 3, where descriptions of Impact and 
Likelihood are matched against the Trust's understanding of these terms (Department of 
Health 2004). 
This thesis argues against the use of a 5x5 criticality grid to assess the risk of any 
managerial non-conformances because: 
.:. There is an inability of like professional and managerial groups to rank risk on 
a consistent basis therefore this is not a reliable system (Conrow, 2003) . 
• :. It is unclear how to score management systems that are only partially 
compliant to the required standards. 
Table 3 
Potential 
Consequences 
NHS qualitative risk assessment grid 
There are various risk assessment techniques in common use (British Standards 
Institution 1991), but they are time consuming to implement, and rely on an assessment 
of the probability of failure of the system as a key component of their methodology. 
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Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have extensively researched the inability of people to 
accurately predict the percentage probability of an outcome. The effect that this problem 
has had on various projects and situations has been the subject of much criticism and 
research (Conrow, 2003). For this reason the use of probability assessments was 
rejected, and in their place the research of Keeney and Raiffa into the development and 
use of Utility Functions was employed (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). 
The recognised algorithm dictating the relationship between risk and its components 
percentage probability of failure and the impact of that failure is: 
Risk = probability x impact 
By holding the impact constant then risk is proportional to the percentage probability of 
failure. Unfortunately it is not possible to directly measure the percentage probability of 
failure of a NHS managerial system relating to maintenance. From this the researcher 
made the assumption that for a managerial system that relied on conformance to 
national standards, then risk would be at a maximum when the percentage conformance 
was zero (Le. no conformance), and at a minimum when the percentage conformance 
was at (or near) maximum (Le. 100%) . Therefore the researcher suggested that risk 
was inversely proportional to the percentage conformance to the national standards for 
these scenarios. 
Risk a %Probability a 1/%Compliance 
Thus by assessing the percentage of compliance (a physical quantity) of a managerial 
systems critical elements to the respective national standard, then this would form a 
proxy assessment of the systems percentage probability of failure, and thus of risk. As 
the two end points were fixed at zero percentage and full (100%) compliance the mid 
points could be assessed utilising expert elicitation techniques ((Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; 
Meyer & Booker, 2001; Ayyub, 2001). 
Following the observations above the researcher solicited the assistance of five 
experienced estates managers, to act as experts within the field of NHS maintenance 
needs and NHS national standards requirements. Their role was to develop a series of 
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generic utility functions that Trust focus groups could use as a template to aid their 
judgements relating to the risk posed by a managerial system. 
As the process involved the elicitation and collection of 'detailed data' the individual 
interview face-to-face mode of communication was used as the preferred option in this 
case, as opposed to use of the telephone or mail, as discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter. The use of individual as opposed to group elicitation was to remove the 
possibility of group dynamic effects, and preserving the individual's anonymity denied 
the participants the opportunity to converse between themselves and compare/influence 
their observations. The combined outputs of the five experts were then aggregated by 
the researcher to form the generic utility functions. It was these generic utility functions 
were to be employed by all Trusts within the analysis, using the diagrammatic method 
(USA Department of Defence, 2002) when assessing the risk generated by the 
inadequacies of their managerial systems. 
The five experts were judged by the researcher to have equal levels of experience and 
knowledge of the eight engineering maintenance topics. Each expert was individually 
interviewed by the researcher and initially asked to review the critical elements and 
assess the level of impact should each critical element fail in service, by making 
reference to the NHS 5x5 criticality grid descriptors for potential consequences of failure 
(impact). Each expert observed that over 95% of the levels of impact assigned to the 
critical elements were level five, i.e. there would probably be a catastrophic failure. 
Following this observation each expert agreed that the most important utility function to 
design first would be that relating to level five. 
The researcher then asked each expert to choose a critical element from those attracting 
an impact score of five at random. Then they were asked to sketch a curve between two 
axis of risk and percentage compliance to national standards. The experts were 
instructed that the curve was to represent their assessment of the rate of change in risk 
as the percentage compliance of the topic under scrutiny rose from zero compliance up 
to a full (100%) compliance in steps of 10%. This was repeated for ten critical elements. 
In all cases the general shape of their curves followed a common outline of an 
exponential form. The researcher then repeated the process two weeks later with each 
expert (Meyer, Miniszewski & Peaslee, 1989). The curves from each expert were 
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aggregated using a simple averaging of the scores (0rtiz, Wheeler & Breeding 1991). 
The resulting curve suggesting the relationship between risk and percentage compliance 
took an exponential shape and when subjected to a simple curve fitting exercise an 
excellent closeness of fit was formed from the algorithm shown below: 
Curve algorithm for an impact of five = (1-eX) 
Where: x was the product of impact value (five), percentage compliance and a 
constant. 
The researcher then formed the curves (utility functions) for impact of one, two three and 
four from reference to the algorithm for this initial curve. A further interview took place 
with each expert to determine their assessment of the five generic utility functions, in 
terms of their ability to act as templates to guide Trust focus groups decisions, relating to 
the risk posed by the inadequacies within their managerial systems. Agreement was 
received from all five experts as to the curves general use. As agreement was given by 
all five experts, the researcher considered that further development work in this area 
was not warranted. These five utility functions are shown below in figure 2. 
Figure 2 
Q) 
The series of five generic Utility Functions created for and used to 
develop the Risk Profile. 
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Each of the utility functions was assigned a weighting to reflect the impact of total failure 
of the management system (i.e. 0% compliance). As the management system improves 
for a given weighting then the value of the function decreases, thus reducing the value of 
the perceived risk score, until total compliance of the management system with the 
recognised standards is achieved at 100%. 
The utility functions are shown against the commonly used NHS traffic light system of 
red, amber and green to denote the seriousness of the risk. The focus group consisting 
between eight and twelve people from the Trust analysing the management system then 
followed two steps: 
1. Assessed the impact if the management system under investigation were to fail, 
assuming zero percentage compliance, i.e. there was no management system in 
place. This determined which one of the five utility functions to employ. 
2. Compared the existing management system against the recommended 
standards across the X axis, and read the assessed risk score from the Y axis. 
A trait of the utility functions is that for management systems that are considered to have 
the greatest impact if failure were to occur (numbers 5 and 4), then their percentage 
conformance must be very high before the level of risk that they are generating begins to 
fall below their respective maximum scores. However, this rate of change decreases as 
the weighting decreases culminating in a gradual decrease in risk score for utility 
function number 1. The five functions were developed to link into the NHS 5x5 criticality 
grid definitions for user impact. Therefore, by using the standard algorithm below for risk 
a simple conversion of the utility function scores was made. 
Risk = probability x impact 
As the consequences of failure, and the assessed risk score, were known from using the 
utility functions, then the 5x5 criticality grid value for likelihood was found. This allowed 
Trusts to enter the resulting scores into their overall risk register for comparison and 
prioritisation against other identified failings within their organisation. A comparison of 
the values generated from the five utility functions, and the resulting 5x5 grid scores 
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developed from the conversion methodology employing the simple equation above, was 
made to determine the relationship between the two. The graph below (Figure 3) shows 
pictorially the closeness of fit. 
Figure 3 A pictorial representation of the relationship between the Utility 
Functions and the NHS 5x5 criticality grid of perceived risk scores. 
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For each of the five utility functions the percentage compliance was varied from 100% 
down to 0%. This produced the curves shown in blue and labelled - 'True'. 
Corresponding 5x5 criticality grid values were computed, coloured red and 
superimposed upon the former and labelled - 'Matrix'. The advantages of using the 
utility curves were: 
.:. Transparency and generation of repeatable assessed risk scores 
.:. Ease of understanding and use by the individual(s) and/or evaluation team(s) 
When this research began the first ten participating Trusts used a series of six utility 
functions as opposed to the five shown above. Since these first ten risk profiles were 
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developed, the researcher has reduced the number of utility functions used by focus 
groups down from six to five. Since this reduction there has been no change in the 
process of uncovering any latent conditions by each group, but it has made it easier for 
them to simulate the utility function shapes with the five criticality grid descriptors for 
impact. The impact descriptors are the same as those for the weighting used within the 
model to determine which utility function curve to chose when assessing the risk being 
generated from a particular critical element. It is the output from these initial ten risk 
profiles that are presented within the results section. 
The focus group employed a desk top exercise only (no on-site inspections/audit) 
normally spanning one or two consecutive days. The researcher read the wording of 
each critical element from an overhead screen via a spreadsheet layout. The screen 
layout used is shown below in table 4. 
Table 4 
Critical 
Element 
No 1 
N02 
etc 
The spreadsheet layout for the assessment of risk scores for each 
critical element. 
Weighting Percentage Probability Impact Assessed Risk Compliance Score 
5 95 5 3 15 
1 100 1 1 1 
4 75 4 5 19 
The focus group then discussed the critical element's meaning in these terms, and 
agreed the impact that would most probably occur if there were no management system 
in place to regulate the element; i.e. 0% compliance with the existing managerial system. 
The level of impact so determined was assigned a weighting on a scale of one to five for 
impact. This weighting exercise choose which one of the five utility function curves to 
adopt when assessing the perceived risk that was being generated from this particular 
critical element. The group then agreed the percentage compliance that the department 
is believed to be actually achieving from its existing managerial system for this particular 
critical element. This ranged from 0% to 100% compliance. Algorithms within the 
overhead display then automatically calculated the resultant assessed risk score and 
display it on the screen alongside the conversions of the score into the NHS 5x5 
criticality grid components of probability and impact. 
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The score for probability was subject to rounding errors due to the conversion into an 
integer format. This thesis considers that this slight error was acceptable as it was the 
assessed risk score that was used within the final analysis. The probability and impact 
components are only shown to aid the group develop a sense of understanding and trust 
in the model's design. The display is dynamic in nature, thereby allowing the group to 
challenge their assumptions and analyse scenarios of 'what if' , e.g. what if the 
percentage compliance was actually 70% when they estimated only 60%. In this way 
they experienced for themselves the robustness of the model's outputs against their own 
perceptions of the level of perceived risk that was being generated. All of the critical 
elements were subjected to this type of assessment. On completion the researcher then 
reconfigured the data to rank the assessed risk scores into a 'Risk Profile' for their 
department. Figure 4 below shows a typical Risk Profile for a NHS Trust estate's 
department. 
Figure 4 A typical Risk Profile for a NHS Trust estate's department 
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Critical Elements 
The risk profile was shown alongside the NHS Traffic Light system to give the group a 
perspective of the scale of assessed risk they believed was being generated. Again at 
this point they had the option of going back into the body of the spreadsheet to challenge 
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1 ... 1 
and question some of their assumptions, and see the effect of any changes on the 
resulting risk profile. 
When the group had agreed the final version of the profile, the researcher then 
presented the profile and salient features to the totality of the estates managers and the 
shop-floor staff within a large group meeting. The researcher then solicited comment. On 
receiving general agreement on the output the researcher then held individual meetings 
with the Trust's specialist advisors to seek their comments and confirmation of the 
assessed risk profile. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
For each NHS Trust taking part within this research the process involved the 
participation of a multi-disciplinary team drawn from the Trust's own senior managers, 
each acting in the capacity of a specialist advisor. The titles of these managers were 
typically: -
+:+ Director of Finance and Chief Internal Auditor; 
+:+ Facilities Manager, Estates Manager and his/her management team; 
+:+ Risk Manager and the Corporate Governance coordinator; 
+:+ Control of Infection officer, Fire officer and the Trust's Microbiologist; 
Individual presentations of the research techniques, critical elements and anticipated 
output were given to each specialist advisor. The reason for individual meetings is to 
eliminate as far as possible any group dynamics influencing their decisions, comments, 
etc (Cook & Slack, 1991). 
Next a group presentation was given to the estate's senior managers and the shop floor 
staff. Following this presentation approximately four volunteers were requested from the 
shop-floor to work alongside the estates managers within a focus group, where the 
researcher acted in a 'process consultation' role to the group. The specific aim of this 
focus group was to compare the department's actual activity against the critical elements 
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identified from the relevant standards, and assess the risk relating to any non-
conformances. Following these risk assessments the group was disbanded. 
It was considered by the researcher a necessity to form such a group to produce the 
output, as no single manager would know all of the activities/non-activities being 
undertaken, and that the situation needed a group interaction to stimulate an informed 
debate to quickly structure a collective opinion. The management of the focus group and 
the mechanisms employed to control the main influencing factors affecting their 
collective judgement; are discussed later within this chapter. 
3.2.4 Confirmation of the assessed Risk Profile 
An individual meeting with each of the Trust's specialist advisors was then arranged. 
Within these meetings the facilitator presented an overview of the work to-date, and 
summarised the findings/discussions. The specialist advisors were then invited to 
comment and to challenge the assumptions made, on the resulting assessed risk scores 
and the overall profile by making reference to the base data. When agreement had been 
reached the assessed risk profile, was confirmed, and the output was regarded as a 
reasonable representation of the assessed risks that the Trust, patients and staff were 
being exposed to. A short presentation was given by the researcher to the Trust Board 
members, of the methodology and the output from the multi-disciplinary group. The 
Board then decided what course of action to take next. 
The number of active participants within each of the 31 Trusts contributing to the data 
collection for this first research objective was between eight to twelve people within the 
focus groups, and involved six to eight specialist advisors. Thus between 496 and 620 
experts were consulted as part of this first research objective data gathering exercise. 
3.2.5 The main influencing criteria on the risk score. 
When designing the methodology used to expose the latent risks within the estates 
department's managerial systems, reference was made to the criteria contained within 
the literature search and the researchers personal experience that would influence the 
Trust's assessment of their risk score (Meyer & Booker, 2001). Table 5 below lists these 
main influencing criteria. 
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Table 5 The main influencing criteria upon the risk score. 
Influencing Criteria 
Actions of the researcher 
Group dynamics 
Understanding of methodology 
Shape of utility functions 
Knowledge of existing managerial systems 
Assessment of weighting 
Cross-over of skills 
Anchoring 
a. Actions of the researcher 
The methodology adopts a series of utility functions, which assists the focus groups to 
assess the risk that their managerial systems are generating. These utility functions 
were designed to mimic the rate of change of risk with respect to the percentage 
compliance of a management system. As this technique was new to the Trusts' involved, 
the researcher helped the groups to manage the assessment process. 
Although the term researcher is used here, the actual methodology employed Process 
Consultation (Schein 1997, Schein 1998). This system differs from facilitation 
techniques, in that the researcher is not regarded as an 'expert' being engaged to solve 
some predetermined problem. Nor is he/she acting in a 'patient-doctor' role, where 
he/she is being asked to determine what the problem is, and to then to develop a cure. 
By adopting the process consultation role, the client (the Trust) is guided into retaining 
both the diagnostic and remedial initiative. This type of approach is much praised and 
practised by Belton and Stewart (Belton and Stewart 2003) in their work relating to 
similar managerial focus group activities. 
Throughout the development of all the risk profiles, the same researcher (the author) 
conducted all seminars, focus groups and data analysis. Thus, continuity throughout the 
study could be regarded as constant. The main role of the researcher was to: -
.:. Build a relationship with each focus group i.e. a psychological contact 
.:. Train each group in the basic concepts and use of the methodology. 
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.:. Bring to the focus groups some 'content knowledge', of the technical and/or 
organisational issues surrounding the managerial systems . 
• :. Refrain from directly contributing to the discussions and decision making 
processes, and remain strictly neutral. 
Therefore, the researcher's responsibility was to help the focus groups to perceive and 
understand the task in hand, by guiding them towards developing a common 
understanding of the situation. 
b. Group dynamics 
The methodology employed to develop the risk profile for a Trust split naturally into four 
discrete parts: 
Initial presentations 
This first part described the objectives and processes for the development of the 
risk profile. Focus group meetings are attended by all of the departments' 
engineering officers and artisan staff. One-to-one discussions were reserved for 
the Trust's specialist advisors. As the initial meetings were only to introduce the 
overall concept and to describe the output of the model, there was little room for 
any adverse group dynamic activity (Cook & Slack, 1991). 
Workshop 
Representatives from the department's engineering and artisan staff attended 
this focus group session. The total numbers within a group ranged between eight 
and ten representatives, normally evenly split between the managerial and shop 
floor staff. It was in this arena that the group assigned weightings and percentage 
compliance values to each critical element in turn. From these assessments the 
overall risk profile was formed. The workshop created a potential forum for 
adverse behaviour to develop, but the participants were advised of this 
possibility, together with the need for the researcher to monitor and control the 
proceedings, whilst being totally impartial throughout. 
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In all cases the outputs from the groups were ratified by the Trust's specialist 
advisors before being finalised. None of the focus groups' risk assessments were 
rejected by the specialist advisors, therefore, showing the success of the process 
to control the effects of group dynamics. 
Final presentations to specialist advisors 
These meetings took place between the researcher and each of the Trust's 
specialist advisors, on a one-to-one basis. Thus the group dynamic influence was 
automatically removed, as previously discussed. 
Final departmental meeting 
The last presentation was to the total departmental workforce as a single group. 
The researcher advised the group of the salient points raised in the development 
of the risk profile. This final meeting was more of an advisory presentation to all 
people within the department, but was also used as an opportunity for any last 
minute discussion. 
c. Understanding of methodology 
Without understanding the basic concepts of the methodology, then risk could not be 
assessed with any degree of confidence. Therefore, a detailed explanation of the 
methodology was presented by the researcher to all of the participants, and their 
views/agreements sought 'before' the creation of the risk profile began. 
d. Shape of utility functions 
When using the utility functions to create the risk profile, the participants within the 
workshops and specialist advisors were encouraged to alter the weightings and 
percentage compliance values to see the effect on the risk score. In this way the 
sensitivity of their responses were immediately demonstrated. This gave the groups 
confidence in the robustness of the final risk score developed (Armstrong 1985), and as 
such they have reallocated existing resources to close the identified managerial gaps. 
e. Knowledge of existing managerial systems 
This criterion is only applicable when assessing the percentage conformance of the 
existing managerial systems when viewed against the national standards required. 
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Therefore, the main contributors to this part of the model were the engineering officers 
and artisan staffs within the workshop groups. By combining both types of personnel 
together within a single focus group, the lack of knowledge of one part of the group was 
counter-balanced by the other. 
f. Assessment of weighting 
An assessment of the weighting took into account the 'as-fitted-infrastructure' and 
corresponding managerial system; combined with the perceived effects on the patient 
should that unique system fail. As these three components affected each Trust 
differently, then within the sample group of Trusts studied the weighting for each critical 
element could not be expected to be similar from Trust-to-Trust. An alternative 
interpretation for such a skewed weighting distribution would be to suggest that some 
Trusts did not assess the importance of the critical element correctly. That in turn is to 
suggest that the combined experience of multi-disciplinary teams within a number of 
Trusts totally failed to appreciate the seriousness of the risk being posed by their 
managerial systems. It is highly improbable that one (let alone a number of) highly 
qualified and experienced multi-disciplinary focus groups could produce consistently 
incorrect assessments. 
g. Cross-over of skills 
Each of the Trusts formed a focus group to assess the risk generated from the 
managerial systems practiced. These consisted of a core number of engineering officers 
and artisans, supported by specialist advisors. A common trait between each member of 
the groups was that each possessed a certain level of technical and managerial 
knowledge/skill of the other professions. This gave an inbuilt 'safety mechanism' that 
checked each assessment made regarding both the weighting and percentage 
compliance of each critical element. 
h. Anchoring 
Anchoring has been explicitly defined as 'bias in judgements under uncertainty' (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). As the entire risk profile is based on qualitative and not quantitative 
judgements, the effects of anchoring on the robustness of the risk profile are explored 
below. Two forms of anchoring are discussed, firstly that caused by suggestion and 
secondly by a near experience. 
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Two disparate groups within each Trust assessed the risk that was being generated from 
the managerial systems within the estates departments. The contribution that each of 
the two groups made to the process are discussed below: -
The focus group was composed of engineering officers and representatives from the 
shop floor. They (as a group) had extensive and detailed practical experience of the 
Trust's as-fitted-infrastructure and its probable impact of failure on the patient population. 
This was complemented with a good appreciation of the existing managerial systems 
and their compliance to the national standards and guidelines. 
The specialist advisors all possessed excellent theoretical knowledge within their 
specified areas, and had all practiced their profession in the field for a number of years, 
at a high level of managerial seniority within the NHS. These facts in turn gave them a 
high level of understanding of the probable impact that the failure of any critical element 
would have on the patient. They did not have (either as a group or as individuals) a high 
degree of familiarity with the existing managerial systems, or their compliance with 
national standards or guidelines. 
Table 6 below summarises the contribution that each of the two groups made to the 
assessment process for both the weighting and percentage compliance components of 
the utility functions. 
Table 6 The contribution of each group to the overall assessment of risk. 
Knowledge of 'as Appreciation of Percentage 
Group fitted probable impact of 
compliance of the 
infrastructure' failure on patients managerial 
systems 
Focus Group Hiqh Medium Hiah 
Trust specialist 
advisors Low High Low 
The skills within the two columns to the left of table 6 influenced the weighting of the 
utility functions. The levels of expertise within the right hand column had an effect on the 
assessment of the existing managerial systems compliance with national standards and 
guidance. 
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The focus group initially assessed the risk of each critical element using the utility 
functions. This assessment was then tested by the researcher and the group by varying 
both the weighting and percentage compliance values on the risk score to the group. 
This greatly aided the discussions and belief that their final assessment of risk was 
robust. The specialist advisors were then presented (on a one-to-one basis) with a 
summary of the findings of the focus group. This data was supported with the option for 
them to view the detailed analysis developed, and to undertake simulations on the 
assessments. Therefore by combining the skills of both groups a robust assessment of 
the overall risk profile was developed. It has been suggested by Mussweiler and Strack 
(2000) that: 
The amount of knowledge a judge has about a target determines the magnitude 
of the anchoring effect. Thus, a small distribution about the mean is developed 
when a high knowledge base exists, the reverse being true when a low level of 
expertise is available. 
The focus group created the first estimates of risk. Table 6 shows the considerable skill 
base that the focus group members possessed. The output from the workshop created 
an anchor for the specialist advisors, but as the second group held a very high 
knowledge base, the magnitude of the anchoring effect was probably negligible. 
The outputs from the workshops were questioned by the specialist advisor groups 
throughout the development of all of the risk profiles. But these discussions centred 
more on areas of clarification rather than on direct challenges to the risk score assessed. 
In all cases none of the risk assessments developed by the focus groups were altered by 
the specialist advisors. This agreement by the two groups supports the work of 
Mussweiler and Stack (2000). 
The second form of anchoring referenced as a near experience, would be created by an 
'incident or near miss' occurring in recent times relating to one or more critical elements. 
This would heighten awareness of both groups within a Trust, which in turn could 
influence judgement. No known anchoring effects were discussed within the focus 
groups during the development of the risk profiles. 
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The results from this first research objective are shown within chapter four of this thesis 
and confirm without doubt that: 
The managerial systems of internal control within the National Health Service 
(NHS) do not give adequate assurance that the day-to-day building service 
engineering maintenance activities conform to their respective national 
guidelines. 
Therefore the researcher developed methodologies to address the second, third and 
fourth research objectives. 
3.3 Development of the second research instrument 
The second research objective developed a robust, transparent and repeatable 
methodology to assess the resource needs to correct the existing managerial system 
deficiencies to that required by their relevant National Health Service standard, via risk 
treatment plans with the specific aim of reducing the assessed risks to levels acceptable 
to the Trust. Not all of the 31 Trusts participating within the first research objective 
considered that they needed to undertake such a detailed study to assess their resource 
need as required within this second objective. Therefore the number of Trusts 
contributing data to this second research objective was reduced from 31 to 27 Trusts. 
For the output of this second objective the researcher developed and presented a 
hypothetical assessment of the likely resource needs to close the managerial gaps 
identified within the red and amber zones, to the Trust estates senior managers 
(experts) again using expert elicitation techniques, for their discussion and adjustment to 
meet their local conditions. These outputs were then subjected to a Monty Carlo 
simulation as recommended by HM Treasury to allow for uncertainty within the expert's 
resource assessments (HM Treasury 2003). Only these latent conditions within the red 
and amber zones were analysed as it is they that were believed to be posing the 
greatest risks. The three resources included within the study are outlined below: 
Manpower 
It was assumed that a competent engineering officer was assigned to the task of 
closing the identified gaps for 100% of his/her time. 
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Outsource Cost 
These figures related to any specialist services that were procured from consultants 
and/or contractors to assist with the closure of the gaps. 
Timeframe 
Two types of timeframe were developed. The first related to an estimate of the 
'actual' time the engineering officer would expend in completing the managerial tasks 
to close the gaps. The second referred to the estimated 'process' time that naturally 
occurs to complete all of the tasks to close the gaps. This included delays, such as 
co-ordinating diaries for a meeting, contractor set up time before undertaking a task, 
etc. 
First the manpower and outsource costs were assessed in parallel (as explained below), 
then the overall timeframe was estimated by combining the 'actual' and 'process' time 
scales together using an industry standard Gantt Chart software package. 
The managerial gaps within the red and amber zones were grouped into the eight topics 
e.g. water, electricity, etc, as discussed in section 1.5. Then, they were further 
subdivided into practical clusters. This approach can be exemplified using the piped 
medical gas topic as an example: -
Assume that a major potential problem had been identified with the accuracy and 
quantity of the 'as fitted' drawings for the site. Also, assume that not all of the 
isolating valves were numbered correctly. From a practical viewpoint these two 
critical elements were combined into one work task; because, as the drawings 
were brought up to date, then the renumbering of the isolating valves would also 
be undertaken. 
Once the practical clusters were formed, then each cluster in turn was sub-divided into 
work tasks and split between engineering officer and outsource tasks. Continuing with 
the Piped Medical Gas problem just described, table 7 below shows an example of a 
partially finished assessment. 
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The man day estimations were restricted to three days or less. If it was considered that 
the time to complete the task would probably be greater than this, then, that particular 
task was again further subdivided until all of the tasks showed less than three days. The 
reason for splitting these tasks up to identify those of less than three days was that, in 
the opinion and experience of the researcher, people have great difficulty assessing 
more than three day's output with any reliable degree of accuracy. 
The time scales assigned to each task were estimated using professional judgement and 
experience only, and represent the mean 'actual' time that the engineering officer would 
be expected to take. Unlike the construction industry that has national norms associated 
with artisan tasks (e.g. a bricklayer can lay 1000 bricks/day in mid-summer), there is no 
such central reference for the type of managerial tasks described above. 
Table 7 Example of a partially completed assessment for Piped Medical Gas 
Engineering Outsource Confidence 
Tasks Officer Costs level 
(man days) (£) (l, M or H) 
PMG Record Drawings 
Engineering Officer 
Develop specification & tender 2 H documents 
Issue tenders 0.5 H 
Tender analysis 1 H 
Meeting with the preferred bidder 1 H 
Management of contractor on site 
assume 2hrs/cuircuit for 15 circuits 4 M 
say 4 days 
Mop up session with contractor 1 H 
Outsource Cost 
Survey 15 circuits say 1 circuits/day 9000 L 
at £300/day for 2 men 
Develop CAD records say 4 1000 M 
circuits/day at £250/day 
3.3.1 Procedure 
Against each of the estimations a level of confidence was assigned by between five and 
eight engineering officers operating within a focus group. The reasons for the use of a 
focus group as opposed to other forms of expert elicitation processes have been 
previously discussed at the beginning of this chapter. These confidence levels range 
102 
• 
• 
between Low, Medium and High, and represented the assessor's view of his/her 
accuracy. These levels were used to conduct a Monte Carlo simulation of the final 
agreed means, as described later in this chapter. 
Once all of the clusters had been assessed in this way, their values were transferred into 
a Gantt chart where their respective process times were added. The tasks and sub-tasks 
were linked together where necessary, and the resources levelled to avoid over 
allocation and work peaks. The resulting documents were presented to the estates 
department senior officers for comment to ensure that any local site anomalies were 
accounted for before the Monte Carlo analysis began. Following agreement between the 
parties then a standard Monte Carlo simulation was undertaken. 
As each task/sub-task was allocated a level of confidence, a probability distribution was 
automatically assigned. The shape of the distribution was determined from the level of 
confidence. This research used a triangle style distribution as this is commonly used for 
rough modelling, and has been found to be acceptable to Trusts. The spread about the 
mean of the distributions differed for each of the three levels of confidence as shown 
below: 
Low 
Medium 
High 
-20%, +20% 
-20%, +25% 
-20%, +30% 
The reason for the skewed distribution for the medium and low levels was to reflect the 
group interaction effects and the ability of people to accurately predict the effort required 
to complete difficult and/or unfamiliar tasks. This research work created these 
distribution limits from experience in the field, and they have been accepted by all of the 
27 Trusts and between the 135 to 216 engineering officers taking part within this second 
research objective. A typical example of this form of final output from an off-the-shelf 
software package is shown in figure 5 below. This shows that the analysis estimates that 
409 man-days of an engineering officer's time were required to close all of the gaps that 
fell within the red and amber zones identified within the risk profile. 
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Figure 5 Typical Monte Carlo output for the estimated totality of an 
engineering officer's actual time needed to close the managerial gaps identified 
within the risk profile. 
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This section only assessed the resource needs to 'close' the identified gaps. It did not 
attempt to estimate the revenue resources required to 'keep' the gaps closed. From the 
+30 years experience of the researcher as an NHS estates manager it was considered 
that the bulk of the essential resources involved to keep these gaps closed would relate 
to the artisan activities of both contract and directly employed labour. The methodology 
employed to assess this type of revenue resource needs is described in the next section 
of this chapter that addresses the third research objective, which is to: 
Develop a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to assess the directly 
employed artisan revenue resources needed to ensure that the maintenance 
activities conform to the National Health Service standards. 
3.4 Development of the third research instrument 
Section 2.4 discussed the lack of an NHS centralised maintenance data base from which 
to draw quantitative information relating to the maintenance function within healthcare 
organisations. This section also highlighted the research work of Labib (2004) and the 
inability of computerised maintenance management systems to have any decision 
making capability. Section 2.4.1 discussed the role and need for maintenance simulation 
models and the dynamic nature of the maintenance function (Sherwin, 2000), and the 
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problems of trying to use historical information (Moubray, 1997). This is followed by 
section 2.4.2 that cites the work of AI-Zubaidi (1997) in relation to the dynamic and 
unpredictable nature of reactive maintenance within a healthcare environment, and the 
work of Zubaidi and Christer (1997) in relation to the need, design and use of 
maintenance simulation models within a healthcare setting, together with the research 
work of Mjema (2002) employing simulation techniques within a manufacturing situation 
facing similar problems. Section 2.7 introduces the research work of Rudolf and 
Repenning (2003) and their simulation of non-novel interruptions on an organisations 
outputs (similar to the environment within healthcare maintenance organisations) which 
was developed using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1968). 
From reference to the above, the development of the third research instrument began 
with the design by the researcher of a 'proof of concept model' based on the research 
work of Rudolf and Repenning (2002) incorporating the findings of AI-Zubaidi (1997) and 
Zubaidi and Christer (1997). From the success of this concept model, detailed 
discussions were then held with each of the eight Trust's participating within this section 
of the research. These discussions were undertaken within eight separate focus groups 
(one for each Trust). In each case the participants were a multi-professional group 
consisting of the Trust's senior managers and were regarded as 'experts', e.g. the 
estate's, risk, fire and internal audit managers. The use of focus groups and the 
reasoning for employing this type of expert elicitation technique has been discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter. 
These focus groups were formed to develop a clear understanding of the problem to be 
solved which was the output from the third research objective: 
Develop a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to assess the directly 
employed artisan revenue resources needed to ensure that the maintenance 
activities conform to the National Health Service standards. 
It was agreed by the group that the research instrument to be used to create this output 
was to be a simulation model based on the successful demonstration by the researcher 
of the 'proof of concept' model. 
105 
The group then defined and agreed the inputs and outputs required by a detailed 
simulation program, and the assumptions and algorithms to be employed, i.e. effectively 
forming a brief for the researcher to follow. The researcher then converted these 
requirements into a computer simulation program, tested the program for correct 
operation and produced the outputs for analysis. The individual focus groups then 
discussed these outputs against their original brief and used this information to inform 
their decisions, in relation to the allocation of their limited trust wide resources to where 
they would do most good. This in effect allowed the focus group members to determine 
the Trust's risk appetite, and form an output specification for their maintenance 
department. 
The following paragraphs discuss in detail the development of this third research 
instrument, the techniques employed, experts involvement and outputs, beginning with 
the creation of the 'proof of concept model'. 
3.4.1 Procedure 
Within the scope of this research the generation of tasks for the day-to-day operations 
and maintenance of an NHS estates department involves data from two discrete areas. 
That data required to comply with national policies which take the form of Planned 
Preventative Maintenance programs, and the data concerned with local reactive 
maintenance needs of the Trust's buildings. The rate at which these reactive 
maintenance tasks are required to be completed on a week-by-week basis over the 
course of a calendar year is not linear. It has been stated by AI-Zubaidi and Christer 
(1997) that this work flow into the department is 'random in time, random in nature and 
random in location' (AI-Zubaidi, 1997; AI-Zubaidi & Christer 1997). 
The workforce to complete these combined planned preventative maintenance and 
reactive tasks is a hybrid mix of a Trust's directly employed labour (e.g. electricians, 
fitters, plumbers, etc) and contractors. For the most part contractors are rarely used to 
undertake reactive maintenance tasks, due to their lack of local knowledge in terms of 
both the 'as fitted' infrastructure and protocol relating to their interaction with 
medical/clinical staffs and patients. Therefore their workload (in the vast majority of 
cases) relates to some planned preventative maintenance tasks only. 
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Eight Trusts participated within the scope of this third research objective. From 
interviews with their respective estates managers it was agreed that in the vast majority 
of cases when resources were scarce (e.g. lack of immediately available manpower), the 
reactive maintenance tasks are completed as priority issues over those scheduled within 
the planned maintenance programme; this leads to some planned maintenance tasks 
not being completed. 
When a planned preventative maintenance task is undertaken on an item of plant and/or 
equipment and the results are found to be within the acceptable limits of the 
specification, then the risk posed to the organisation, etc, is regarded as being 
acceptable. As time progresses to the next planned inspection/test/examination the risk 
will naturally begin to rise up to the next time period for inspection. At this point the risk 
will have risen to its acceptable maximum; it is this value that is termed the residual risk. 
This 'saw tooth' type rise and fall between these inspections would in the normal cause 
of events continue throughout the lifespan of the plant/equipment. 
If the next planned inspection were not undertaken then the risk would continue to rise 
with time and the plant/equipment would be classed as being in potential failure mode. 
The level of the impact of the failure, should it materialise, would depend on the type and 
location of the plant/equipment that had actually failed. As the purpose of a planned 
maintenance programme is to reduce the likelihood of a building's plant and/or 
equipment failing to perform within a predefined set of limits, then the inability to detect 
any such plant/equipment failure will increase risk to the organisation. Two types of 
planned preventative maintenance task are undertaken within the NHS. The first is an 
invasive inspection e.g. the changing of a filter. This first type of planned preventative 
maintenance task is a true planned preventative maintenance action, as it prevents the 
system from deteriorating beyond a pre-determined tolerance level. The second type of 
planned preventative maintenance is a non-invasive inspection. This addresses the 
condition of the system and is designed to record readings, for example temperature 
and/or pressure. The term planned preventative maintenance that is assigned to these 
non-invasive tasks is historic and dates back to when planned preventative maintenance 
was first introduced into the NHS. In these modern times this term should not be used as 
these types of actions do not 'prevent' any deterioration of the system. They merely 
confirm (or not) that the system is operating between acceptable limits. Figure 6 below 
107 
was derived from a similar sketch within the international guidance for the 
Australian/New Zealand risk management standard (Standards New Zealand 2005). It 
depicts the fall in perceived risk as the available budget (resource) is increased. The fall 
in risk is assumed to level as the budget for the organisation approaches the ideal, 
where the ideal point is regarded as the budget allocation that funds all of the tasks 
necessary to match both national and local standards. At this point the remaining risk 
experienced by the organisation/stakeholders, etc is that of the residual risk and that any 
budget increase after the ideal point will have negligible impact in risk reduction. The 
figure also depicts the level of perceived risk where an organisation under-funds their 
maintenance activity below the ideal point, and where they are not putting their limited 
resources to where they will do the most good. 
Figure 6 
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The effects of varying budget allocation with respect to the 
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As shown within the results chapter of this research, as resources are withdrawn from 
the planned preventative maintenance system (invasive and non-invasive) the risk rises 
until the overall level becomes unacceptable to the Trust, i.e. the 'Tipping Point' is 
breached. 
Rudolph and Repenning (2002) developed a dynamic model to simulate an organisation 
and investigate the elements affecting this Tipping Point. Their model which was 
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described within the Literature review chapter of this thesis, attempted to mimic the 
actions of an organisation that was so overwhelmed by a series of non-novel 
interruptions (tasks) over a short period of time, that for those involved the levels of 
stress exceeded the Tipping Point (as theorised by the Yerkes-Dodson Law), and they 
were unable to clear all of their tasks within the allotted time, which led to a disaster 
occurring. From reference to the Rudolph and Repenning model, a simple 
representation was designed by the researcher as a 'proof of concept model' to reflect 
the situation that occurs within a typical NHS Trust estates department when resources 
are withdrawn and the assessed risk begins to rise. This was achieved by keeping the 
same terminology but making the following two fundamental assumptions. In summary 
these were: 
a. Within the original model a time delay was developed to mimic the period 
between the need for the organisation to increase their rate of resolving 
interruptions/minute, and the organisation realising that they needed to increase 
this rate. As the timeframe for the estates simulation is operating with a 
timeframe of weeks as opposed to minutes, the need to include this realisation 
time was removed and treated as a constant. 
b. The NHS has for a number of years operated a national productivity scheme to 
monitor the output of the artisan workforce. If their performance output fell then 
the shop floor wages were affected accordingly. This monitoring scheme was 
totally disbanded in the year 2006 from all NHS Trusts. From the evidence from 
two large acute hospital sample sites it was observed that these productivity 
levels were unaffected by workload pending. Therefore based on this evidence 
the effects on stress have been neutralised within this simulation programme. 
The two assumptions above reduce the original Rudolph and Repenning model to one of 
a simple stock and flow structure as shown below. 
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Figure 7 The basic stock and flow structure of interruptions in organisations 
as reproduced from the Rudolph and Repenning paper (2002). 
Interruption Arrival 
Rate (inflow) 
Interruptions Pending 
(stock) 
Interruption Resolution 
Rate (outflow) 
In the simplified estates model the Interruption Arrival Rate (inflow) was the number of 
man hours required to complete all of the tasks for a given week. This arrival rate was 
not constant but varied dependant on the summation of the reactive maintenance needs 
and the planned preventative maintenance tasks for the week, again assessed in hours. 
The Interruption Resolution Rate (outflow) is the rate that the workforce could complete 
the set tasks, measured in hours/week. This rate again varies from week-to-week as it is 
affected by staff holidays, sickness, unfilled vacancies, etc. 
Any tasks that were unable to be completed for a given week remain as stock in the 
system (Interruptions Pending). During normal operations both the inflow and outflow 
varied independently, and slack time was developed that allowed the stock of tasks to be 
reduced. If the manpower of the organisation was reduced the stock of tasks built up. It 
was stated earlier that the reactive maintenance tasks were always completed before 
any planned preventative maintenance tasks, therefore this build up of stock was 
actually a backlog of uncompleted planned preventative maintenance tasks. If planned 
preventative maintenance work was not completed then the risk posed to the 
organisation, staff, stakeholders, etc, began to increase. 
Therefore a Microsoft 'Excel 20.03 macro' was designed by the researcher to simulate 
the simplified estates 'stock and flow' model just described so to observe the effects of 
risk for varying levels of manpower availability. This was chosen as the preferred 
software media for a number of significant reasons, but namely the ability to 
demonstrate transparency of the model's algorithms and assumptions to the Trusts 
involved as this software is commonly used throughout NHS organisations (Armstrong 
1985). 
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In order to give a sense of authenticity the simple estates 'proof of concept' model was 
developed from actual data relating to the planned preventative maintenance tasks for 
the fitting and plumbing trades from the 650 bed Hospital referenced as site S within this 
thesis in order to preserve their anonymity. This gave an average workforce need of 56 
hrs per week over a year, but the need varied between 104.5 and 31 hrs/week. In order 
for a level of risk to be computed should a planned preventative maintenance task fail to 
be completed, values of impact were assessed, using the NHS 5x5 criticality grid. A 
cumulative probability distribution profile was also assessed for each task, should the 
frequency of inspection be missed. 
For the dummy data it was assumed that a hospital's planned preventative maintenance 
system accounted for approximately 40% of the total day-to-day workload, the remaining 
60% being reactive maintenance. From the work of AI-Zubaidi and Christer (1997) they 
stated that the reactive maintenance workload for an acute hospital was random, 
therefore for the purposes of the test a reactive workload was developed with a mean of 
84 hrs/week over a year, but varying between 97 and 84 hrs/week. The combined 
planned preventative maintenance and reactive workload formed the 'dummy' input to 
the simulation model. Eleven simulations were run for varying constant levels of 
manpower availability from 70 hrs/week to 170 hrs/week in steps of 10 hrs for a two year 
timeframe. It was assumed that at the start of each simulation the whole planned 
preventative maintenance system had previously been fully resourced and that the only 
risk that was being generated was to the level of the residual risk. Thus a common 
starting point was formed for each simulation. The resulting levels of risk generated for 
each step down in manpower availability were recorded, and the graph in figure 8 
obtained. 
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Figure 8 Output from the simulation of reducing manpower availability and 
the effect on the organisations level of risk for the simplified estates model. 
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Rudolph and Repenning (2002) developed the central notion within their analysis that 
'organisations can have tipping points beyond which their response to interruptions 
changes dramatically'. In the simple estates simulation model the term interruptions was 
changed to refer to maintenance tasks to be completed. As the available manpower 
resource reduced the tipping point was breached and the estates response was seen to 
change dramatically. 
In the original Rudolph and Repenning model the interruption arrival rate was varied 
whilst the organisation's manpower to deal with the interruptions was constant. In the 
dummy estates model the reverse was true. The interruption arrival rate (maintenance 
tasks per week) was held constant but the manpower availability to undertake the 
maintenance tasks was varied. At a maximum manpower level of availability, the peaks 
and troughs of the maintenance tasks arriving and the corresponding peaks and troughs 
of the reactive maintenance needs created opportunities for the system to regain a state 
of relative equilibrium. In the beginning, as the manpower availability was reduced with 
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each simulation run the ability of the organisation to deal with the incoming tasks was 
not significantly effected, as any increase in resulting risk from the stock of uncompleted 
maintenance tasks was negligible. However once the available manpower was reduced 
to between 140 and 150 hrs per week the system quickly began to descend into crisis, in 
a similar way to the original Rudolph and Repenning model. They observed that from the 
system dynamics of their model: 
.:. The Tipping Point only needs to be exceeded for a moment to create 
disaster . 
• :. The wider the variation in arrival rate the more likely the tipping point 
threshold will be crossed . 
• :. The system collapses rapidly once the threshold is exceeded . 
• :. The model implies that even systems in low-variability environments face the 
possibility of a quantity induced crisis. 
Identical observations to those of Rudolph and Repenning were made from varying the 
parameters of the dummy estates model in relation to the input (maintenance tasks) and 
available manpower, simulating the system and recording the rate of rise of risk. 
Based on the results from the simulation of the dummy estates data, it was assumed 
that for a fully resourced workforce, the only risk that would be generated would be the 
residual risk from each individual asset. This assumption was found to be totally false 
when a Trust's actual 'data' was simulated, as demonstrated and explained within the 
results chapter of this thesis. 
Following the apparent success of the simple estates 'proof of concept model' to predict 
the effects of varying resource levels and resultant generation of risk, it was decided by 
the researcher to enhance the model and use it with a Trust's 'actual data'. 
Sterman eloquently describes the impossibility of being able to 'verify and validate' a 
model's ability to mimic reality as all models are wrong, and are in his words, "limited, 
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simplifications of the real world", and they, "differ from reality in ways large and small, 
infinite in number". He goes on to illuminate his observations by citing a number of past 
studies in this subject. By accepting this premise, then the model created for this thesis 
was subjected to a rigorous testing programme designed specifically to uncover errors, 
so that a greater understanding of the model's limitations could be formed. This is in 
stark contrast to the problem often suffered by model designers and their clients which is 
referred to by Sterman as 'confirmation bias'; in these cases results are selected that are 
favourable to their preconceptions (Sterman, 2000). As the various parts of the 
simulation process are described within this methodology chapter, the assumptions and 
known limitations at the time are highlighted. Others were uncovered only following the 
simulation of 'actual data', which gave a greater understanding of the processes at work. 
These latter observations are described in detail within the results and discussion 
chapters. 
The whole model process and output results were designed to simulate the current time 
horizon, and assumed that there would be no significant change within any endogenous 
elements that could affect the model. Figure 9 below gives a pictorial overview of the 
procedure employed to simulate the effects of varying the available manpower resources 
for an estates department's artisan directly employed labour force, and to analyse the 
resulting rise (or fall) of risk to the organisation, staff, patients and stakeholders. The 
figure is followed by a brief explanation of the various steps throughout the process. 
114 
Figure 9 An overview of the simulation process 
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Reading figure 9 from left to right, three pieces of work were begun in parallel. The first 
established the planned preventative maintenance requirements of the organisation from 
reference to the relevant national codes of practice and any local periodic maintenance 
needs. These tasks were then arranged into a yearly schedule alongside an assessment 
of their relevant resource needs and cumulative probability distribution profile. This was 
followed with a judgement of the impact that would befall the organisation should the 
asset actually fail. It was from the multiplication of the probability and impact figures that 
risk was computed for each asset on a week-by-week basis. 
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Secondly the software was constructed that would simulate the variation in resource 
availability. Before the simulation was undertaken the program was subjected to various 
tests to determine its accuracy and robustness. The third part of the project began to 
gather the Trust's actual data in relation to the available manpower and the reactive 
maintenance completed on a week-by-week basis. 
Once these three areas had been completed the actual data was simulated. The output 
was then presented together with an interpretation of the results. Throughout the 
procedure extensive use was made of focus groups comprising of the organisations 
estates and other senior Trust specialists (e.g. Control of Infection, Chief Nurse, etc). 
The following paragraphs expand this brief overview to describe the process in detail as 
shown within table 8. 
Table 8 Overview of the simulation process 
Process Topic 
Focus groups 
Establish planned preventative maintenance requirements 
Develop planned preventative maintenance schedule and resource need 
Assess cumulative probability distribution profile 
Gauge impact descriptor ratios I 
Construct software model and test 
a. Focus groups 
As all of the data generated in relation to the probability of an asset failing and its relative 
impact on the organisation, staff, patient, stakeholders, etc, were based on qualitative as 
opposed to quantitative data, Trust specific focus groups were again employed. The 
participants within these focus groups were specific to each Trust participating within this 
research, and consisted of estates senior managers and other Trust specialist advisors 
e.g. Control of Infection managers, Chief Nurse, Risk Manager and Internal Auditor. The 
inherent problems surrounding the reliability of these groups to produce consistent and 
robust outcomes have been discussed and addressed previously, within this 
methodology chapter when describing the development of risk profiles .. 
As in the case for the development of the risk profiles, members of the focus groups 
were specifically selected for their expertise within the area under discussion. Prior to 
any workshop undertaken, a full and frank explanation was given of the aims of the 
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project, methodologies, timescales and probable outcomes together with all of the 
assumptions made throughout the whole process. Specifically explained was the fact 
that the expert elicitation technique employed was a heuristic tool NOT a scientific tool, 
that was being used, in the words of the US Army this process is used, "to explore vague 
and unknown issues that were otherwise inaccessible" (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
2000). 
b. Establish planned preventative maintenance requirements 
Reference was made to the various technical standards (which included manufactures 
recommendations) and local maintenance needs, national NHS (and other) codes of 
practice, together with the Trust's Estate and Clinical strategies. This was undertaken by 
the Trust's local estate managers and officers with reference to the Trust's specialist 
advisors such as Fire, Control of Infection officers, etc. These basic actions began to 
form an audit trail from tasks undertaken on the shop floor up to statutory requirements, 
cross linking to the strategic directions and objectives of the organisation. 
c. Develop planned preventative maintenance schedule and resource need 
For each Trust site every asset (plant and/or equipment) was individually assessed, and 
the resources needed to undertake each individual planned preventative maintenance 
task in terms of man-hours and frequency of inspection were agreed by the focus group 
from reference to the national and local planned preventative maintenance needs. Then 
the planned preventative maintenance schedule was designed to produce an even 
workload (as far as possible) throughout the year. 
d. Assess cumulative probability distribution profile 
The NHS 5x5 Criticality grid employs the use of numbers (1 to 5) to depict the various 
levels of probability and impact. In the NHS system these are multiplied together to give 
a value of risk. As the simulation program requires mathematical manipulation to 
determine the variation of probable failure rates with alterations in resource availability 
then this grid has been rejected for the following reason. There are four types of 
measurement; the level of measurement dictates the arithmetic and statistical operations 
that can be undertaken on the figures (Wharrad, 2004). These four types are: Nominal, 
Ordinal, Interval and Ratio. 
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The NHS 5x5 Criticality grid has been constructed using un-calibrated ordinal scales for 
both the probability and impact axis, thus are unable to be mathematically processed 
(Department of Health, 2004). Conrow (as discussed earlier within the Literature Review 
chapter) makes great criticism of these types of scales as they lead much 
misinterpretation and confusion (Conrow, 2003). This stance is supported by the work of 
Stamper who states that, 'Failures of organisational behaviour stem, not, infrequently, 
from a failure to use measurements correctly' (Stamper 2001). Therefore the formation 
of Utility Functions to determine the probability and impact scales was adopted. Keeney 
and Raiffa have described in detail within their much cited work the fundamental 
development and mathematical use of utility functions (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). 
e. Development of the probability utility functions 
In this case the failure distribution of components must be determined in order to create 
the probability distributions. The maintenance engineers were regarded as the 'experts', 
and their judgement was sought relating to the remaining lifespan of the equipment 
before it began operating beyond its design tolerance parameters, should the planned 
preventative maintenance tasks not be undertaken. In other words how long would it be 
before the equipment failed? To this end they were asked to respond to the same 
question posed by 0ien when undertaking his research into the optimisation of 
maintenance models: 
'Assuming that you had not carried out this planned preventative maintenance 
task, how long do you think the remaining lifelength of the component would 
have been?' 
0ien 1998 
By 'component' 0ien means the piece of equipment, and 'lifelength' is the remaining 
time frame before the equipment was deemed to fail. As 0ien points out, 'this is 
beneficial as the answer to the question may be given in years, i.e. the term probability is 
not involved' (0ien, 1998). 
Noortwijk, Dekker, Cooke and Mazzuchi (1992) also employed expert elicitation 
techniques in their research to obtain lifetime distributions needed for maintenance 
optimisation, due to the scarcity of reliable data. As in this case, the maintenance 
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engineers that they worked with had little or no knowledge or experience with statistical 
failure models and only had a limited time to spend during the elicitation process. Due to 
time constraints and the powers of concentration of the experts, they had in one 
elicitation session to gather information relating to several component lifetime 
distributions, effects of planned preventative maintenance, consequences of failure and 
any other relevant information. For these reasons the use of a well-known failure model 
was rejected as experts would be asked (in their words), 'to fit a parametric distribution 
to their subjective probabilities is a lot to ask for even from statistically trained experts'; 
again as in this case. They go on to claim that: 
From a practical point of view, it is more comprehendible for statistically 
untrained experts to use a discretised version of the continuous probability 
distribution function (viz, a histogram) thus replacing the concept of the 
probability of failure in a fixed time interval' 
Noortwijk, Dekker, Cooke & Mazzuchi, 1992 
Copying their research technique, this research also employed the use of a simple 
histogram asking for failure probabilities from only two different time intervals. As in their 
case this research found that this approach found favour with the experts. To this end 
the probability function descriptions (continuous scale) and their rank order from the 
NHS 5x5 Criticality grid were used by the focus groups as an aid to assess the 
probability of failure over time should each asset's associated planned preventative 
maintenance task not be completed. Table 9 reproduces that part of the grid that was 
used for this purpose. 
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Table 9 
Rating 
Failure 
descriptions 
The ranking and descriptions for the probability scale from the NHS 
5x5 Criticality grid 
Probability of Failure Rating 
1 2 3 4 5 
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain 
Non or Normal wear Reasonable Major physical Failure 
minimal and tear. physical damage/ occurred. 
remedial Sound, damage/ deterioration. Unacceptabl 
action operationally deterioration. Failure e built 
required safe and Reassignment apparent/asses environment. 
and/or exhibits only of life may be sed as Not 
new/recent minor acceptable imminent or appropriate 
upgrade. deterioration. based on unacceptable to reassign 
Estimated Estimated technical tests built life. 
time to time to failure or residual environment. Estimated 
failure may maybe robustness. Not appropriate time to 
be circa> 10 circa<10yrs Estimated time to reassign life. failure may 
yrs to failure may Estimated time be circa < 
be circa < 5 yrs to failure may six months 
be circa < one 
yr 
Fire! Fire! Fire! Fire! Fire! 
statutory statutory statutory statutory statutory 
Complies Complies with Known Dangerously Dangerously 
with mandatory contravention of below "B". below "B". 
mandatory fire safety one or more 
fire safety requirements requirements -
requirements and statutory which falls short 
and statutory safety of - "B". 
safety legislation 
legislation with minor 
deviations of 
a non-serious 
nature 
The methodology employed to assess this increase in the probability of failure is best 
illustrated by the example in figure 10 below which is a cumulative probability distribution 
profile for a fictional asset. 
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• 
• 
Figure 10 The perceived increase in the probability of failure of an asset as the 
number of planned preventative maintenance tasks not completed increases. 
1.2.-----------------------------------------------------------~ 
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O+I------------,------------,------------,------------,------------~ 
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No of missed PPM tasks 
Figure 10 shows that if a relative planned preventative maintenance task was completed 
at the scheduled frequency (1) then the remaining risk level would remain at the 
accepted residual risk. In the example the focus group had estimated that if the first 
scheduled planned preventative maintenance task was not completed at the scheduled 
frequency, then the risk would rise from Rare (rating 1) up-to Unlikely (rating 2) from 
reference to the probability scale in table 9 above. If the relevant planned preventative 
maintenance tasks continue not to be completed the focus group estimated that the 
probability of failure would continue to rise from Unlikely (rating 2) on to Likely (rating 4) 
and level out at Certain (rating 5) for both the 4th and 5th time that the planned 
preventative maintenance task remained uncompleted. Thus the graph in figure 10 is 
showing the focused group assessed cumulative probability distribution profile for the 
asset in the example should the relevant scheduled planned preventative maintenance 
task not be completed. 
As time progresses the probability of failure can only increase (not decrease), however 
where the group considered that the increase was extremely negligible they were 
allowed to assume a flat line increase between points. Also it was agreed within the 
group that the simulation should only need to consider five missed planned preventative 
maintenance tasks, as they considered that after this any probability estimation would 
level to a flat line. These rules allowed the generation of 72 possible cumulative 
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probability distribution profile shapes to be available following the five failure descriptions 
within table 9. The descriptions within table 9 were only used as an aid for the focus 
group to determine five points on the graph. The intervening positions were determined 
using interpolation between the points. This system for calculating the probability value 
during the computer simulation does give rise to an error when using the interpolation 
process against what can be assumed to be the 'true value' that would form a curve 
between the set point values. Therefore it was necessary to estimate the size of this 
error and to determine its significance once the results of the simulation run was 
completed. As with the development of the probability utility functions the design of the 
impact utility functions made reference to the NHS 5x5 Criticality grid as an aid only, but 
in this case the Analytic Hierarchy Process was adopted to create the impact utility 
function (Saaty, 2001). There are various methods available to conduct a multi-criteria 
analysis for the comparison of descriptors such as those employed within the NHS grid 
for potential consequences, but as Emblemsvag and Kj01stad state: 
The greatest advantage of the Analytic Hierarchy Process concept, for our 
purpose, is that it incorporates a logic consistency check of the answers provided 
by the various participants in the process'. 
(Emblemsvag & Kj01stad, 2006). 
Table 10 below shows the design of the NHS grid relating to impact. 
Table 10 NHS 5x5 Criticality grid relating to impact 
Severity 
Rating Descriptor Health & Safety 
1 Insignificant No injury/breach of 
III guidance/procedures Q) Minor injury/ill health (first aid or 0 
s:::: 2 Minor self treatment) reach of legal Q) 
::::I requirement. C" 
Q) Moderate injury/ ill health III 
s:::: 3 Moderate statutory obligations, 0 
(.) improvement notice issued. 
'i Major/significant injury or long-:;::: 
s:::: 4 Major term incapacity/disablement. Q) 
-
Prohibition notice issued. 0 
a.. Fatality and lor permanent 5 Catastrophic incapacity/ disability. Prosecution. 
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As the grid descriptors were pre-arranged in rank order by the NHS system, the design 
of the hierarchal structure was effectively pre-designed, as shown below in figure 11. 
Figure 11 The design of the Analytic Hierarchy Process structure 
Impact 
I 
I I I I 1 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
During the development of this part of the methodology four people separately used the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process system to create the ratio differences between the five 
impact severities via commercial decision support software Logical Decisions ®. The 
results are shown within figure 12 below. 
Figure 12 
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Results from the trial run to determine the impact ratios using the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process method 
--Person 1 
-- Person 2 
Person 3 
-- Person 4 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
The closeness between the results can be easily observed and is verified from table 11 
below. 
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1 .. 1 
Table 11 Ratios relating to the five descriptions of impact 
Person Person Person Person 
1 2 3 4 
Insignificant 0.031 0.052 0.036 0.039 
Minor 0.069 0.062 0.069 0.068 
Moderate 0.104 0.097 0.13 0.119 
Major 0.274 0.363 0.293 0.296 
Catastrophic 0.521 0.426 0.427 0.478 
CR value 0.087 0.056 0.04 0.017 
The consistency ratio (CR) within table 11 forms an integral part of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process. It assesses the uniformity of the decisions made when conducting 
the pair-wise comparisons within the hierarchal structure. It is recommended that for this 
number of descriptors of impact that a consistency ratio of less than 0.1 is desirable to 
give acceptable results (Saaty, 2001). 
The researcher suspects that the closeness-of-fit of the observed and calculated values 
within figure 12 and table 11 were formed due to the restrictions of the descriptor values 
being pre-defined and pre-ranked in order; thus leaving little room for excessive 
individual interpretation from the participants. 
Although the Analytic Hierarchy Process ratios can be developed within a focus group 
setting (Saaty, 2001) the researcher decided not to follow this form for the assessment 
of these figures based on the results shown within figure 12 and table 11 above. The 
reason given for rejecting the group approach was due to the lack of detailed prior 
knowledge of the complex Analytic Hierarchy Process by the group members coupled 
with the already multifaceted and lengthy process of the methodology employed to 
develop the simulation and interpretation of the outputs. 
f Construct software model and test 
The software was designed to simulate the effects of various resource availabilities 
against the Trust's actual historic data, for the directly employed Trust employees (as 
opposed to contract labour) manpower availability and the maintenance tasks that were 
needed to be completed on a week-by-week basis. These maintenance tasks were 
composed of two maintenance types, reactive and the planned preventative 
maintenance system. Figure 13 below shows the salient parts of the software design. 
124 
Although the diagram is relatively self-evident eight essential points and assumptions to 
note are given below, and were agreed with the focus groups 
Reactive maintenance is always completed before any planned preventative 
maintenance task, therefore the man-hours required for the weeks reactive 
maintenance is subtracted from the week's available man-hours. Any remaining 
man-hours for the week are then directed towards completing the planned 
preventative maintenance tasks that are generating the greatest risk, thus a perfect 
work scheduling programme is always assumed. 
ii There was always sufficient manpower per week to complete that week's 
reactive maintenance demand. 
iii Available manpower, reactive and planned preventative maintenance figures 
never assume negative values. 
iv If any available man-hours were surplus for a given week after all of the weeks 
reactive and planned preventative maintenance tasks were completed, then the 
planned preventative maintenance scheduled tasks for the following week are 
brought forward. Thus the program is simulating a fully occupied workforce always 
having their resources directed towards where they would be doing the most good, 
reducing risk to its lowest possible level. 
v All of the algorithms used within the software to model the variation in resource 
and calculate the resulting value of risk were void of 'add-factoring'. This is the 
practice of using a fudge factor to the output of a model so that it reflects the 
mod eller's intuition. 
vi No multi-year frequencies were simulated within the model. These frequencies 
relate to planned preventative maintenance inspections that are undertaken say 
every 2 years, 5 years, etc. The justification for this limitation was to greatly simplify 
the design of the software, and from the knowledge that these multi-year frequencies 
only account for a very small percentage of the total workload requirement for a 
Trust. 
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vii It is natural for a small number of maintenance tasks (either reactive and/or 
planned preventative maintenance) not to be totally completed at the end of each 
week but to be 'carried over' to be completed the following week. Therefore the 
software was designed to mimic this action. 
The software was designed and written by the researcher to ensure that on a week-by-
week basis all available resources were targeted to completing the reactive maintenance 
tasks first; any remaining manpower was then used to complete the scheduled and 
outstanding planned preventative maintenance work. These planned preventative 
maintenance tasks were then completed in priority order i.e. those tasks that were 
generating the greatest risks were completed first. Any planned preventative 
maintenance tasks not completed for that week were moved forward into the next 
week's stock of work, recalculated in terms of their risk generation and prioritised 
alongside the other planned preventative maintenance tasks scheduled for the week. 
Where the resource availability was in excess of the total reactive and planned 
preventative maintenance needs for the week, the software brought forward the next 
weeks planned preventative maintenance tasks, prioritised them and assigned 
resources for their completion. In this way the software on a week-by-week basis was 
constantly assigning resources to where they would do most good i.e. completing all 
tasks in priority order, thus keeping the generated risk to an absolute minimum with the 
manpower available. 
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Figure 13 The salient parts of the software design. 
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3.4.1 Simulations using actual Trust data 
At this part of the project confidence and experience had been gained, from the simple 
estates model and the academic rigor relating to the estimated cumulative probability 
distribution profile and impact assessment figures . Thus the decision was taken by the 
researcher to load the simulation model with 'actual data' from a representative Trust. 
The simulation using 'actual data' was programmed to replicate 20 years of operation to 
allow the large data mass to equilibrate. Also at the start of each simulation the program 
assumed that previously all reactive and scheduled planned preventative maintenance 
tasks had been completed, thus a common starting point was established at the residual 
risk level. 
3.4.2 Methodology Overview 
For each of the Trusts involved, the exercise to simulate the artisan workload was split 
into distinct parts, as shown within Figure 14 below. 
Figure 14 The steps of the simulation process 
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The initial arrangement started with a number of group presentations to the estate 
departments officer's to describe the process, timeframe, and probable output; together 
with the need for involvement of other Trust specialist managers for professional and 
clinical advice. During these presentations it was agreed that a series of initial 
simulations would be completed first, before any senior managers external to the 
department were actively involved within the process. This was in recognition that the 
simulation would involve a great deal of complex and detailed technical data, which 
would require much discussion before any agreement could be reached between the 
estates officers. And until this was completed it would not be effective to involve others. 
Following these initial discussions, the Trust estates operational manager gave an 
overview of the exercise to the senior managers external to the estates department with 
an indication of their expected involvement, timeframes, etc. 
Following the presentations, and agreement about the process and timescale by all 
concerned, the task of gathering the base data began. This could only be undertaken by 
the local estates officers as it required access to and interrogation of the Trust's 
computer systems. The data gathered and agreed from this process formed the input 
into the simulation model. A natural development following the initial simulations was the 
creation of 'what-if' scenarios. These were formed from the focus groups questioning the 
simulation outputs, and were a direct reflection of their increased understanding of the 
maintenance processes. 
Following agreement by the various focus groups on the interpretation of the simulation 
outputs, the results and recommendations generated were presented to the respective 
most senior managers of the Trusts. This gave them the understanding necessary to 
enable them to make policy decisions, knowing the probable effects in terms of the risk 
that would most likely be created. 
Prior to analysing the data it was necessary to test the software to ensure that the 
software program would accurately perform to its design intent. This had been done 
initially on the simple estates model used to access the applicability of the Rudolph and 
Repenning work when applied to an estates setting. However since then the model had 
been significantly enhanced. This final testing procedure consisted of running the 
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software under the following five extreme conditions (reality checks) and observing the 
output against known values as shown within table 12 below: 
Following the successful completion of these tests the 'actual data' was simulated and 
the resulting variation in risk was recorded and is discussed within the results chapter of 
this thesis. The output data was subjected to three separate tests to determine when a 
'steady state' had been reached; these are fully explained within the Results Chapter. 
Following these tests the interpretation of the results was restricted to the final 500 
weeks of the simulation, as it was considered that by this time the program would have 
settled and that this part of the output was a reasonable reflection of the situation that 
would occur in practice. 
Table 12 The software extreme test conditions against the anticipated and 
observed outputs 
Extreme Condition Anticipated and observed output 
Zero manpower input. The total risk for each week rapidly rose 
and levelled out for each successive year. 
Zero manpower input with an extremely As above, but within the week of the step 
large manpower step function spaced at function all tasks were completed and the 
irregular intervals. risk reduced to the total resultant value. 
Following each successive step function 
the risk began to rapidly rise until the next 
step function encounter. 
Extremely large manpower input. The total risk for each week year-on-year 
was reduced to the residual value. 
Extremely large manpower input with zero As above, but within the week of each step 
manpower level step function spaced at function the risk rose, followed the next 
irregular intervals. week with a drop of risk to the residual 
level. 
Confirmation of the software programmed The software programmed algorithm was 
algorithms against hand calculations for confirmed by the hand calculations and 
the rise in risk for a given asset, should the recorded the rise of risk until the risk 
available manpower be unavailable and levelled at its maximum value when the 
the planned preventative maintenance planned preventative maintenance task 
tasks were not completed for successive had not been completed after the fifth time. 
periods. 
There have been eight Trusts participating within this third research objective. Each 
focus group employed between five and seven engineering officers with support from 
their specialist advisors, totalling between nine and eleven experts per Trust. Thus 
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between 72 and 88 experts in total were involved. The trade groups simulated varied 
depending upon the size of a Trust estate's workforce. In total 47 trade groups have 
been simulated. 
The next section describes the fourth (and last) research objective which is to: 
Develop a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to assess the directly 
employed artisan revenue resources needed to ensure that the maintenance 
activities conform to the National Health Service standards. 
3.5 Development of the fourth research instrument 
A major part of any managerial system is the need to regularly monitor the organisation 
to give assurance that the local managerial systems that have been specifically 
designed to conform to the various national standards were actually being practiced (as 
discussed and referenced within chapter 2). Therefore an assurance framework must be 
implemented as part of the day-to-day managerial system process as opposed to the 
reliance on a periodic (normally 12 month) audit. This next section describes the design 
of such a system. 
The managerial procedures operating within an NHS estates department are primarily 
safety systems, of which the monitoring routine is a major component. Ericson states 
that the: "goal of system safety is to find out what can go wrong (before it does) and 
establish controls to prevent it or reduce the probability of occurrence" (Ericson 2005). In 
the ideal world the monitoring technique should be designed in conjunction with the 
physical infrastructure in order that they can both be influenced by the other, rather than 
trying to retrofit or enforce design changes in either system afterwards. 
Unlike the majority of engineering solutions that once designed, installed and switched 
on, over effectively long periods of time, managerial issues cannot be simply left to look 
after themselves; they must be watched, fussed over, tweaked, and adjusted on a 
regular basis. Thus the monitoring system must be regarded as a dynamic structure, 
constantly under review and subject to change. As external forces alter the procedures 
must respond and adapt. For this to be achieved the managers designing the monitoring 
regime must understand hazard theory, the techniques for hazard identification and risk 
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elimination and/or reduction. This understanding together with knowledge of how their 
engineering systems are designed, acceptable tolerance limits of performance, detailed 
operation of their engineering infrastructure under normal and fault conditions and how 
each sUb-system will interact and the effects of failure on the Trust, staff, patients, 
stakeholders, etc. are needed to design a robust and effective monitoring scheme. 
3.5.1 Hazard Analysis Techniques 
There are a number of methods used to undertake a hazard analysis, and no single 
technique will necessarily identify all of the hazards within an organisation's engineering 
systems. Therefore different techniques may need to be employed throughout the 
varying depth of an analysis. Ericson states that there are over 100 such techniques in 
use, obviously some more general in nature than others and most minor variations of 
others The majority of these employ both qualitative and quantitative data within their 
methodology. Within a previous chapter it was stated that the fully quantitative data was 
not available, but in a risk analysis (although desirable) precise numerical accuracy is 
not always necessary (Ericson, 2005). 
3.5.2 What to monitor 
The basis for this section can be traced back to Taylor who coined the phrase 'Scientific 
Management' (Taylor, 1911). He improved productivity by breaking a process down 
into small elements, analyzed how each step contributed to the overall task (goal), 
then by redesigning the process steps reduced the time (cost). His work spawned 
much research by others over the years; one of these areas became to be known as 
Operational Performance Management. There has been a resurgence of interest in 
this field lately within the NHS through their Payment by Results initiative. In this the 
payment mechanisms have completely changed in relation to how a Trust receives 
funding. In the past the monies allocated to Trusts were based on historical formulas 
based on population served, geographic location, etc. This has now altered to a 
system where the funding for a particular patient follows the patient, irrespective of 
where the patient receives their treatment, or what treatment they are actually given. 
Therefore, it is imperative that effective means are found for Trusts to pay close 
attention to current and projected income cash flow movements (Dr Foster Research 
Team, 2006). Frameworks need to be developed so that Trust boards can identify 
132 
their information requirements. These include the need to ensure that they spend 
more time on strategic matters by using their information more efficiently and 
effectively. This in turn means that they must take a balanced focus when 
scrutinizing current, recent and projected operational performance. This requires that 
the information is presented in a format that enables Boards to focus on a particular 
area of service provision, understand the patterns of need, the current service 
response to that need, variations in performance and the risk factors. 
3.5.3 The operational performance reporting system 
Five criteria were outlined within the Literature Preview Chapter that created a 
framework around which the monitoring system had to be designed. In summary the 
criteria required that the system must conform to international and national standards, 
reference mainstream academic theory, employ existing hierarchal staffing structures, 
job descriptions and software, be applicable to a multi-professional team, and be 
revenue neutral against existing budgets. 
The methodology presented for this final part conforms to all of the five criteria outlined 
above. This is achieved by the design of a 'driver' to push a common 'generic 
framework', which employs standard operational performance management techniques. 
The output of the process is a quantitative assessment of the department's efficiency, 
quality and effectiveness towards supporting the Trust in achieving its objective goals. 
This is presented as a series of performance index profiles against a base period, 
showing the actual achievement against a target value. 
As such, reference was taken of the work by Johnston (2002) and his research into such 
performance systems. He criticises organisations for creating in his words, "a cottage 
industry" from the production of performance measurement data, to feed the plethora of 
frameworks and tools that have been developed over the years, citing a number of the 
most dominant systems. His reasoning arises from the effort and cost of producing this 
data compared to the usefulness of the outputs, and goes on to discuss the worthy work 
of academics who over the years have attempted to understand and quantify the 
relationships between the performance measures, by creating casual models and 
computing the correlations between elements, but seriously questions the results 
(Johnston, Brignall & Fitzgerald; 2002). It was from this background that the monitoring 
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system was developed and designed. At all times simplicity was paramount, as it was 
obvious that it was only when the most basic of monitoring information was available in a 
relevant, robust and transparent manner, could the more sophisticated and complex 
performance models be considered in future years. The researcher thus created a series 
of generic key steps to follow when designing an outline project plan and shown in 
Figure15. As each Trust and estates department differs in their organisational structure, 
reporting arrangements and managerial systems, only a generic approach can be 
presented within this methodology chapter as each project must be tailored to cater for 
each situation. 
Figure 15 The generic key steps to be followed shown as an outline project 
plan 
Development and design 
.:. Initial survey 
.:. Detailed identification of the process steps 
.:. Define the process 
.:. Analysis 
.:. Design of the efficiency measures 
.:. Measuring the efficiency of the process 
o Aggregation of multiple operations 
o Non-productive time 
o Overheads 
.:. Input specification 
o Units of labour 
o Salary cost 
o Operating maintenance costs 
o Capital costs 
.:. Measuring the quality of the process 
o Reactive maintenance 
o Planned Preventative Maintenance 
o The management function 
.:. Measuring the effectiveness of a process 
.:. The reporting system 
.:. Structure of the monitoring process 
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o The driver 
o The assurance framework Operational Risk 
The implementation plan 
.:. The implementation team 
Maintenance 
The outline plan above is split into three distinct headings. These are the development 
and design, implementation and maintenance phases. But due to the extreme 
importance attached to the monitoring system for the safe delivery of patient care, it is 
essential that the introduction of the system is supported from the Trust board 
throughout the three phases. This commitment should be communicated to all 
concerned through briefing notes, announcements and updates regarding progress. As 
the monitoring system is a managerial tool it must also be supported throughout the 
managerial structure. This can only be achieved if the respective managers are satisfied 
that the measures selected provide them with relevant and timely information, in a 
format that they can digest and use to assist in achieving the maximum performance of 
their respective departments. 
The following paragraphs expand and explain each step shown within the outline plan, 
starting with the development and design phase which splits into various sub-sections. 
3.5.3 Development of the research instrument 
As the output from this fourth research objective is to develop a robust, transparent and 
repeatable methodology to monitor the day-to-day activities of the maintenance 
department in line with the requirements of the National Health Service standards, then 
only a 'generic' methodology can be created as a research instrument. This is due to 
each organisation, department and processes differing in their structure and procedures. 
The development and design of the monitoring system requires the interaction and co-
ordination of a diverse range of groups in a way that cannot normally be accommodated 
by existing organisational structures. Therefore it would be necessary to form a 'steering 
committee' chaired by a Trust board member. The task of the steering committee would 
be to direct, co-ordinate and evaluate the activities of the project team, commit 
resources and make definitive decisions. However a prime task for the steering 
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committee is to ensure the relevance and technical integrity of the monitoring system 
and its integration as a supporting mechanism for the whole of the Trust's information 
systems and decision making process. The committee in turn must be supported by a 
project team, who under the terms of reference dictated by the steering committee, must 
develop and design the monitoring system. 
The first steps that the project team would take would be to instigate an initial survey to 
determine the likely scope that the monitoring systems would cover within the particular 
department under investigation. This can effectively be achieved by forming a focus 
group containing a cross section of the department's managers and operatives (Le. 
experts in the department's processes, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter and 
successfully employed within each of first three research instruments. However this is 
presented as only one probable methodology, when in the 'field' the research instrument 
must be designed to match the prevailing environment and constraints. 
3.5.4 Initial survey 
This would consist of a review of the existing organisation charts, operational plans, 
existing estimates and forecasts, management reports, and selected interviews. From 
this the project team would create an overview of the existing inputs and outputs of the 
department, with a comparison against the national standards and local needs of the 
Trust. Put simply this work would begin to answer the 'where are we now?' question. 
Following this an initial project plan should be expanded to include the first area to be 
selected for monitoring. This extended plan should include milestones, target dates and 
resource estimates, together with an overview of the next steps. Codling (1998) states: 
"Experience has proved repeatedly however, that the quality of the result achieved is 
directly related to the effort invested at the outset". In other words she is recommending 
that by putting a great deal of effort into this the planning, the overall process would be 
easier (Codling, 1998). 
Following approval from the steering committee to the now extended plan, it would be 
necessary to determine the critical success factors of the organisation. This would 
necessitate the involvement and support from the most senior managers, to ensure that 
efforts were directed to areas of strategic importance rather than to those that were 
'easy'. Two questions must then be asked of the key operational processes. These are, 
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"'What is it?" and "How do they do it?" These answers would give a picture of how an 
organisation's systems 'actually' worked, as opposed to the actions outlined within a 
department's policies and procedures. Only through a detailed understanding of the in-
house procedure would it be possible to understand how it functioned, and then to form 
an appreciation of the key steps that would be needed to create its monitoring process. 
This understanding would be developed from a structured approach analysing the 
process steps as opposed to the department's outputs. During this part it would be 
extremely important to comprehend the interdependence with other 
departments/processes within the organisation, due to the complex and tightly coupled 
interactions that exist. 
From this, the project should begin to develop a very detailed picture of the department's 
links to other departments, work procedures, origins of work, work flows, factors 
affecting workload and the end use of the outputs produced. The quality, quantity and 
availability of the input data, the components and actors that form the outputs and the 
quality of the outputs, would have to be identified and quantified. This process would 
create an appreciation of the key steps that would need to be monitored. 
The tolerance limits for each of these initial 'key steps' would need to be established 
from reference to the relevant national and local standards, and the methodology for 
data collection designed. The gap between the acceptable levels of output and that 
actually achieved, must then be formed, followed by the setting of future targets. The 
completion of this process would not be a set of results; rather it would be a 
measurement of a set of quantitative or qualitative tasks. 
From this an outline action plan for the design of the operational performance system as 
a whole would be formed. This would contain estimates relating to milestones, target 
dates and resource needs. At this part the action plan would be very basic but would 
form a template that in time would be expanded in detail as the project developed. 
Following the approval of the steering committee, the project team then would begin to 
identify in detail the department's process steps. 
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3.5.5 Detailed identification of the process steps 
The chosen areas to investigate would be stripped down to their base components so 
that each step in the processes could be analysed in turn. This would identify the critical 
inputs and outputs from each step, and the position of the weak points in the system. It 
would be this attention to detail that would be essential to successfully identifying the 
critical points to monitor. This in turn would guide the design of the parallel defensive 
systems to give assurance that the step in question would be robust and relatively free 
from failure. One of the outputs from this work would be a diagram that resembled an 
organisational chart, which would show the basic steps in sequence that formed the 
whole process. The development of this diagram would be crucial to the whole exercise, 
as it would assist the team (and others) in learning how the procedures work, by 
identifying their component parts, interrelationships and actors involved in the total 
system. But in order to analyse such a process it would be necessary to accurately 
define it, identify its boundaries, and discuss each step in turn. 
3.5.6 Define the process 
Different people and/or professions sometimes describe, name and define things in 
different ways. As such, confusion and misinterpretation can cause problems unless 
they are correctly defined to everyone's agreement at the beginning of the analysis. To 
do this requires statements that answer questions such as: what is the actual and 
desired output of the process?, who are the actors within each step?, who are the clients 
for each output and what are their requirements?, does the process deliver what is 
required?, what are the start and end points?, and who is responsible for the process? 
These 'boundary' questions must be addressed as comprehensively as possible as 
these could identify the root cause of problems or dysfunctions. The more steps and 
interactions there are within a process, the greater the potential for problems to be 
created. Where the process networks with other departments they must be consulted to 
fully agree the boundaries. This in turn would facilitate in gaining ownership and 
responsibility for the whole process. 
Following the definition of the process and its boundaries it would be essential to re-list 
and re-name each single step in sequence. It is at this point that the 'detailed' flow 
diagram would be developed to create a pictorial view of what was actually happening. 
This could then be converted to a process flow diagram. This would be the final phase in 
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defining the overall process that was being analysed. The map would give a pictorial 
overview that would show the interfaces and interconnections with other departments 
(either internal or external) to the Trust. 
The discipline involved in producing the map creates numerous spin-offs. For example, it 
facilitates the analysts to point to the potential steps that could lead to failure, and gives 
guidance towards those steps that would require close monitoring, to detect any 
deviation in output from acceptable levels. 
As Codling (1998) remarks; "Time and again the process map proves how few people 
really understand the process". A bonus that this methodology naturally gives is the 
ability to critically examine the system in terms of streamlining the process by: reviewing 
the skills of the operatives necessary to complete each step, removing duplicate steps, 
reducing any inherent delays and exploring the introduction of technology to reform and 
reduce the resource needs to deliver the same output. The completion of this section will 
go a long way to answering the question, 'where are they?' in terms of what people are 
doing and how they are doing it. From this base information the actual design of the 
main body of the operational performance measurement system would begin by an 
analysis of a comparison of actions 'at-the-coal-face', against the organisations policies 
and procedures. 
3.5.7 Analysis 
This whole process involves interviews with selected line managers as a major part of 
the data gathering exercise. This must include discussions on such topics as: the 
organisation and structure; the staff roles and responsibilities; the work procedures from 
the origin of the workload, workflows and factors effecting it; the end-use of the outputs; 
the department's objectives and personal objectives, and the links into the Trust's 
objectives; the line managers views relating to the outputs and the individual 
components making up the outputs; the availability and quality of the data sources, and 
the ability to quantify the data; the applicability and use of any weighting system; and 
finally the use of the existing information systems. 
The previous phase in this planning section identified the data sources and the most 
appropriate methods of collection, as attention was directed at the areas most likely to 
139 
create suitable (useful) information. In order not to create 'information overload', it would 
now be necessary to craft another framework, but this time one that considers the 
answers to the following questions: 
.:. What is the objective of collecting this particular type of information? 
.:. What do staff need to look for and why? 
.:. How accurate must the data be? 
.:. How much information do they need? 
.:. How much resource can they allocate to the collection of this data in 
terms of time, staff, and budget? 
The data collection plan above must also show the source of the data to be collected, be 
it internal or external to the Trust, who is to undertake the collection, and how. The data 
considered in this part would consist of both input and output data. It would be during 
this phase that suggestions would be made relating to possible alternative outputs, and 
consideration of the pros and cons of each suggestion argued. It would be important to 
document the output of these discussions for future reference. It must not be the case 
that the subject to be monitored was someone's 'pet-subject' or this month's 'flavour-of-
the-moment', but should be one of strategic importance to the Trust; where failure in this 
area would significantly affect the Trust in achieving its objectives in delivering patient 
care. As the department is a part of a highly complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisation, it would be necessary to engage with other departments in order to form an 
opinion of which subject areas to choose form an output and to monitor. At the 
operational level the outputs should be large packages of work performed, e.g. the 
completion of reactive maintenance tasks/week. These outputs should be representative 
of the work performed, quantifiable, repetitive and reasonably uniform over time, 
mutually exclusive and affect the Trust's objectives. Also the outputs must be created 
within a given time period so that problems of measuring work-in-progress are avoided, 
and the outputs must also be reasonably predictable in terms of forecast trends. 
Outputs could be combined to form a single measure. Where there was a constant 
output mix ratio such as the outputlm2 for a number of sites within a Trust, then the 
volumes of each output could be added to give a single output figure. Where there was a 
variable output mix, then a series of output weights could be derived, where the various 
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output volumes could be multiplied by their respective weights to arrive at an overall final 
output figure. 
Irrelevant and 'nice-to-know' information must be discarded at the earliest opportunity. 
The precise date of collection would be important as vague timelines such as mid-month 
would be imprecise and open to misinterpretation and abuse. 
Fundamental to any gap analysis would be the knowledge of what should be done by 
the department when compared against the national and local standards. Managerial 
systems that did not conform to the recognised codes of practice could readily be 
identified by the use of a very much simplified 'V' diagram. This could be used as a 
framework to aid the auditing and checking of the system under scrutiny. This type of 
diagram is used within the software industry, by creating a structure to describe the 
methods to be used, procedures to be followed and the functional requirements applied 
when developing complex software (Hirschberg, 2000). Figure 16 below gives a very 
much simplified example of its possible use within the NHS to highlight gaps within a 
department's managerial systems. 
The inputs into the management system cascade down the left hand side of the V, and 
range from the government and Strategic Health Authority strategies, through the 
nationally recognised management standards, and on to the technical briefs and 
specifications; i.e. increasing in levels of detail. At the base of the 'V' are the actual 
individual tasks that are being undertaken. It is these tasks within the management 
system that are assessed against the standards that rise up the right hand side of the 
'V', i.e. decreasing in level of detail. 
The first of these standards on the right of the 'V' are grouped under the heading 
Technical Specifications, and in this case make reference to NHS Health Technical 
Memoranda, Approved Codes of Practice and manufacture's recommendations. These 
in turn cross reference to the left of the 'V'. 
The second node that is rising on the right of the 'V' relates to the NHS Healthcare core 
and developmental standards, Statutory Acts and the NHS Corporate Governance Risk 
Management Standards. These follow on to the Corporate Governance responsibilities 
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of the organisation, and the ISO 9000 guidelines relating to good quality managerial 
systems. Lastly the activities are compared to the Trusts Clinical and Estates strategies 
which should match the government's and Strategic Health Authority's strategies. 
Each reference document is made up of a series of discrete tasks that must be 
undertaken to fulfil the requirement of the management system under investigation. 
Assuming that the task under examination conforms to all of the standards included 
within the left and right legs of the 'V', then the task is deemed to pose no untoward 
perceived latent hazard to the patient, organisation or society as a whole. 
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Figure 16 A generic much simplified 'V' model structure for a department's 
output requirements 
Government & 
SHA Strategies 
Trust Clinical & 
1 ... . 1 Estate Strategies 
Managerial 
Standards 
NHS Corporate 
Governance 
requirements 
Technical Briefs I ... . 1 
Healthcare, 
NHS LA& 
Monitor 
Technical 
Specifications 
HTM's, ACOP's & 
Manufacturers 
Recomemdations 
Department 
outputs 
If however, there is a gap between the standards and the actual task(s) undertaken, then 
a perceived latent condition is assumed to exist that is generating a perceived risk. It is 
at this point that the level of perceived risk must be analysed by a risk characterisation 
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process. Following the analysis the relevant managers must decide to act (or not). This 
naturally moves the monitoring process into the next phase, what to monitor. 
The final data plan must be agreed by all of the actors within the process and those 
receiving the outputs of the monitoring information. On collecting and delivering the 
monitoring information a 'negative feedback' loop would be created, which could inform 
those departments controlling their systems inputs of the likely effects of their actions 
through an analysis (simulation) of their processes. One important consideration must be 
the format in which to present the data, as each department would probably have 
different needs, methodologies of interpretation and use of the records. Here the views 
of the line managers throughout all levels must be sought, whether they are creating the 
initial work load stream, managing the work process or using and relying on the work 
load output. Throughout and beyond this development phase of the project the line 
managers at the operational level must be in agreement that the information produced 
will assist them to assess their performance, and will provide them with the information 
that is of use to them. On completion of this phase the inputs and outputs of the 
department would be known, therefore the design of the efficiency measures could 
begin. 
3.5.8 The design of the efficiency measures 
The techniques created within this methodology chapter are aimed at producing 
operational performance management information, that would assist in the analysis and 
forecasting of both resource budgeting and management control. The performance 
measurement would begin from an observation of the gaps between the accepted and 
recorded values. The cause and seriousness of the deviation would be assessed and 
suitable action taken. Sometimes the comparison between the actual values could lie 
within the acceptable tolerance limits, but could show a trend suggesting that the 
process is heading towards a breach of these limits, thus giving a warning of things to 
come. The gap analysis would contain as an example: 
.:. Descriptive and numeric data comparing the actual against the acceptable 
figures 
.:. Calculations of the size of the gap 
.:. Future trends should the gap be ignored 
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+:+ Explanations of the possible cause 
+:+ Resources needed to close the gap 
+:+ Actions in priority order to close the gap (reverse the trend) 
+:+ Proposed implementation programme 
The design of the efficiency measuring methods would rely on the correct identification 
and measurement of the outputs, quantification of input/output ratios and the delineation 
of the dimensions of quality. From this performance could be assessed in terms of its 
efficiency and effectiveness through the indicators proposed. 
The efficiency of a process would be a function of its input and output ratio. The 
effectiveness of a process would be the assessment of its contribution to the 
achievement of the Trust's overall strategic objectives/targets. Both the indicators of 
efficiency, quality and effectiveness must be developed over a number of time periods 
for the analysis to be meaningful, when forecasting projections in relation to resource 
and risk. 
It was important to separate the terms of efficiency and effectiveness into two separate 
indicators, as it is possible for a single process to be highly efficient but have little effect 
when assisting the Trust to achieve its strategic objectives. The reverse is also true, 
where a low efficiency process could be vital to the Trust in their strategic planning. By 
separating these two indicators it allows for the identification of the greatest importance 
to the organisation, so that they could target their limited resources to where they would 
do most good. This also assists in removing the belief that: 'by increasing a department'p 
resource, the more effective it would become'. 
Fundamental to the development of the indicators is the acceptance of the 'means-end' 
principle, that begins with inputs such as labour, materials and capital, which in turn lead 
to the process ends, the operational outputs, such as the completion of reactive 
maintenance tasks. In a similar way these operational outputs serve to form the 'means' 
for producing the programme 'ends' (outputs), such as meeting the NHS Healthcare 
Commission's core standard C21 which would be one of a Trust's strategic objectives in 
relation to the patients 'well being'. 
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The values of labour, capital, materials, etc reflect the expenditures on a particular 
process, and cannot be considered to be useful proxies for changes in well being. The 
process outputs are the services produced as part of an objective/target. These are, for 
example the completion of the scheduled planned preventative maintenance programme 
for a given time period. This creates the unit costs for producing these outputs, which in 
turn reflect the operational efficiency of the process. These figures can only represent 
partial proxies in relation to the overall effectiveness of the process as they relate to 
efficiency only. It is an objective's output that reflects the effectiveness of the process, 
rather than how the process was undertaken and completed. It is these indicators that 
are the real proxies as it is these high level outputs that effect a patient's well being. 
In the above, various levels of outputs have been discussed in terms of their use as 
proxies for the objective of well being. Even if well being could be perfectively measured 
there would still be a need to measure the process efficiency and effectiveness to 
exercise managerial control over the process. In the private sector there is a raft of 
operational performance indicators managed below the final and ultimate profit and loss 
statement. The control of the eight engineering topics for their day-to-day operational 
maintenance activities within an NHS Trust is no different. 
3.5.9 Measuring the efficiency of a process 
The efficiency measurements for these eight engineering topics would be associated 
with the tasks undertaken by the artisan staff of an NHS estates department. This basic 
measure relates to the ratio of the processes' operational outputs to the inputs used 
within the production, e.g. if 200 reactive maintenance dockets were completed by 
expending 60 man-hours, then this would equate to 3.03 completed dockets/man-hour. 
The inverse of the efficiency ratio represents the unit cost of the output, in this case 
being 0.3 man-hours per reactive maintenance docket. To compare the efficiency across 
a number of time periods an efficiency index would need to be created. Figure 17 below 
gives an example of such an efficiency index graph. The efficiency index would be 
computed from the following formula: 
Efficiency index (yr n) = (Output/input ratio (yr n) x 100)/(Output/input ratio (base year)) 
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Figure 17 An example of an efficiency index graph. 
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A base period would be awarded a value of 100 and any subsequent period compared 
against this base value. The more efficient periods would attract a ratio greater than 100, 
and those generating a lower efficiency a ratio less than 100 when compared to the base 
period. Where there were a number of like efficiency measures, these could be 
aggregated to summarise the group's or department's performance. In these cases the 
operational performance of each measurement ratio would be monitored through the 
efficiency ratios, e.g. separate efficiency ratios for electrical, mechanical and semi-skilled 
sections for each site within a Trust. But the efficiency measures for all 'like' operations 
within the department would be aggregated into one efficiency level , e.g. artisan 
efficiency ratio for the department. The use of a weighted figure could be employed to 
differentiate between trade groups to arrive at a weighted efficiency index for the 
department as a whole, but the researcher questions the added value of this increased 
computation and the complication that this would give to the analysis. 
An important consideration when measuring efficiencies would be to account for non-
productive time and overhead costs. The workforce naturally produces unproductive 
time through holidays, sickness, training, etc. This again could be measured using an 
efficiency index, where the base figure was a set target agreed by the senior managers 
as a reasonable value for their Trust. Overheads include such topics as buildings, 
supervision, administration services, etc. Within a Trust these could be split into costs 
and man-hours, but whatever figures would be produced they would be a constant, 
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therefore the creation of these on a periodic basis for day-to-day monitoring would be 
meaningless, unless they were used as part of a benchmarking exercise. But as 
previously stated such analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The operational performance measurements above would not indicate if the organisation 
was operating to the maximum possible efficiency, but it would allow a comparison 
between periods and indicate if it was doing beUer or worse than other periods. For such 
a detailed assessment against the maximum possible efficiency, the Trust would have to 
implement a work measurement programme such as a Labour Management Scheme, 
but this is beyond the scope of this research. 
The cost per man-hour could have been used in place of the hours expended to create 
the efficiency ratio, but this would have to have been subjected to price inflation, wage 
increases, etc, before any comparison across time bands could have been made. The 
input expended to produce an output includes all resources used to create the output, 
e.g. labour cost, materials, capital, buildings, land, time, etc. Defining the input 
components to produce an output is fundamental in any operational performance 
measurement and requires an input specification to be created. 
3.5.10 Input specification 
In practice the measured performance is only a partial measurement as it is often 
impractical to include all factors which go to create the final output. Those readily 
quantifiable are normally labour and consumable costs over a stated period of time. 
Thus only partial efficiencies are normally calculated and 'trade-offs' in accuracy must be 
accepted. Inputs could be specified as: units of labour, salary cost, operating and 
maintenance costs or capital costs. These four types of input descriptors are briefly 
described below. 
Units of labour 
These are readily available, such as man-hours actually expended completing all 
reactive maintenance tasks per week. The number of trades people employed in 
a given time period would not give a consistent measure of input to the output, as 
sickness, holidays etc would vary, as time input is not a function of price 
changes, it is a measure of 'real' input. Therefore the use of worked time would 
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give a more consistent measure of input over time. But this takes no account of 
an individual's level of efficiency or skill; again a trade-off must be accepted if 
units of labour are employed. 
Salary cost 
Use of the salary costs to produce a given output would be hampered from a like-
by-like analysis with respect to time, due to the differing wage rates paid to the 
varying skilled staff employed, possible overtime rates were paid for certain 
duties, and the change in inflation rates from one year to the next. These 
problems could be overcome by assigning various price adjusters within the 
calculations, but this would make the maintenance of such a measurement 
system complex. 
Operating and maintenance costs 
This unit of input measure would combine all labour and non-labour costs 
together. The identification of the contributing factors and the accuracy of the 
estimations could be simplified to exclude capital, land, buildings, etc. The 
problem for an NHS estates department would be separating the non-labour 
revenue costs from those relating to the maintenance function, particularly if a 
small directly employed labour force was employed. Again, as with the previous 
section relating to the subject of inflation, etc, the complexity would be increased 
when maintaining such a system of measurement. 
Capital costs 
Including these costs for the proposes of a day-to-day monitoring system would 
create a major problem, as buildings, plant and equipment depreciate in value, at 
different rates and at varying levels with respect to time. Also there would be time 
lags in relation to determining the opening and closing values of these various 
assets. 
As described above, an NHS estates department produces a range of outputs in relation 
to the eight engineering topics studied as part of this research. These must be combined 
to form a small number of performance measures. The major determinant influencing the 
preferred method includes factors such as accuracy required, measurement system 
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complexity and the availability of the relevant data. In all cases within this research the 
recommended method by the researcher was to adopt the units of labour measurement. 
The accuracy of the computations was acceptable, the data was readily available and no 
alteration to the existing managerial systems was needed to generate the information. 
The administration of the measurement system was simple to operate and understand, 
particularly by non-technical peoples. 
With the methodology outlined to identify the relevant inputs and desired outputs of the 
various processes, and the calculation of the relative efficiencies defined, it would be 
necessary to develop and design a method for measuring the quality of the process. The 
measurement analysis should report on the quality of the outputs. This would give an 
indication of the quality with respect to pre-agreed standards. An example of such quality 
measures would be the timeliness of the output. In terms of the artisan activities these 
quality measures would be split into two topics, reactive maintenance and planned 
preventative maintenance tasks. 
It is common for Trusts to set response times for the completion of reactive maintenance 
tasks relative to the urgency that the user places on the failure being reported. For 
example the urgency could be defined in one of three ways, as shown within Table 13 
below (NHS Estates 2002). 
Table 13 
Classification 
Emergency 
Urgent 
Routine 
Typical reactive maintenance fault classification and response time 
needs 
Definition Response 
time 
Fault creating immediate danger and/or disrupting a Immediate key business operation 
Fault could develop into an emergency Within 24 hours 
Fault is a non-emergency and is non-urgent Within seven days 
The measure of quality would be a measure of the department's ability to match (or 
exceed) these pre-set response times. Again the measurement could be presented as 
an indexed graph for each response need. The conventional planned preventative 
maintenance system uses a series of regular inspections against a set pre-agreed 
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schedule. The frequencies of these tasks are commonly: weekly, three weekly, six 
weekly etc. In this case the measure of quality would be a measure of the department's 
ability to match these pre-set frequencies. As with the artisan functions, measurements 
of the management function could be formed from the timeliness of the outputs from the 
line managers against a pre-agreed schedule. Again the measurement could be 
presented as an indexed graph for each response need, probably aggregated into an 
overall departmental measure of quality. 
3.5.11 Measuring the effectiveness of a process 
Prior discussions created the case for the need to measure outputs in terms of 
efficiency, quality and the effectiveness of the output in achieving the Trust's overall 
objectives. Of all three measures it is this final evaluation that will cause the most 
problem to design and determine to an acceptable and useful level of accuracy. 
The first step would be to determine the programme output; this could be the socio-
economic effect of creating a patient well being. This is quite different to the operational 
inputs which would be task orientated and relatively straight forward to measure. 
Probably the way forward would be to measure the effectiveness of the operational 
outputs against an intermediate operation, which itself would form an input into a higher-
level operational output. This higher-level output may itself be another intermediate 
output or the final programme output. 
The ratio of programme output to operational output would form a proxy measure of 
effectiveness. But this approach has its drawbacks: it only measures a relationship not 
its significance, e.g. should the ratio be greater and if so how much greater? It ignores 
the influence of external factors, and it disregards the effect of any time lags between the 
two outputs, and whether relationship is linear or not. If the effectiveness could be 
measured then it should be possible to produce meaningful targets for the effectiveness 
to achieve. This measure is not only determined by the values of quantity and quality of 
the operational outputs, but is also influenced by the operation's interrelationships with 
other operations both within and external to the department. Ideally these other factors 
influencing performance should be delineated, leading to quantitative relationships 
specified to link all significant variables. 
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What this short discussion has shown is that there is no simple answer to the evaluation 
of operational effectiveness. As the researcher dug deeper into this topic it became 
obvious that the development of a robust measurement of effectiveness was beyond the 
scope and timeframe of this thesis, and therefore would be included within the 
discussions relating to further research topics. 
From the development and design of monitors the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
processes defined the project should naturally move on to the next phase, which would 
be the creation of a reporting structure. 
3.5.12 The reporting system 
The content and presentation of each report must be matched to the needs of the 
individual line managers. Some would prefer graphical as opposed to tabular 
presentations, or a combination of both. In either case a narrative should accompany the 
data to give explanations, interpretations and elaborations as necessary. As a general 
rule the level of detail from the lower ranks would be summarised when reports are 
presented to the next higher level of authority. In all departments the need for this 
vertical dissemination of reports would be without question. But in such a highly complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisation, it must be recognised that in addition it 
would be necessary to design and disseminate operational performance reports, also on 
a horizontal level, to other departments on a similar systematic basis. 
The frequency of the reports would vary dependant on where the recipient sits in the 
hierarchal structure. Volume and efficiency data would be dependent on the variability of 
output demand and input. Therefore where these figures were subjected to high 
fluctuation, then these types of reports would be required more frequently to ensure that 
resources could be matched against output needs in a timely manner, e.g. weekly or 
monthly. 
In contrast, the levels of performance relating to the effectiveness of the operation would 
probably only be reported say every quarter. This would be in recognition that to view 
progress in its proper perspective then it would be necessary to report against a greater 
time period, as month to month variations would normally be insignificant and/or 
immeasurable. Also the frequency must be matched against the time it would take to 
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create and disseminate the report. There would be little point in reporting on a weekly 
basis if it took three weeks to produce and circulate the document. 
The reporting system would be split into five parts which must be integrated into the 
overall managerial system for the department and organisation. These five parts would 
be: setting the targets, initial planning to achieve the targets, measuring the results from 
the pre-determined methodology, comparing the results achieved against the set target, 
and finally taking some form of corrective action to bring the situation back on target. 
Therefore the reporting system for the operational output of a department must contain 
measures of efficiency and effectiveness in parallel to the more traditional personnel and 
budgetary information, etc. Outputs should be presented on an aggregate and individual 
basis in both an· absolute and index format. The internal and external factors which 
would have an effect on the output should be reported, if they could be identified and/or 
quantified. The data relating to the measurements of the quality of the output against the 
pre-agreed standards should also be recorded. 
The performance report should contain corresponding input measures. These should be 
split into: 
a. Input utilised in measurable operations, to include apportioned overhead. 
b. Input utilised in immeasurable operations, to include apportioned overhead. 
c. Input utilised in overhead operations, indicating allocations to measured and 
unmeasured operations. 
The inclusion of this data would assist in the analysis of any efficiency changes. The 
measures would also facilitate the development of the unmeasured to total input ratio, 
and the overhead to total input ratio. The operational efficiency indices could be 
presented as unit volume or unit cost ratios. But as described earlier the use of a cost 
figure complicates the administrative burden of the report production as inflation, wage 
agreements, etc must be converted to a common base for any meaningful comparison 
and interpretation to be made with respect to time. Operational effectiveness measures 
must be included which would show target vs. actual programme output/operational 
output ratios. If it was not possible to directly measure the programme output then proxy 
measures for the output volume and quality measures must be employed. 
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The previous phases indentified the inputs and required outputs of a department. Once 
completed the project then would then progress on to creating a managerial structure for 
the monitoring process. 
3.5.13 Structure of the monitoring process 
As previously discussed reference was made to the work of Perrow (1999) and others 
when researching into why systems fail, and the comparisons between these failed 
organisations with those regarded as High Reliability Organisations A common theme 
developed from their research was that High Reliability Organisations' managerial 
systems were designed with inbuilt parallel defensive systems. From research into errors 
in maintenance it has been proposed that managers should develop their monitoring 
systems to mainly deal with error-provoking tasks and error-inducing situations, as 
opposed to error-prone people (Reason & Hobbs, 2006); and that based on the 
evidence organisations should: 'be treating errors as an expected and foreseeable part 
of maintenance work'. Reason and Hobbs research has shown that no one type of 
defence within the managerial system is sufficient to capture all errors before they cause 
undue harm, but that an array of such barriers needs to be constructed. Ideally these 
safe guards should have both redundancy (multiple backups) and diversity (a variety of 
safeguards), and be designed to limit and contain the effects of the errors. They go on to 
state that: 'removing error-promoting situations and improving defences form the two 
most important parts of an effective error management programme'. Checks and 
inspections are examples of defences that are designed to identify these latent 
conditions (errors). 
Following this research parallel defences have been formed as an integral part of the 
monitoring system. A typical way of presenting these types of defences pictorially is 
shown below in figure 18. The diagram in figure 18 shows a series of boxes representing 
the parallel managerial defensive systems, surrounding a red dot signifying an incident. 
The inner most box (first defence system) would be designed to identify the incident (the 
red dot) and to surround and contain it. This then would alert the organisations 
manager's of the incident so that it could be immediately contained and corrected. The 
box is shown not to be a perfect square. This is in recognition of the work of Perrow and 
the Normal Accident theory, which in its simplest form states that all management 
systems will fail sometime. 
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Figure 18 Pictorial representations of managerial systems in parallel 
• 
Reason and Hobbs, 2006 Page 13 
Assuming that the inner most box (the first defence) fails to recognise the incident for 
whatever reason; the middle box (the second defence) should identify the incident and 
similarly alert the managers . In a similar way if both the first and second defences fail to 
spot the event, then the outer box would be designed as the third and last line of 
defence. When this theory is applied to a practical application with an NHS estates 
environment, the managerial structure would resemble that in figure 19 below. The figure 
shows a typical chain of command within a NHS estates department, from the trade's 
staff through the supervisor, engineering officer, estates manager and up to the board 
director. One form of parallel defence is shown as an external auditor reporting on the 
actions of the estates operatives and managers. The weakness with this reporting 
structure arrangement is that the external auditor would be reporting into the department 
being audited. Therefore any adverse comments could stay within the very department 
that could be causing the problem. 
A more robust defensive system is shown that includes the risk manager, control of 
infection officer and internal auditor as an example. In this arrangement the three 
managers are totally divorced from the estates department in terms of budget or 
managerial control, but all have a personal responsibility to advise the Trust of any 
deviation away from national and/or locally agreed standards/working practices. By 
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involving these three managers within the monitoring system, they could report any 
departure from the agreed standards through their own department's managerial 
structures, free from the influence of the estates department 
Figure 19 Basic parallel defence structures. 
- External Auditor - ......... ---------- ..... 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
, Tradesman r-- Supervisor r-- Engineering - Estates I- Director of Officer Manager Facilities -
,--- Risk Manager r-
Control of Infection Officer 
- Internal Auditor r-
In the experience of the researcher, one of the fundamental flaws within some 
monitoring systems is their reliance on a single person (or small group) to operate and 
maintain the processes. The reliability and robustness of the whole monitoring process 
would be greatly increased by removing this immediate human dependence, and 
creating an independent 'driver' to force the monitoring procedures to be completed. 
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3.5.14 The driver 
Within the structure developed and designed within this research, the creation of this 
independent 'driver' is achieved by utilising the existing estates department's planned 
preventative maintenance software. This currently produces work dockets for use by the 
trades' staff from a prescheduled list of periodic tasks to be completed at set frequencies 
throughout a calendar year, e.g. weekly, three weekly, six weekly quarterly, half yearly 
and yearly. The software records the issuing and completion of these planned 
preventative maintenance tasks for analysis and auditing purposes. This research has 
adopted this software to produce dockets addressed to the managerial staff of the Trust. 
The instructions contained within these dockets would be for the respective managers to 
complete their monitoring tasks, all against a pre-agreed schedule. This schedule would 
form an assurance framework as shown in figure 20. 
The figure shows an example of the various personnel within a monitoring regime 
together with their frequency of monitoring. The system operates without relying on a 
manager's memory to undertake a certain monitoring task, as the dockets are produced 
automatically by the computer, dispatched and returned via the internal mail system. As 
a typical Trust estates department produces approximately 800 such dockets a month, 
the additional docket production per month to operate the assurance framework system 
is negligible. The next section explains how in practical terms the assurance framework 
would operate. 
3.5.15 Assurance framework operation 
The work content contained within the dockets would instruct the recipient to undertake 
a specific monitoring task, with the results of the task being recorded in the computer for 
analysis and auditing at a later date. The instructions, technical detail and knowledge for 
each person within the framework would differ depending on their place within the 
organisational structure. 
As an example, the engineering officer would be trained in the requirements of the 
national codes of practice, and have intimate local site knowledge of the plant and 
equipment fitted. His command of the technical and practical aspects of the topic would 
be far superior to say the Trust internal auditor. It would be the engineering office's role 
to manage and oversee the safe operation of the engineering topic in question, but it 
157 
would be the internal auditor's function to ensure that the locally agreed monitoring 
procedures were been followed, and that the staff have been involved at the correct 
parts of the process and have undertaken their respective monitoring duties to the 
agreed timescale. Any deviation from either the national or locally agreed standards 
would be uncovered and reported to the Trust senior managers, as the robustness and 
reliability of the process would be complemented by the three (sometimes four) parallel 
defence systems inbuilt into the monitoring assurance framework. 
Figure 20 An example assurance framework. 
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Figure 20 shows the involvement of the Trust's health and safety manager, control of 
infection officer and internal auditor, forming three of the four parallel defences. Each of 
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these personnel would operate through a totally separate managerial structure from 
those within the estates department, yet they would all have a role to play in monitoring 
various activities and advising the Trust of any risk that may be generated. The health 
and safety manager would report to the Trust health and safety (risk) committee, the 
control of infection officer would report to the control of infection committee, and the 
internal auditor in turn would report to the Trust audit committee. Depending on the 
governance arrangements within the Trust, all of these committees eventually would 
report to the Trust board. The fourth defence system that could be employed would be 
created through the commissioning of an external auditor (advisor) reporting to a 
committee or management stream outside of the estates managerial chain of command. 
His/her role would be to provide a managerial and technical evaluation of the monitoring 
process and content as a whole to create a culture of 'continuous improvement'. 
The previous sections discussed the methodology used to create a driver to ensure that 
the locally agreed actions were completed to an acceptable standard and within a 
tolerable timeframe. Once this basic operational assurance framework has been agreed, 
then the detailed actions for each operative within the monitoring structure could be 
created. 
This phase concludes the development of the whole of the operational performance 
measurement system, as the inputs and outputs of the department would have been 
matched to the national and local needs of the Trust. The efficiency and effectiveness 
indexes would have been created from which the department could be measured. And 
the design of the generic mechanism to drive the performance management process 
completed, with inbuilt managerial parallel defence systems to create the high reliability 
demanded. 
This would conclude the work of the project design team, but before they were 
disbanded they would have to record all aspects of the operational performance 
measurement system developed; report on the methods of approach, the outputs 
considered and those rejected with reasons given; report on the availability of the 
information systems and report on the reporting format. Then they must develop a plan 
for the implementation phase of the project, this would involve setting up an 
implementation team. 
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3.5.16 The implementation plan 
Following the disbandment of the project design team the implementation team must be 
formed. Their role would be to prepare the briefing and instruction manuals, deliver the 
orientation training to the operatives, commence the data collection and begin its 
processing. 
The introduction of the monitoring system could be either simultaneously across the 
whole department or phased. Whilst introduction across the department as a whole has 
the advantage of a reduced implementation programme, in large complex highly 
interactive and tightly coupled departments this approach could be problematic; 
therefore a sequential approach would be favoured as the practical alternative, 
particularly if the resources of the implementation team were small. The time frame for 
the introduction must be specified within the project plan, starting from the bottom and 
moving to the top of the hierarchal structure, but including time for the horizontal process 
that must take place 
The time horizon for this implementation phase must take account of the available 
information. It may be that a first part would be concerned with the data immediately at 
hand, the second part utilising data accessible only in the short term, through to the final 
and third part when all data would become accessible. 
The methods for collecting and processing the data into the pre-agreed report format 
and frequencies should also be included within the implementation plan. It should state 
the manual and automatic steps of the process, the personnel responsible for each of 
the steps, the analysis methods, the training required for each operative/line manager, 
and the suggested implementation team structure. 
The implementation team reporting to the Steering committee should include 
representatives from the department that the operational management system had been 
designed for. In this way the team would consist of a diverse range of skills, knowledge 
and experience to implement the design of the monitoring system in the sprit and 
content of the original intent. An essential part of the team's tasks would be to create 
and deliver familiarisation training to all staff in the monitoring process loop. This would 
include an explanation of its need and links to the overall Trust's corporate governance 
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requirements, objectives, risk assessments and to legal compliance issues. Particular 
stress must be made to all concerned that the measurement system is only relative and 
not absolute; and that it is a representation of the group as a whole, and thus could not 
be used to assess an individual's performance in terms of efficiency and/or 
effectiveness. Also the staff should be given a clear indication of how the information 
would be interpreted, used, and by whom, for planning and managing operations. 
Without this initial training and support then the monitoring system would quickly 
disintegrate and become unreliable. Once implemented the operational performance 
measurement system would enter its final phase of maintenance. In this state the whole 
performance management process should be continuously reviewed to ensure that its 
composition is still delivering the information applicable and relevant for the needs of the 
Trust. This is in recognition that conditions change both within and outside the 
organisation, and that organisational structures, reporting arrangements and 
departmental functions naturally evolve over time. Therefore the measurement system 
must be constantly appraised to ensure that it is not only reflecting reality, but that it is 
also measuring the relevant topics. This would involve the critical re-examination and 
alteration as necessary, of the outputs and their structure, the validity of any weighting 
applied, and a reconsideration of the continued validity of the base period integral to the 
efficiency and effectiveness indexes. In other words a culture of 'continuous 
improvement' would be created. 
3.6 Chapter Three Summary 
The literature search demonstrated to the researcher that to adequately answer the 
research question the methodology employed must be split into four disparate research 
objectives, in order to examine the managerial system as a whole. 
First research objective 
The methodology created for each Trust taking part within this research, a multi-
professional focus group comprised of a Trust's own senior managers, for each Trust 
analysed. Their role was to compare their managerial systems to the respective national 
guidance, identify the gaps (latent conditions) and assesses the level of risk generated. 
Within the methodology developed as part of this research to assess these risk levels 
was the rejection of the NHS national standard '5x5 risk criticality grid' in common use 
throughout the Service, in favour of a series of specific 'Utility Functions'. It was shown 
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that these give a transparent, quick, repeatable and auditable assessment of risk that is 
far superior to the NHS risk assessment system. A critical review of the main factors that 
could influence the risk score developed by the participants using this preferred method 
is presented, together with a description of the techniques used to minimise their effects. 
To the researcher's knowledge, this is the first time that the use of 'Utility Theory' has 
been applied to such scenarios. 
Second research objective 
The methodology for this objective designed and used the simple project management 
techniques of Gantt Charts and Monte Carlo simulations, to determine the resource 
needs in terms of man-power, cost and time frame to close the identified managerial 
gaps. 
Third research objective 
Whilst the outputs from the first two research objectives of the process identified the 
latent conditions creating the risks, and estimated the resource needs to close the 
managerial gaps to reduce the risks to an acceptable level, they did not give any 
indication of the revenue consequences needed to keep the gaps closed in terms of the 
directly employed artisan shop-floor staffs. Thus the crux of this objective was to assess 
the effects of reducing the available artisan man-power resource below an acceptable 
level, and to predict the resulting increase in risk. The technique used to explore this 
previously unsolved problem within NHS estates departments created a simulation 
program that modelled the changing work load patens, resource availability and 
assessed risk with respect to time. The methodology used a Trust's own historical data 
and risk profiles derived from utility functions created via a Trust's specific multi-
professional focus group; therefore the resulting outputs were particular to each 
individual Trust. 
Fourth research objective 
The methodology developed and designed a generic day-to-day monitoring assurance 
framework that integrates audit and review, and which can serve multiple functions, e.g. 
compliance checking, policy enforcement, embedding performance management into 
governance systems, and creating the structure for information transfer across 
organisational interfaces. 
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Chapter Four Results 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter gave a detailed description of the methodology that was employed 
to answer the research question: 
Does the managerial system of internal control within the NHS give adequate 
assurance that Trust engineering day-to-day maintenance strategies conform to 
national guidance? 
The literature search demonstrated to the researcher that to adequately answer the 
research question the methodology employed must be split into four disparate research 
objectives, in order to examine the managerial system as a whole: This chapter presents 
the results of the research findings with a brief discussion. 
4.2 First research objective 
The aim of the analysis was to develop an appreciation of the risks that NHS Trust 
estates departments were generating through latent conditions within their engineering 
core managerial systems. This was undertaken by referencing their current systems 
against eight main national codes of practice that were specifically written for the NHS 
estates departments. The gaps between the national standards and a Trust's actual 
compliance and associated risks were assessed via a multi-professional focus group 
exclusive to each individual Trust. The result from this objective was the creation of a 
Risk Profile explicit to each Trust. 
In order to analyse these profiles and form an opinion about the general level of 
compliance of NHS estates departments relative to the national standards, a comparison 
of like-for-like Trusts was formed. Trusts within the NHS are classified into five groups to 
reflect the differing types of healthcare that they provide, see below: 
a. Acute Trusts. These employ a large part of the NHS workforce. They provide 
both outpatient and inpatient services which include such departments as 
accident and emergency, theatres, intensive care, special care baby units, etc. 
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b. Ambulance Trusts. As the name suggests these organisations control the 
ambulance service. But they are also responsible for providing transport to get 
patients to hospital for treatment. 
c. Care Trusts. These are organisations that work in both health and social care. 
They carry out a range of services, including social care, mental health services 
and primary care services. 
d. Mental Health Trusts. Again as the name suggests these Trusts provide 
services for people with mental health problems. 
e. Primary Care Trusts. These Trusts command approximately 75% of the NHS 
budget. They provide the type of service that people normally need when they 
first have a health problem, such as NHS Walk-in centres, the phone line service 
NHS Direct, etc. 
Each of the five types of Trust has differing needs from their respective estates 
departments. This is a reflection of the type of service that the Trusts provide to the 
patients they serve. For example; Acute Trusts normally operate from large sites which 
house highly technical building services. In contrast Primary Care Trusts normally 
provide their function from a large number of relatively small sites with technically simple 
engineering services. The detailed analyses of the risk profiles were restricted to 10 
Trusts in total. All of the sites were classed as Acute, with one exception. In this case the 
organisation belonged to the Primary Care group. Its inclusion within this detailed 
analysis was due to the very unusual situation that its engineering building services 
within its property portfolio closely resembled those of an Acute site, therefore the 
researcher considered it justifiable to include it for analysis. The combined data for all 
hospitals for each critical element were grouped into one of the eight topics. The 
maximum, minimum and average values were computed for each critical element for the 
three values of weighting, percentage compliance and risk score. From these data three 
graphs were developed for each of the eight engineering topics, creating 24 graphs in 
total. The next section (Data Analysis) shows all 24 graphs. A detailed description of the 
first three graphs is given to aid interpretation. A discussion of the results follows the 
data analysis section. 
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4.2.1 Data Analysis 
Figure 21 below shows the maximum, minimum and average risk score for the topic of 
Medical Gas Pipeline Systems (MGPS) . It should be noted that late in the year 2006 the 
name for this topic which was previously Piped Medical Gas (PM G) was changed to 
MGPS when a revised set of national guidance standards was issued (Department of 
Health B 2006). The maximum and minimum values for each critical element are shown 
as a vertical black straight line, with the average value depicted as a blue diamond . The 
data is arranged so that the critical elements with the highest average risk score are to 
the left of the graph. The NHS traffic light system of red, amber and green has been 
superimposed onto the graph, to indicate those critical elements that were generating 
unacceptable levels of assessed risk. The colours were acting as a guide 'only'. They 
were part of the final presentation of the risk profile but played no part in the actual 
assessment of risk. 
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The critical element number one (at the left of the graph) shows a maximum risk score 
value of 25, and a minimum value of 20, with an average close to the maximum of 25. 
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Therefore the Trusts have all regarded this particular critical element to be generating 
unacceptable levels of assessed risk. In contrast, critical element number 26 (at the near 
right of the graph) shows a maximum risk score of 20, and a minimum value of near 
zero, with an average value of approximately two. This demonstrates that although the 
majority of hospitals regard the risk that they are generating from this critical element to 
be very low (well within the green zone), there are outliers where this is not considered 
to be the case. From a visual examination of the figure it is obvious that there is a wide 
spread of assessed risk for the topic of Medical Gas Pipeline Systems. The methodology 
used to develop the assessed risk scores employed a series of six utility functions that 
reflected the weighting and percentage compliance for each critical element. Therefore, 
in order to analyse the data further, it was necessary to break down the assessed risk 
score for each critical element into the individual components of weighting and 
percentage compliance, as in the following two graphs. To allow cross references to be 
made between all three figures for this topic, the critical element numbers are common. 
Thus, critiGal element numbers one, two, etc in figure 21 are the same as critical element 
numbers one, two, etc in figure 22, and so on. Figure 22 below shows the weighting 
applied to each critical element for the topic of Piped Medical Gas. 
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Figure 22 produced a small spread around the average values for the majority of data 
points, indicating a general consensus between Trust focus groups regarding the 
importance of these critical elements. To analyse the data further, figure 23 (below) was 
developed to examine the compliance of the managerial systems for each critical 
element against the nationally agreed standards. 
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In figure 23 the same convention applies to the numbering of the critical elements as in 
figure 22, e.g. figure 22 critical elements one, two, etc, are the same as figure 23 critical 
elements one, two, etc. Critical element one shows a near zero percentage compliance 
value when assessed against national standards. When this is computed with the 
average corresponding weighting assigned to critical element number one in figure 22, 
then figure 21 gives an average risk score of a near maximum value of 25. The 
interpretation that can be placed upon this result is that even though all Trusts 
considered that the Medical Gas Pipeline Systems critical element number one is 
extremely important, their managerial systems fall far short of the national standards. In 
contrast, critical element number 26 shows a near average of 90% compliance. When 
this is again computed with the corresponding average weighting in figure 22, then figure 
21 records an average low risk being generated from this critical element. The 
interpretation that can be drawn from this is that all of the individual focus groups 
considered that the Medical Gas Pipeline Systems critical element number 26 was 
extremely important, and that on average their managerial systems almost matched the 
national standard requirements. Figure 21 showed the average level of risk being 
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generated from the Medical Gas Pipeline Systems within the Trusts analysed. Listed 
below (in no order of importance) is a summary of the failures that have attracted an 
average risk score within the red and amber zones:-
.:. The Trust must have an operational policy that clearly states that the 
executive manager is responsible for overseeing the policy to ensure that it is 
be properly implemented. This should be carried out a regular basis, and the 
procedure for such monitoring should be set out in the policy. The document 
must also outline the procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency . 
• :. The designated medical or nursing officer is the person in each department 
with whom the authorised person liaises on any matters affecting the system, 
and who would give permission for the planned interruption to the supply. The 
policy should list these designated persons and their training regime relevant 
to their area of responsibility, together with the arrangements for cover due to 
their absences . 
• :. The authorised person should be appointed in writing by the chief executive 
on the recommendation of a chartered engineer who has specialist 
knowledge of medical gas pipeline systems. The recommendation for 
appointment or reappointment as an authorised person should be made by a 
Chartered Engineer who has specialist knowledge of medical gas systems, 
via an individual assessment. 
.:. The authorised person should be consulted prior to the purchase of any 
medical equipment, which will be connected to the system. And the 
operational policy should state the procedures to be followed . 
• :. The estates department should have accurate and up to date drawings of the 
system showing main sections and branches, departments served, control 
valves, terminal unit and alarm systems for each gas service. And each 
isolating valve should be individually identified by the unique reference 
number. 
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.:. Evidence of current maintenance contractor's registration should be by sight 
of the current and up-to-date certificate of registration. And all maintenance 
work should be carried out accordance with the relevant codes of practice as 
a minimum. 
An identical arrangement and analysis has been undertaken for the remaining seven 
topics. This has produced three figures per topic showing risk, weighting and percentage 
compliance. These 21 figures are presented below. Under each of the seven figures that 
show the average risk score for each topic is a summary listing of those critical elements 
falling in the red and amber zones. Following the detailed analysis of the 21 figures is a 
discussion of the overall results from which general conclusions are drawn . 
Figure 24 The Water average risk score for each critical element. 
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Figure 24 showed the average risk being generated from the water systems within the 
Trusts analysed. Listed below (in no order of importance) is a summary of the failures 
that have attracted an average risk score within the red and amber zones: 
.:. Emergency deluge showers and eye baths are to be flushed weekly to 
prevent stagnation of water. 
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.:. A written operational plan, policy and procedures should be formed from a 
detailed risk assessment, and should be in place for each site. This should 
comprise of: up-to-date drawings and descriptions of all the supply, storage 
and distribution systems within those premises, and step by step instructions 
relating to the operation, maintenance and shut down for each branch of the 
system. These documents must identify the nominated person (and his 
deputy) responsible for overall accountability together with details of their 
training needs. All details contained within these documents must be 
acceptable to the control of infection team . 
• :. These risk assessments should be undertaken at least annually. The risk 
assessment should be conducted not just for the routine operation or use of 
the system, but also in unusual circumstances, breakdown, abnormal 
operation and commissioning . 
• :. A contract supervising officer having specialist knowledge, training and 
experience should be appointed to witness tests and checks under the terms 
of the contract. Pre-commissioning, commissioning and testing must be 
carried out upon systems before handover. And all new and/or altered 
installations must at the time of handover be supplied with installed record 
drawings and operating/maintenance instructions, and test certificates. Also 
additional monitoring checks/analysis should be carried out after any repairs 
or modifications to the system . 
• :. All isolating valves should periodically be worked through their full range of 
travel . 
• :. The Trust should ensure that an accurate record of all assets relating to the 
hot and cold water distribution systems is set up and regularly maintained . 
• :. During a period of low ambient temperature, a check should be made relating 
to the temperatures of the outflow from the hot water supply calorifier to 
establish that the temperature is above 60 degrees centigrade and that the 
temperature at the return connection is 55 to 50 degrees centigrade. Also the 
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most distant draw-off point on the system should be checked to ensure that 
the temperature reaches a steady state value between 60 and 50 degrees 
centigrade within one minute of running the water at full flow . 
• :. Whenever a calorifier is taken out of service or its flow temperature falls 
below 45 degrees centigrade for any reason, then it should be pasteurised . 
• :. It is essential to check the temperature settings and operation of all water 
mixing devices routinely, at least half yearly . 
• :. Where two or more pressurisation/supply pumps are installed for pressurising 
systems, each pump must regularly be brought into service at least daily as 
the main duty or lead pump. Hot water circulating pumps should be switched 
daily to ensure that any standby or back-up pump is regularly brought into 
service as the main duty or lead pump . 
• :. The maintenance of ice making machines, water coolers and drinks vending 
machines should be carried out in accordance with the manufacturer's 
recommendations . 
• :. During temporary closure of wards or departments, a procedure for flushing 
the hot and cold water service systems should be instituted . 
• :. In multiple cistern installations a check must be carried out for stagnant 
water. 
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Figure 25 The Water average weighting for each critical element. 
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Figure 26 The Water average compliance level for each critical element 
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Figure 27 The lifts average risk score for each critical element. 
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Critical Elements 
Figure 27 shows the average risk being generated from the lift systems within the Trusts 
analysed. Listed below (in no order of importance) is a summary of the failures that have 
attracted an average risk score within the red or amber zones:-
.:. All passenger and bed/passenger lifts should be fitted with an emergency 
intercommunication point (two way) . 
• :. Record of inspection and servicing procedures should be maintained . 
• :. Trust staff members should be trained in methods of emergency hand 
winding of traction lifts and emergency hand lowering of hydraulic fittings . 
Records of training and refresher dates should be maintained . 
• :. A member of the hospital maintenance staff should regularly check the 
emergency lighting and intercoms systems. 
174 
I; 
Figure 28 The Lifts average weighting for each critical element 
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Figure 29 The lifts average compliance level for each critical element 
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Figure 30 The Ventilation Plant average risk score for each critical element. 
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Figure 30 shows the average risk being generated from the ventilation systems within 
the Trusts analysed. Listed below (in no order of importance) is a summary of the 
failures that have attracted an average risk score within the red or amber zones:-
.:. An asset register should exist that lists all ventilation and air conditioning 
plants, together with the relative areas been served from each plant. The 
maintenance schemes should consist of sufficient measurements of the 
plant's performance to determine its continuing ability to perform to its 
designated function. Information for each plant should be available in relation 
to the filter grades and the dirty and clean pressure drops . 
• :. Regular tests, at intervals agreed with the local fire prevention officer, will 
need to be carried out in order to demonstrate the continuing efficiency of the 
fire detection and containment systems. These tests include the testing of fire 
dampers. The location of these fire dampers should be marked on the 
ductwork, and a visible point on the fabric if the ductwork is concealed. 
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.:. All ductwork should be marked in order to identify its purpose and direction of 
airflow, (fume cupboard and safety cabinet extract ducting) . 
• :. The maintenance schemes should disinfect all sections that are known to 
become damp in normal use, with a record being kept of who carried out the 
disinfection procedure, when it was completed and the method used . 
• :. Records of dynamic tests measuring the volumetric airflow at randomly 
selected supply and extract terminal devices: together with records 
comparing these results with original commissioning information . 
• :. All ductwork should be marked in order to identify its purpose and direction of 
airflow, fume cupboards and safety cabinet extract ducting . 
• :. Plant located outside roofs should be provided with designated walkways to 
protect the roof surface. 
Figure 31 The Ventilation Plant average weighting for each critical element. 
7 
6 
5 
~ 4 
~ 
.21 
~ 3 
2 
o 
~ ~ 
Ventilation Plant - Weighting 
~~ ~ 
...... ...... ..................... 
..... ~~ ~~ ~~ 
..... ... ......... 
~ ~~ ~~ 
~ ~~ ~ 
~~ ~~ 
...... ~ ...... 
..... ..... 
....................... ~ ~ ~~ ..... 
... ... ... 
I I I I I I I I I I I , I I I I I I I I I I I I 
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 
Critical Elements 
177 
Figure 32 
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The Ventilation Plant average compliance level for each critical 
element 
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Figure 33 The BMS average risk score for each critical element. 
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Figure 33 shows the average level of risk being generated from the building 
management systems within the Trusts analysed. Listed below (in no order of 
importance) is a summary of the failures that have attracted an average risk score within 
the red and amber zones:-
.:. The operational procedures for the BMS should detail the main and 
foreseeable potential problems and hazards that can arise from failing to 
follow the agreed operating, monitoring and maintenance procedures, as well 
as the possible legal consequences 
.:. Arrangements for dealing with BMS alarms should be graded according to 
severity, and agreed with a Trust multi-disciplinary group e.g. cross infection 
officer, microbiologist etc . 
• :. Performance monitoring, risk assessments, performance reports and auditing 
of the system should be undertaken on a periodic basis . 
• :. Written operational procedures should contain: -
• Periodic training regimes as the BMS system and staff change. 
• Training records for each BMS operative that clearly shows that 
they have been specifically trained. 
• A user brief comprising a description of a BMS, plant under BMS 
control and the intended mode of operation . 
• :. The following records should be available: -
• Plant diagrams showing locations of field devices 
• Precise design requirements with regard to physical parameters 
measured and controlled by the BMS 
• Commissioning manuals listing the results of commissioning tests. 
• Record drawings 
• Schematics 
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Figure 34 The BMS average weighting for each critical element. 
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Figure 35 The BMS average compliance level for each critical element 
BMS - Compliance 
120 
100 .... ..., 
Q) ~~ ~ (.) 
c: 80 
.!!! ~~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~ c. ~ ~ E ~~ ~~ 0 ~ ~~ ~~ ~ () 60 
Q) ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ Cl 
0:1 
.... 
c: 
Q) 40 (.) ~~ .. Q) 
c.. 
~~ ~ 20 
~ ~~ 
0 , ; : , 
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 
Critical Elements 
180 
Figure 36 The Pressure Systems average risk score for each critical element. 
Figure 36 shows the average risk being generated from the pressure systems within the 
Trusts analysed. Listed below (in no order of importance) is a summary of the failures 
that have attracted an average risk score within the red or amber zones:-
.:. The Trust shall provide instructions for the operation of the plant and 
equipment, and shall include for the safe operation of the system and the 
action to be taken in the event of any emergency. The Trust shall also be 
responsible for ensuring that the system is properly maintained in good 
repair, so as to prevent danger. 
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Figure 37 The Pressure Systems average weighting for each critical element. 
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The Pressure Systems average compliance level for each critical 
element 
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Figure 39 The Fire average risk score for each critical element. 
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Figure 39 shows the average risk being generated from the fire systems within the 
Trusts analysed . Listed below (in no order of importance) is a summary of the failures 
that have attracted an average risk score within the red or amber zones:-
.:. A risk assessment must be available that assesses the risk of maintaining 
these hoses against the risk associated with Legionella. This risk 
assessment must be undertaken by a multi-disciplinary group . 
• :. A risk assessment should be undertaken to determine the frequency of 
planned preventative maintenance for each set of fire doors . 
• :. The minimum acceptable levels of fire precautions should be determined 
from a full fire risk assessment undertaken using the nationalised 
guidance relating to fire. These risk assessments should be used to 
develop an emergency evacuation plan. 
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.:. The emergency lighting system must be periodically tested. The testing 
programme must make reference to the manufacture's requirements, in 
particular, the shelf life of the battery backup cells . 
• :. The Trust must maintain an up-to-date set of drawings, which indicate: 
alarm and detection systems, means of escape, emergency lighting, 
containment, first aid fire fighting equipment and fire brigade access . 
• :. If an automatically started generator is used as part of the standby supply, 
then it should be started up once each month by the simulation of a failure of 
the normal power supply, and a check should be conducted to ensure that it 
energises the fire alarm system. 
+:+ 
A visual inspection should be made to check whether structural or occupancy 
changes have affected the requirements for manual call points, detectors and 
soundness . 
• :. All dry and wet fire mains should be checked for correct operation on a 
periodic basis . 
• :. Each and every fire detector should be periodically checked for correct 
operation in accordance with the manufacture's recommendations . 
• :. Where lightning protection systems are provided they shall be subject to a 
yearly planned preventive maintenance inspection and report. 
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Figure 41 The Fire average compliance level for each critical element 
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Figure 42 The Electricity (L V) average risk score for each critical element. 
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Figure 42 shows the average risk being generated from the electrical systems within the 
Trusts analysed . Listed below (in no order of importance) is a summary of the failures 
that have attracted an average risk score within the red or amber zones:-
.:. Management must have a clearly defined electrical safety policy and 
programme for the operation and servicing of their low voltage systems and 
equipment. All authorised or competent persons concerned with operating 
maintenance or work on the low voltage systems of the managed premises 
shall be provided with a personal copy of management electrical safety rules . 
• :. The operational policy should contain a schedule of possible emergency 
incidents, with remed ial operational procedures, which may cause a loss of 
normal electrical suppl ies . 
• :. Essential power supply facilit ies for existing health care premises shou ld be 
periodically reassessed . Upgrading of emergency power should be 
considered to maintain essential clinical and surgical life support facilities . 
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.:. Simulation of loss of mains supply should be initiated once per month. It is 
recommended that an emergency exercise be undertaken and independently 
adjudicated to test the contingency plans for alternative emergency 
generating plant. 
.:. All fixed low voltage electrical systems shall be periodically inspected and 
tested. Therefore records shall be presented for every system, together with 
a pre-agreed programme of inspection routines. The frequency of inspections 
and testing shall not exceed 5 years for normal installations and 3 years for 
industrial areas e.g. kitchens and workshops . 
• :. All fixed or portable items of electrical equipment which are connected to the 
electrical supply should be subject to registration for approved use by the 
authorised person responsible for the electrical supply and distribution 
system . 
• :. Distribution boards controlling final outlet circuits shall be accurately identified 
by labelling of each board and circuit. 
.:. Risk treatment plans should be developed that show how the Trust is 
correcting the deficiencies that are required to be addressed . 
• :. A system or installation accepted from a contractor must be accompanied 
with handover documentation including test certificates . 
• :. The operating theatre emergency lights must be tested on full load for a 
period of not less than 3 hours . 
• :. All portable electrical equipment shall be subject to inspection and testing 
procedures. 
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4.2.2 Brief discussion of the results from the first research objective 
The approach employed within this first research objective was very similar to the work 
of Ramanujam and Goodman (2003) which asked similar questions when analysing 
organisations against pre-specified routines and generally accepted norms which 
uncovered latent gaps within the managerial systems. From the results of this research it 
has been shown that all of the ten Trusts analysed have been at risk from unacceptable 
and intolerable unknown latent conditions within their management systems. The results 
showed that all of the Trusts analysed generated risks in the red and amber zones. From 
an examination of the critical elements within these red and amber zones it is apparent 
that these risks were caused by long term failures of the managerial systems, and not by 
momentary 'errors of judgement' or 'lapses of memory'. Following the development of 
each profile large resources were redeployed by each of the participating Trusts, to 
reduce their specific identified risks. Thus, it is argued that the Trusts have accepted the 
use of the overall methodology of the research instrument developed to identify latent 
conditions within their managerial systems and to assess a risk score. Also a trait 
common to all profiles developed was that the departments were not ISO 9000:2000 
compliant. Thus the main conclusions drawn were that: 
.:. Methodologies used by the process have been accepted by the Trusts 
involved . 
• :. Current monitoring systems employed by the NHS are woefully inadequate. 
The model has uncovered numerous previously unknown latent high risk 
conditions . 
• :. Without the alignment of a Trust's managerial systems with recognised 
quality standards, then the problems and risks of latent high risk conditions 
will persist, and the NHS corporate governance initiative will be 
compromised. 
4.3 Second research objective 
This objective sought to assess the likely resource needs (manpower, outsource costs 
and timeframes) to close the identified gaps within the managerial systems uncovered. 
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The resource needs required for each Trust were not consistent between Trusts. This 
was to be expected as each organisation has operated independently. What was 
common was that each Trust reallocated their existing limited resources to where they 
would 'do most good', based on the findings. From this it can be concluded that they 
collectively accepted the methodology and assessments. 
4.4 Third research objective 
This was by far the most complex in terms of methodology, project management, data 
collection/analysis and interpretation. It sought to answer the question, "What directly 
employed artisan revenue resources do we need to keep the gaps closed?" In the 
researcher's personal experience it has been a question that has been asked throughout 
the past three decades, without an answer coming fourth - until now. 
During the course of this information gathering period it became obvious to the 
researcher that, each Trust controlled and monitored this basic managerial information 
differently. This variation ranged from virtually no apparent control through to practicing 
close monitoring procedures. In all cases the researcher had to question the accuracy of 
some of the information and subsequently had to require the organisation to justify some 
figures. These historical base figures needed for the simulation consisted of the following 
three data sets, all containing week-by-week totals over the last one to three years for 
the mechanical, electrical and semi-skilled trade groups/site. The time frame of between 
one and three years of the historical data used was dependent on the availability and 
accuracy of the records. 
a. Available man hours 
b. Defect hours 
c. planned preventative maintenance schedule 
a. Available man hours 
The available man hours were the actual hours available to undertake the defect and 
planned preventative maintenance tasks. These were the hours remaining after their 
diverted time was removed. The diverted time was a phrase used within the (now) old 
NHS Labour Management System, and consisted of a number of codes that were 
agreed locally, and used to record unproductive time such as holidays, training, trade 
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union meetings, etc. In all cases the researcher had to discuss and agree the 
appropriate diverted time for each trade group/site. 
b. Defect hours 
This data was readily available from each Trust's computerised work information system. 
The data recorded all of the directly employed labour artisan man hours that had been 
expended undertaking the day-to-day maintenance duties, which were generated from 
the various wards and departments. 
In all cases it was agreed that the artisan staff workload consisted (in simple terms) of: 
reactive and planned preventative maintenance tasks, with a small amount of low cost 
'new works', where the term 'new works' related to the adaptation and/or alteration of the 
existing infrastructure and contained a portion of 'Backlog' maintenance activities. It was 
agreed that that the man hours expended undertaking these 'new works' would be 
removed from the simulation process, as these were not classified as day-to-day 
maintenance. Thus only the true day-to-day tasks of the reactive maintenance needs 
and the planned preventative maintenance schedule were to be subjected to the 
simulation process. 
c. planned preventative maintenance schedule 
In all cases the planned preventative maintenance regime, associated frequencies and 
estimates of man hours to complete each planned preventative maintenance task, had 
to be either partially or completely rewritten before the simulation could commence. As it 
was found that the systems had not been updated to keep pace with the changes to the 
national guidance, and/or local plant and equipment and/or advances in technology. This 
was undertaken initially by the estates officers by identifying each task required, and 
referencing the relevant national guidance and local specific requirements. This resulted 
in an 'assessment of need', together with descriptors relating to the assessed impact 
should an item fail whilst in service; and with an assessed probability of failure with 
respect to time should a planned preventative maintenance task fail to be completed for 
whatever reason. It was this revised planned preventative maintenance schedule that 
was used within the simulation and not any historical data relating to periodic 
maintenance. Following the design of the planned preventative maintenance regime, the 
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relevant tasks were balanced throughout the year to form an even workload on a week-
by-week basis within each trade group. 
In order to initiate the simulation the impact and probability profile assessments were 
initially assessed by the engineering officers within the planned preventative 
maintenance workshops. These preliminary judgments allowed the simulation to 
undergo a series of iterations, fine tuning of the data and output format, in preparation 
for presentation and discussion with the clinical and medical professions. In all but a few 
cases the original values assigned by the engineering officers were accepted. Thus the 
final maintenance simulation outputs were formed from the active involvement of a multi-
professional team, as recommended by the NHS guidance Estatecode. But before the 
simulations were run, the researcher considered it necessary to rewrite the original 
simulation software, for the reasons discussed below. 
4.4.1 The simulation programs re-design 
The software program for this third research objective was initially designed using 
Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications language. The program took approximately 1 ~ 
hours to complete one simulation run for a single trade group for one Trust site, when 
operated on a laptop computer with average processing power. The speed of the 
program run time was increased by employing the use of a reasonably high powered 
desk top machine, but the researcher considered that it was still too slow, therefore an 
alternative software compiler was sought. 
The chosen software was FORTRAN 2003, one of the oldest high level programming 
languages. It was introduced in 1957 and used in the scientific, numerical and 
engineering fields. Through the years the program has been the subject of a number of 
revisions to keep pace with computer technology and to be competitive with other 
programming languages. Due to the longevity of the language there is a wealth of 
information and experience readily available, along with a demonstrable track record of 
its use. This with the programs syntax being similar to the Microsoft Visual Basic for 
Applications language made it this researcher's obvious choice. 
Thus the original Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications program was rewritten into 
FORTRAN 2003. The resulting increase in the speed of a single simulation moved from 
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1 Yz hours to just a few seconds, when operated on the same laptop machine. This 
increase in speed allowed the original program to be enhanced to give a greater detail of 
analysis. This in turn promoted additional understanding of the operational maintenance 
activity and the associated generation of risk, and allowed the simulation to be expanded 
from a 10 year to a 20 year period. 
The base data for the simulation was provided by the estates departments in Microsoft 
Excel format. This was imported into FORTRAN as a series of arrays. Prior to any 
simulation run each base data array was viewed on the screen for the researcher to 
confirm (or otherwise) that the transfer of the data had been completed successfully. 
Once the researcher was confident that the transferred data was correct the program 
was allowed to create the following arrays: 
Tests 1 & 2 
These two arrays produced a series of step functions for the available man hours 
which were used to ensure that the program responded correctly to pre-
determined extreme levels. 
Available Hours 
This array calculated on a week-by-week basis the time that was available for the 
completion of the planned preventative maintenance tasks by subtracting the 
defect hours from the available man hours. 
Sickness/vacancy 
The effects of long term sickness were explored from these three arrays by 
assuming that the available hours were reduced by one WTE for three, six and 
nine months respectfully, starting at week 420 of the 1040 week (20 yr) 
simulation in each case. The term WTE is commonly used within the NHS to 
describe the available man-hours of one operative to undertake one week's work. 
Currently an operative is employed for 37.5 hours per week, but this figure is 
reduced by holiday entitlement, sickness, and other diverted time. 
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The same effect was judged by the researcher to be experienced when a Trust 
deliberately holds open a vacancy for a period of time in an attempt to balance 
the revenue budgets. 
Impact assessments 
As previously discussed the figures within the NHS criticality grid are unsuitable 
for use within computations as they are ordinate scales. Therefore this array 
converted the Trust's response to the descriptors into a dimensionless utility 
function via the Analytical Hierarchal Process (Saaty 2001). 
Probability assessments 
Similarly this array was formed from a conversion of the probability assessments 
into a dimensionless utility function. 
Rate of Change 
A mUlti-dimensional array was formed that calculated the rate of change of the 
probability of failure between the probability utility function set points using an 
interpolation technique. 
Following these initial calculations the program simulation was activated. Initially two test 
simulations were completed to confirm the correct program responses to extreme 
values. Although these tests were originally used within the development part of the 
software, the researcher considered it prudent to repeat the tests for each operation of 
the program as a protection against any unknown error that could possibly develop 
within the source code. 
To test that the model could perform to basic physical realities the model was exposed 
to extreme unrealistic step values and the outputs recorded. Again to aid the discussion 
(as in the previous chapter) examples of the outputs created for Trust X are shown The 
first test simulation presented the existing available man hours as a series of successive 
step functions. The simulated output for test 1 that was developed for the electrical trade 
group in site H, is given in Figure 45 below. The graph shows the total assessed risk 
generated within the green, amber and red zones (G, A & R), those risks lying within the 
amber and red zones (A & R) and finally the risks within the red zone (R). 
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Figure 45 below shows that for an excessive available man hour input between weeks 1 
and 104 the resulting profile is equivalent to the residual risk, i.e. the minimum risk 
possible. Between the weeks 105 and 299 the available man hours were reduced to 
zero via a step function . This caused the resulting assessed risks to rise from their 
residual values towards the maximum. The rate of increase with respect to time differed 
for each planned preventative maintenance task, and was dependent on their respective 
assessments of impact and their individual probability profiles 
Figure 45 Test 1 output for site H electrical trade group. 
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At week 300 a step function was introduced where the available man hours were 
increased for one week to excessive levels. This caused the model to complete all 
outstanding planned preventative maintenance tasks within the week, and their 
assessed risk fell to their residual levels by week 301 . Between weeks 301 and 530 the 
available man hours remained at zero, and the assessed risk began to rise again. For 
week 530 through to week 690 the available man hours remained at excessive levels, 
and the assessed risks were kept at their residual values. These unrealistic step 
functions were repeated at weeks 531, 691 and 800. The program response to these 
extreme values gave confidence to all concerned that the model appeared to be 
operating correctly. 
The second test was to run the simulation with the existing level of man-power, but to 
instantly reduce this level to zero at week 420, and observe the output over the full 1040 
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week (20 year) simulation period. Again using the values relating to site H and the 
electrical trade group within Trust X, the resulting graph that was produced is shown 
below in figure 46. 
Figure 46 Test 2 output for site H electrical trade group. 
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The graphs in figure 46 show that the simulation appeared to quickly settle after say 
week 20. Thereon after, the level of risk responded naturally to the variation in available 
man-power against the combined workload of the reactive and scheduled planned 
preventative maintenance need, until week 420. As expected at this point with the man-
power reduced to zero, the assessed risk within all the three zones of green, amber and 
red began to rise to their maximum values. This sudden increase is in agreement with 
the work of Rudolph and Repenning (2002). They produced a very similar graph that 
showed an organisation's inability to handle quantities of tasks beyond their capability, 
where the input varies in an apparent random form. The remaining simulations were 
conducted with available man hour levels -3 Whole Time Equivalent (WTE), -2WTE, -1 
WTE, existing WTE, +1 WTE, +2 WTE and +3 WTE. 
From the computations, 36 additional arrays were created that summated the risk for 
each of the 1040 weeks (20 years) simulated. These arrays recorded the risk within the 
green, amber and red zones for each of the twelve levels of available man hours. The 
arrays were normalised to simplify the analysis and presentation, then arranged into 26 
output files, as shown within the four tables 14, 15, 16 and 17. 
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Table 14 
This table contained the title of the output files that recorded the simulation results from 
the two test available man hour levels. In both cases the test runs used the existing man 
hour figures as their base data, and presented their outputs as the assessed risks within 
three risk zones: green, amber and red zones (G, A & R), the amber and red (A & R) 
zones only and finally the assessed risks within the red zone (R). 
Table 14 Output files from the two test simulations. 
File No Title 
1 Test 1 
2 Test 2 
Table 15 
The output files within this table recorded the total computed risks within a series of 100 
week steps, which advanced one week at a time generating 940 steps throughout the 20 
year simulation. It was from these files that the researcher (and others) could confirm 
when each simulation had settled down into a steady state and was ready for analysis. 
The files record the computed risk for the following seven levels of available man hours, 
-3 WTE, -2 WTE, -1 WTE, existing WTE, +1 WTE, +2 WTE and +3 WTE. Again the 
outputs were split into the computed risks that fell within the G, A & R, A & Rand R 
zones. In order to assist in determining the settling down period, the standard deviation 
(SO) for each of the 940 periods was recorded. 
Table 15 The computed risk within each of the 940 sampling periods and their 
respective standard deviation (SD). 
File No 
3 
4 
5 
6 eriods 
7 
8 
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Table 16 
This table shows the largest of the output file groupings. In order to ease the 
interpretation the outputs were arranged into five sets to reflect the available man hours 
used within each simulation. These sets were: very low WTE, low WTE, existing WTE, 
high WTE, and finally very high WTE. Again all were subdivided into the various risk 
zones. 
Table 16 The simulation outputs split into five sets of available man hours. 
Set File No Title WTE 
1 9 G, A & R very low WTE -3 -2 Existing 
10 A & R very low WTE -3 -2 Existing 
11 R very low WTE -3 -2 Existing 
2 12 G, A & R lowWTE -2 -1 Existing 
13 A& R lowWTE -2 -1 Existing 
14 R lowWTE -2 -1 Existing 
3 15 G, A & R med WTE -1 Existing +1 
16 A& RmedWTE -1 Existing +1 
17 R med WTE -1 Existing +1 
4 18 G, A & R high WTE Existing +1 +2 
19 A& R high WTE Existing +1 +2 
20 R high WTE Existing +1 +2 
5 21 G, A & R very high WTE Existing +2 +3 
22 A & R very high WTE Existing +2 +3 
23 R very high WTE Existing +2 +3 
Table 17 
This remaining table shows the files that recorded the assessed risk if there was a long 
period of sickness or a vacancy was deliberately held open. These sickness/vacancy 
periods were three, six and nine months. In this case the simulations only recorded 
these effects against the existing available man hours. Again the files were split to show 
risk within the three zones. 
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Table 17 The effects of sickness/vacancy 
File No Title 
24 G, A & R sick/vac 
25 A & R sick/vac 
26 R sick/vac 
The 26 output files were converted from the FORTRAN format into that suitable for 
opening within the excel environment, as this was in all cases the preferred data format 
for Trusts. From this the Trusts were able to access these files for their own future 
analysis and forward man power planning, etc. These files were converted to initially 26 
output risk profiles for each trade/site. As the Trusts began to interrogate the information 
they created additional profiles from the data. 
4.4.2 Simulation 
In order to illustrate the typical results obtained from the various Trusts that were part of 
this research, reference is made throughout this section to one particular Trust. In order 
to protect its identity throughout this thesis it shall be named Trust X. This Trust operates 
from two large acute sites that are approximately seven miles apart. The two sites shall 
in turn be called site H and site C. Both sites Hand C have electrical, mechanical and 
semi-skilled trade groups, i.e. six independent trade groups. Only the simulation outputs 
from Site H electrical are shown and briefly discussed below as an example of the 
inputs/outputs. 
Due to the nature of the planned preventative maintenance schedule being pre-planned 
the waveform developed from this set of data created an almost straight line of the man-
hours need throughout the three years. Figure 48 below shows the waveform developed 
from the available man hour computations, following the removal of the backlog 
maintenance, new works and diverted time allocations for the past three years, all on a 
week-by-week basis. Similar waveforms were created for the remaining five trade 
groups. 
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Figure47 Site H electrical available man hour waveform 
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The reactive maintenance waveform shown in figure 48 produced a similar apparent 
random fluctuation of values as in figure 47 above. 
Figure 48 Site H electrical defect hour waveform 
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From the simulation of the three data sets of available man hours, reactive hours and 
planned preventative maintenance scheduled hours seven values of available man 
hours were simulated over a 20 year period. These included -3 WTE, -2 WTE, -1 WTE, 
existing WTE, +1 WTE, +2 WTE and +3 WTE. Also during the process the risk 
generated from each uncompleted planned preventative maintenance task was split into 
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their respective green, amber and red risk zones. Figure 49 below shows for the existing 
available man hours only the total normalised assessed risk computed for the last 10 
years of from the 20 year simulation, as it was assumed that the simulation had settled 
into its steady state by year 10. 
Figure 49 The total normalised assessed risk computed from the last 10 years of 
the 20 year simulation for the existing man hours only for site H. 
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Figure 50 below shows a 100 week period taken from this steady state phase. All data 
relating to the computed assessed risks within the green zone have been removed 
leaving only those assessed risks within the amber and red zones. 
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Figure 50 Sample assessed risk waveform taken from the equilibrium zone of the 
20 year simulation period for the electrical trade group showing the amber and red 
zones only on site H. 
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From the profiles developed within Figure 50, the simulation model allowed the 
observation of five main themes: 
a. Variation of WTE on assessed risk levels 
The graph demonstrates the effects of increasing or decreasing the existing available 
man hours with respect to the assessed risk by plus or minus one whole time equivalent 
(WTE). Because the methodology employed to compute the resultant risk used utility 
functions, the areas beneath the graphs are a true ratio of the assessed risk in relation to 
that generated between the three levels of WTE . 
b. Involuntary trespass into the amber and red zones 
The graph shows the remaining assessed risk as a series of 'spikes'. This demonstrated 
that the short intermittent and involuntary trespass into the amber and red zones as a 
naturally occurring event. 
c. Level of outstanding planned preventative maintenance in stock 
Around week number 81 it is observed that there is an overlap between the graphs for -1 
WTE and that for the existing complement of staff. It shows that as the WTE is 
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decreased the risk reduces. This apparent anomaly was seen to occur within other 
simulations for other trade groups within other sites; but only rarely. 
The suggested cause of the phenomenon is that each simulation was run totally 
independently. The content of the planned preventative maintenance tasks in stock 
waiting to be completed varied with respect to time, as this level was dependent on the 
week's available man hours. For the majority of the simulations this stock variation 
appeared to keep in step between the various levels of WTE, but occasionally a stock 
accumulation occurred that knocked this out of phase. It must be remembered by the 
observer that like any simulation model the outputs attempt to copy reality. They cannot 
claim to mimic real life, but only to come close enough to allow judgements to be based 
on their predictions within levels of confidence, as previously discussed within the 
Literature Review Chapter. 
For the great majority of the time, as the available man hours were decreased by one 
WTE the level of assessed risk significantly increased, similarly the reverse occurred 
with the increase in available man-hours by one WTE. 
d. Removal of all assessed risk within the amber and red zones 
The model clearly demonstrated that increasing the level of WTE to a point where all of 
the assessed risks were removed from the amber and red zones would need the 
available man hours to be increased to well beyond reasonable levels, and that this 
would leave an unacceptable excess of available man hours/week. 
e. Interpretation needed a 'Judgement Call' 
The above demonstrated that the correct interpretation of what available man hours 
were acceptable relied upon a 'Judgement Call' on behalf of the Trust's most senior 
managers. This lack of precision within an all embracing algorithm to determine the 
directly employed labour resource need is recognised within Estatecode, which clearly 
states that estimates, should be reviewed using professional judgement and local site 
knowledge to reach the final decision (NHS Estates 2002). It was from profiles similar to 
that in Figure 50 that Trusts were able to make their 'Judgement Call', in relation to the 
level of risk that they were willing to accept. This in turn set the level of available man 
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hours that they were prepared to balance against the budget, which they considered 
appropriate when compared to all of the other known Trust risks. 
4.4.3 Main simulation outputs for Trust X 
Graphs showing the assessed risks against all seven levels of available man hours were 
developed for each of the three trade groups for each of the two sites Hand C. This data 
was then presented to and discussed with the Trust's estate managers, together with an 
'initial' assessment. These 'initial' assessments are summarised and shown within Table 
18 and discussed below. 
Table 18 A summary of the estates manager's initial assessments of existing 
manning levels for Trust X. 
Trade Group H C 
Electrical Correct Correct 
Mechanical Correct (ish) Undermanned by 2 WTE I 
Semi-Skilled Overmanned by 1 WTE Overman ned by 1 WTE I 
Below is a summary of the profiles used by the estates managers in Trust X to assess 
their current manning levels against the Trust's specific needs. As stated they are a 
small proportion of the actual data created, and are contained within this Chapter to 
demonstrate the type of information that was developed as part of the simulation 
process. The totality of the output information was presented to the Trust within a 
Compact Disk for their (and others) further consideration. The final analysis suggested 
that the existing available man hours were delivering an acceptable level of assessed 
risk, and that any variation of available man hours of plus or minus one WTE would 
create an unacceptable increase in assessed risk or a waste of resource. To ensure 
continuity of presentation Figure 51 below is a direct copy of Figure 50 above. 
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Figure 51 Sample assessed risk waveform taken from the equilibrium zone of the 
20 year simulation period for site H electrical trade group, showing the amber and 
red zones only 
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When the mechanical trade group within site H were subjected to the simulation program 
figure 52 was developed. This shows the variation of plus or minus one WTE was less 
clear cut as in the previous assessment for the electrical trade group, and therefore 
required further discussion and analysis in an attempt to form a firm opinion . However 
the Trust was advised that such an ideal solution may not be possible to obtain, and that 
a compromise may have to be made. 
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Figure 52 Sample assessed risk waveform taken from the equilibrium zone of the 
20 year simulation period for site H mechanical trade group showing the amber 
and red zones only 
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The graph in figure 53 relating to the semi-skilled trade group clearly demonstrated that 
by reducing the directly employed labour force by one WTE, there was little effect on the 
level of assessed risk that would be experienced. Additional data showed that any 
further reduction by say two WTE would without doubt create serious levels of assessed 
risk. 
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Figure 53 Sample assessed risk waveform taken from the equilibrium zone of the 
20 year simulation period for site H semi-skilled trade group, showing the amber 
and red zones only 
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For site C the electrical trade group risk generation graph (in figure 54) attracted the 
same comments as with the site H electrical trade group, as the assessment suggested 
that the existing available man hours were delivering an acceptable level of assessed 
risk, and that any variation of available man hours of plus or minus one WTE would 
create an unacceptable increase in assessed risk, or a waste of resource. 
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Figure 54 Sample assessed risk waveform taken from the equilibrium zone of the 
20 year simulation period for site C electrical trade group, showing the amber and 
red zones only 
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Serious concerns were raised with regard to the existing level of available man hours for 
the mechanical trade group in site C as shown in figure 55. It was clearly demonstrated 
that in this case the staffing levels were undermanned by between two or three WTE at 
least, as the assessed risks being generated were continuously within the amber and 
red zones throughout the equilibrium period . 
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Figure 55 Sample assessed risk waveform taken from the equilibrium zone of the 
20 year simulation period for site C mechanical trade group, showing the amber 
and red zones only 
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The site C semi-skilled trade group risk generation graphs, shown in figure 56 were 
assessed as being overman ned in excess of one WTE. 
Figure 56 Sample assessed risk waveform taken from the equilibrium zone of the 
20 year simulation period for site C semi-skilled trade group, showing the amber 
and red zones only 
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By reducing the available man hours there was no significant increase in the level of 
assessed risk. However, when the whole of the 20 year simulation for this trade group 
was viewed, four large periodic increases in risk were experienced when the manning 
level was reduced. But this was interspersed with relatively long low levels of risk. 
Therefore again the 'Judgement Call' was not clear cut but did suggest that the existing 
manning level was high. 
4.4.4 Sensitivity of results to uncertainty in assumptions 
It was only when the simulations using real data had been completed, could the actual 
sensitivity of the model's outputs and design assumptions be examined and observed. In 
order to ease the readability of this results section the simple tests and short outputs 
designed to analyse the sensitivities of the model have been included within this chapter. 
This section is split into the following discrete eight parts: 
a. Determination and observations of the steady state value 
b. Identification and observations of possible problem planned preventative 
maintenance tasks 
c. Rounding error identification and observation 
d. Interpolation verses integration within the software design 
e. The focus groups being risk adverse 
f. Probability utility sensitivity 
g. Impact utility sensitivity 
h. Crude assessment of man-power needs 
a. Determination and discussion of the steady state value 
In practice when making any decisions, a number of 100 week periods were presented 
from different parts of the 20 year simulation time frame. In this way a cross-section of 
the outputs was viewed. For confidence to be assured that the model had indeed 
reached a steady state, the following three tests were applied. 
Total risk within each 100 week period 
ii Standard deviation for each 100 week period 
iii Consistency of each 'Judgement call' 
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i. Total risk within each 100 week period 
The output was split into 100 week periods, where each period advanced one week at a 
time, thus forming 940 periods throughout the 20 year simulation cycle. This 
arrangement is shown in table 19 below: 
Table 19 Table showing the 100 week periods. 
Period Start Week End Week 
1 1 100 
2 2 102 
3 3 103 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
938 939 1038 
939 940 1039 
940 941 1040 
For each 100 week period the area under the resulting risk graph was calculated. From 
these data Figure 57 (below) was developed. This shows the total assessed risk within 
each 100 week period against each period start week. 
Figure 57 The total assessed risk within each 100 week period for site C 
electrical trade group. 
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- -1 WTE 
- Existing WTE 
+1 WTE 
ii. Standard deviation for each 100 week period 
As a normal distribution about the mean was assumed, the standard deviation was also 
computed for the period. As the areas and associated standard deviations stabilised, it 
was assumed that the overall 20 year simulation also stabilised. 
iii. Consistency of each 'Judgement call' 
The third and 'acid test' to confirm that the simulation had indeed steadied, was to take a 
number of 100 week periods as representative samples; and if the same 'judgement call' 
relating to the effects and acceptance of any man-power variation were made, then it 
would appear that the system had reached a steady state. 
In practice the summation of the total assessed risk beneath each 100 week period, and 
resulting standard deviation computations were inconclusive. Therefore the whole 
process relied on the stability of the 'Judgement Call' from a number of 100 week 
periods to be the determining factor. This sounds crude and an unconvincing method to 
use, but the variation in risk generated by reducing/increasing the directly employed 
labour workforce by one WTE was pronounced in the majority of cases. Although the 
simulations were considered to have settled to their steady state by week 300, each of 
the focus groups decided to concentrate their analysis from the simulated year 10 
onwards (weeks 500 to 1040), as a precaution. 
b. Identification and observation of possible problem planned preventative 
maintenance tasks 
This part of the analysis was formed to identify and discuss if an individual planned 
preventative maintenance task (or group of planned preventative maintenance tasks), 
was continuously generating high levels of assessed risk in comparison to others. This 
necessitated recording each level of computed risk for each planned preventative 
maintenance task for each week throughout the 20 year simulation period. This was 
repeated for each of the seven levels of the available man hours. 
It was agreed previously between the focus groups and the researcher that the 
simulations had settled down into their steady state from year 10 onwards. This then 
formed a consistent timeframe within which all of the data could be compared. From 
year 10 onwards the total assessed risk generated between years 10 to 20 was 
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summated then normalised to ease presentation and interpretation. The graph below 
shows the risk generation for the existing man hour availability. Six similar graphs were 
produced for the -3 WTE through to +3 WTE scenarios. Again to aid the discussion the 
output from the electrical trade group for site H is shown in figure 58. 
Figure 58 The normalised total risk being generated during the last 10 years of 
the simulation for each electrical planned preventative maintenance task for the 
existing available man hour levels for site H. 
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The figure shows a series of troughs notably at planned preventative maintenance task 
numbers 99, 152 and between numbers 310 and 352. By rearranging the graph into a 
descending order Figure 59 was developed. This rearrangement clearly shows that the 
total risk generated was held at a fairly constant value throughout the simulation period 
across the majority of the planned preventative maintenance tasks, with the exceptions 
being at the graph's extremities of left and right. By analysing these extreme points, it 
was found that for this level of available man hours a simple pattern at first appeared to 
exist, developing from the impact and probability profile shapes assigned to each 
planned preventative maintenance task. 
Between numbers of 1 to 20 the planned preventative maintenance tasks were formed 
from similar values of impact, all with a monthly frequency (M), and all with probability 
shapes that generated the lowest levels of the rate of rise with time. planned 
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preventative maintenance task numbers of 326 to 366 were composed with impact 
descriptor values of two, with a corresponding yearly frequency (Y) and in the majority of 
cases assigned with probability utility shapes that created the greatest rate of rise with 
time. From planned preventative maintenance task number 367 onwards the impact 
descriptor was five with a corresponding frequency of weekly (W), and in the majority of 
cases was assigned with probability utility shapes that created the greatest rate of rise 
with time. The mid range of the graph was created from a mixture of impact and 
frequency values with varying probability utility shapes. 
Figure 59 The normalised total risk being generated during the last 10 years 
of the simulation for each electrical planned preventative maintenance task for the 
existing available man hour levels for site H arranged in descending order. 
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The procedure of developing and analysing a graph with descending values of risk, as in 
Figure 59 above was repeated for available man hour values of -3 WTE and +3 WTE. 
From this Table 20 was formed. 
Table 20 Components of the assessed risk formed within figure 59 above 
WTE High risk end Low risk end Freq' Impact Prob' UF Freq' Impact Prob' UF 
+3 Low Low Med High High High 
Existing High - High Low High High High Med 
-3 Low High High Low Low High 
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For simplicity the frequency range was split into three zones. The high zone was 
included with weekly (W), two weekly (2W) and three weekly (T) frequencies, the mid -
range as a monthly frequency (M), and the remaining quarterly (Q), half yearly (H), and 
yearly (Y) frequency as low. The impact was split into a low zone containing descriptors 
one and two, the mid-range being three with the high range being four and five. The 
probability utility function shapes split neatly into again three zones with those shapes 
that created rapid rates of rise with respect to time being classed as high, those with a 
low rate of rise as low and medium for those in between. 
As can be observed from table 20 the initial assumption that a simple pattern could exist 
between the variables was shown to be false, as the interaction was complex. 
From a further analysis of the data, the possibility that certain planned preventative 
maintenance tasks were continuously generating high levels of risk was explored. The 
output files from the simulations recorded the number of times that each planned 
preventative maintenance task was the maximum value for each week, i.e. the number 
of hits where the simulation identified that a particular planned preventative maintenance 
task was deemed to be generating the greatest risk for the week. The researcher 
recognises this methodology is crude, but it assisted in forming a picture of what was 
happening within the model throughout the simulation period. Again using the existing 
available man hours as a datum point the graph within Figure 60 was formed. 
Planned preventative maintenance task number one received 41 hits out of a possible 
520 throughout the simulation period, and was composed of the highest frequency 
weekly (W), with an impact descriptor five the maximum possible, and was assigned a 
probability shape that generated one of the greatest rates of rise possible. This again 
indicated that a simple pattern would exist, but when the files for the remaining six levels 
of available man hours were examined no simple pattern was visible, as they all 
displayed various maximum values at differing planned preventative maintenance task 
numbers, and with various values of impact, frequency and probability utility rates of rise. 
From the hunt for possible problem planned preventative maintenance's, none were 
found. But the investigation did show that a simple pattern of impact, probability profile 
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shape, and frequency combinations appeared not to exist, and that the resulting 
assessed risk profiles appeared to be as a result of a complex interaction of values. 
Figure 60 The number of times that each planned preventative maintenance 
task was deemed to be generating the greatest risk for a given week. 
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c. Rounding error identification and observation 
Again once the simulation outputs had been formed from real data, it was possible to 
determine and discuss if the model was prone to rounding errors. 
Numbers are stored within a computer with limited precision; this loss of precision of a 
value is termed a 'round-off' error. As complex arithmetical operations are performed, 
such as within a simulation model, these errors can combine to become a considerable 
source of model error (8eddall 2006). As numbers are stored in a binary format, their 
precision is influenced by the size of computer memory assigned to store the binary bits, 
where the larger the memory, the greater the precision. The Fortran compiler used to 
create the simulation model normally operated at what is termed 'single' precision, which 
generated seven significant figures. To test if the model was suffering from rounding 
errors and creating incorrect predictions, the simulations were rerun using 'double' 
precision. This is where the memory allocated to storing the numbers is increased to 
create a number with 15 significant figures. 
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Although the model's program was inherently prone to round-off errors due to the 
physical design of computers , there were no observed differences between the outputs 
from the single or double precision simulations for seven significant figures. Therefore 
the researcher considers that rounding errors were not a significant problem within the 
simulation model designed . 
d. Interpolation verses Integration within the software design 
This part of the results assesses the significance of the error caused by employing 
interpolation of the probability util ity in place of an integration technique. From reference 
to the probability of failure descriptor part of the NHS 5x5 criticality grid, the estates 
officers (in meetings chaired by the researcher) assigned a probability utility shape to 
each individual task. As with assets (plant and equipment) types were grouped together 
to share a common utility shape. For site H and site C the results found that only 22 of 
the possible 72 utility shapes were used. Each of these 22 shapes was assigned a 
reference letter, and their usage pattern formed into Figure 61 below. 
Figure 61 The probability utility shape usage 
900 
800 
"C 
700 
3l 600 :::s 
IOCHHI 
. HRI 
:!l 500 Q. 
~ 400 (/) 
"-
o 300 
0 
z 200 
100 
a 
• n. rl r-fti- rI ~ nn II r1 
, , 
ABC D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q U R S T V W x 
Individual shapes 
A trend line was fitted to the most commonly used utility shape as shown in Figure 62 
below. The researcher assumed that the trend line was the true probability utility formed 
by the focus group. It was then assumed that the difference between areas formed by 
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the trend line calculated by integration, and that formed by the straight line interpolation 
technique would give an indication of error. 
Figure 62 The trend line and straight line shape formed by the probability 
utility shape P. 
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The lowest frequency of inspection was three weekly (T). This was the worst case 
scenario, in relation to interpolation accuracy. Therefore the difference in areas under 
shape P was computed for this frequency, first by Simpson's Rule (as the formula for 
interpolation between points), and then by integrating the trend line algorithm. The 
resulting calculations are shown below. 
Table 21 was formed for each of the thirteen weeks analysed for the three weekly (T) 
planned preventative maintenance task. It shows for each week the probability 
descriptor rating and corresponding utility value. 
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Table 21 Table showing various values for each week 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Frequency T T T T 
Utility value 0.2 0.46 0.73 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Probability descriptor 1 5 5 5 rating 
Area approximates to s/3[(F + L) + 4E +2R] 
Where: 
S = width of each strip 
F + L = sum of the first and last ordinates 
4E = 4 x the sum of the even numbered ordinates 
2R = 2 x the sum of the remaining odd-numbered 
ordinates 
12 13 
T 
1 1 
5 
As the time steps are each one week in length, and there are 3 weeks between 
frequencies, then S = Ya. Therefore the approximate area under the probability function 
between the probability of failure rating limits of 1 and 5 is shown below, followed by a 
corresponding calculation using integration: 
Approximate 
area 
= 1/9[(1 +5)+4(.46+ 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1)+2(0.73+ 1 + 1 + 1 + 1)] 
= 3.61 units2 
y = - 0.0333x4 + 0.4667x3 - 2.3667x2 + 5.1333x - 1 
Approximate area = J1
5 
_ 0.0333x4 + 0.4667x3 _ 2.3667x2 + 5.1333x - 1 
= 3.77 units2 
The difference between the areas computed by the two methods for the worst case 
scenario was -0.42 percent, therefore the researcher considers that any error caused 
due to the adoption of the interpolation technique, was negligible. 
e. The focus groups being risk adverse 
If the focus groups were risk adverse they would be overestimating the probability and 
impact utility values. Therefore as part of this discussion it was important to estimate the 
sensitivity of both of these utilities on the final risk profile results produced. The tests for 
both the probability and impact utility sensitivities follows 
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f. Probability utility sensitivity 
The method chosen was to simulate site H Mechanical planned preventative 
maintenance schedule five times, each run spanning a 10 year cycle, and analysing the 
last 100 weeks of each simulation for any significant difference. The first simulation was 
with the original shape P, which accounted for 54 percent of the profile shapes that were 
assigned by the focus group across the 497 individual planned preventative 
maintenance tasks within this schedule. This shape was also the most risk adverse 
shape that the focus groups could have chosen. The simulation was repeated by 
substituting for shapes 0, N, M and W. A comparison of these five utility shapes is 
shown within Figure 63 below. 
Figure 63 The five probability utility shapes used to assess their relative 
sensitivities 
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The resulting areas under each of the five risk profiles developed for the red and amber 
zones were then compared. The probability utility shape P was used as the reference to 
which all other areas were compared. For shape ° there was no detectable difference in 
area. For the remaining three shapes equal differences to shape P were recorded of -4 
percent and -5 percent for the current manpower level and for a reduction of 37.5 
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hrs/week respectfully. When the manpower was reduced by 75 hrs/week the difference 
for the three shapes became -16 percent. Figure 64 was developed to observe these 
differences. 
Figure 64 
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It is difficult to distinguish the differences visually between the risk profiles, except for the 
75 hr/week manpower reduction. This is an important observation as the decision 
making process employed to determine the effects of reducing the available manpower 
to that acceptable, relies in part on the visual inspection of the resulting risk profile 
graphs. The researcher considers that the differences between the probability utility 
shapes of P and Ware extreme. Thus the researcher assumes that the methodology is 
not significantly prone to a focus group being risk adverse, as the effects between the 
simulated extreme values were considered slight by the researcher. 
g. Impact utility sensitivity 
This section explores the sensitivity of the focus group's impact utility on the risk profile 
output. Within the research instrument designed to meet the needs of this objective the 
boundary lines between the red, amber and red zones were formed by splitting the 
maximum risk score (25 from the NHS 5x5 criticality grid) into three equal parts. Thus a 
risk score below 8.33 was deemed to be in the green zone, between 8.33 and 16.66 the 
amber zone and above 16.66 the red zone. This simple split sufficed for the accuracy 
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that was required .. However, when assessing the risk a much more refined methodology 
was required to determine the split between the three zones. From reference to the NHS 
5x5 Criticality Grid, reproduced below in Table 22, it can be seen that the matrix is split 
into coloured zones representing differing levels of risk severity as a guide to its use. 
Table 22 
1m pa ct 1-1 _-=---------j 
The NHS 5x5 Criticality grid 
Score 
Range 
Risk 
Ranking 
Department of Health, 2004 Page 18 
As discussed within the Methodology Chapter the grid is comprised of ordinal scales 
only. Therefore they have no mathematical meaning except to denote rank order. Within 
this research these scales were replaced with probability and impact utility scales. The 
resulting risk score within the matrix was a true ratio assessment of risk. Within the 
Methodology Chapter the Analytical Hierarchal Process (AHP) was used to develop 
impact utilities of four individuals. Their Consistency Ratio (CR) values ranged from 
0.087 to 0.0017, where an acceptable value was deemed to be less than 0.1 (Saaty, 
2001). Therefore two criticality grids were designed that used these two extreme utilities 
of impact. These are shown below in Tables 22 and 23. 
As all of the probability utility functions begin with the value of 0.2, then this research 
project regarded any probability <0.2 to be generating risk within the green zone. The 
determined significance of risk is a function of an interpretation of the descriptors for the 
relative probability and impact. 
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Table 23 The criticality grid developed from a low CR value (0.017) for the 
assessment of impact ratios 
Impact 
Ratio 
The researcher considered that it was essential to honour the judgments made within 
the national NHS grid in Table 22, as reflected within the colour coding of the matrix 
cells. The numerical rule observed within the grid was that no risk score value within a 
colour band (say yellow) could have a greater numerical value than those risk scores 
within a higher coloured band (say pink). Therefore when the risk scores were computed 
within Table 23, the colour coding of some of the cells were changed by the researcher 
to conserve the numerical rule dividing the different colour bands, and the national 
judgements. When the grid was constructed using the ratio set for impact with the high 
CR value of 0.087, the grid in Table 24 was produced, which again created slightly 
different coloured zones. 
Table 24 The criticality grid developed from a high CR value (0.087) for the 
assessment of impact ratios 
I m pact 1-1 --=-=-=----
Ratio 
In order to maintain a simple approach for the focus groups the researcher amalgamated 
the yellow and pink zones into one amber zone, thereby conserving continuity of 
presentation with the research instrument created within the first research objective. 
From the two grids developed, the boundary splits between the red, amber and green 
zones were formed, as shown within Table 25 below. 
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Table 25 The determination of the zone boundaries 
Risk Score Range 
Zone High consistency ratio value Low consistency ratio value (0.087) (0.017) 
Red .521 - .219 .478 - .287 
.. 
Amber .219 - .054 . 287 - .047 
Green .054 - .047 -
The sensitivity of the differing consistency ratio values was assessed by running two 
simulations with different consistency ratio values of 0.087 and 0.017, and comparing 
the areas (via Simpson's rule) under the risk profiles for the combined red and amber 
zones, for the last 100 weeks of a ten year simulation. The results gave an identical 
assessment of area correct to four decimal places, for both the current manpower and 
when the manpower figure was reduced by 37.5 hrs/week. The only difference detected 
was when the simulation reduced the manpower by 75 hrs/week which gave a 0.05 
percent variation in area. The researcher thus considered that the variation in 
consistency ratio below 0.1 produced insignificant effects. 
h. Crude assessment of manpower needs 
From the researchers experience a formula that has been used for many decades within 
NHS estates departments' circles to assess the man-power needs is shown below. 
(Reactive hrs + planned preventative maintenance hrs)/(37.5(52-6)) = WTE/yr 
The earliest use of this algorithm is unknown, and no reference documentation 
explaining its formulation has been found. But it has been handed down from engineer-
to-engineer throughout the years. The reasoning behind the figures is that the total 
artisan workload for each trade group is the summation of the reactive and planned 
preventative maintenance hours needed for a typical year. This is divided by the total 
hours for a week, being 37.5, multiplied by the weeks of the year, with the total 52 weeks 
being reduced by 6 weeks. This reduction is used to account for any unproductive time 
such as holidays, sickness and other diverted time. The output computes the manpower 
needs as whole time equivalent (WTE) needs per year. Table 26 below shows the base 
data for the total hours per year for each of the trade groups. 
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When this simple formula was applied to the six Trust trade groups, using the data 
contained within Table 26, and compared to the assessments made using the risk based 
methodology created from this research; the results within Table 27 were formed. 
Table 26 
Site Trade group 
H Mechanical 
Electrical 
Semi-
Skilled 
C Mechanical 
Electrical 
Semi-
Skilled 
The total hours per year for planned preventative maintenance, 
reactive and available man-power per year 
planned preventative Reactive total Available man-
maintenance total hours/year power total hours/year hours/year 
4598 7678 12595 
3225 10504 15981 
7217 9944 19639 
8681 7491 12489 
3835 6980 11825 
6855 5662 12972 
Table 27 Results from applying the simplistic formula to assess man-power 
needs against the existing man hour availability 
Simple Risk assessed 
Site Trade group formula methodology 
required 
WTE/year requirements 
H Mechanical -0.2 Correct 
Electrical -1.3 Correct 
Semi-Skilled -1.4 - 1 wte 
C Mechanical +2.13 + 2.5 wte 
Electrical -0.6 Correct 
Semi-Skilled -0.3 -1 wte 
The table shows that in all cases (except C Semi-Skilled) the simplistic formula 
underestimated the man-hours needed per trade group to generate an acceptable level 
of risk from their activities. The researcher considers that the assessed differences were 
due to the simple static formula (which takes no account of risk) being applied to a 
complex dynamic situation. However it does show that the simplistic formula has a use 
as a rough estimate of resource need, and could be used as a starting point when 
assessing resource need. 
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4.5 Chapter four Summary 
First research objective 
The results presented clearly showed that the NHS estates departments analysed did 
indeed have problems, and where they were. The results also showed that these 
previously unknown risks ranged from moderate through to substantial/intolerable levels. 
Second research objective 
The results clearly showed what resources were needed in terms of man-power, 
outsource costs and time frames. 
Third research objective 
The results clearly showed the effects of reducing the man-power below an acceptable 
level and the resulting increase in risk. Also shown were the naturally occurring peaks of 
risks which were formed by the rapidly changing dynamics of the available resources, 
set against the demands of the reactive and planned preventative maintenance 
workloads. Also presented are the results of an extensive sensitivity analysis of the 
model's outputs against the design assumptions made, and confirmation of the 
robustness of the model's predictions. 
Fourth research objective 
As previously explained, due to time restrictions no results with regard to this question 
have been developed for inclusion into this thesis, due to time and resource constraints. 
It was for this reason that the phrasing for this objective excluded the word 'implement' 
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Chapter Five Discussion Chapter 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reported that in every Trust the results confirmed that there was a 
major problem with the managerial systems and overall governance arrangements, and 
that this was so severe that deficiencies were placing the Trusts, patients, staff, public 
and stakeholders at substantial/intolerable levels of risk. 
This chapter discusses the research unpinning the methodology used to create the 
results, the techniques employed and the robustness of the outcome. Following the 
successful analysis, discussion and conclusion of the procedures the researcher then 
shows that the simulation models created as part of the research instrument within the 
third research objective could be 'reverse engineered', to assess the trade group needs 
of a Trust if they had no reliable raw data. 
5.2 First research objective 
Evidence was presented within Chapter two against the assumption that plant and 
equipment failures were totally independent from managerial failings, as the collapse of 
managerial systems can lead to hazardous conditions quite separate to the type and 
condition of the infrastructure. It was argued that this had been recognised throughout 
the world within the Healthcare industry (Emslie, 2005). Which in turn had created a 
focus towards managerial system design, organisation and operations (Reason 1990; 
Department of Health, 2000). 
The types of managerial failures discussed were split into active and latent, where the 
former were those actions committed 'at the sharp end' by the operatives that are the 
immediate causes of the incident. Latent failures however are caused by senior 
managers and lie dormant within the managerial system for a long time (possibly years) 
until triggered by an active failure (Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003). At this point they can 
combine to breach the system's defences. It was the need to expose these latent 
conditions before failure could occur (Reason, 2005) that led to the design of research 
instrument within the first research objective. The output of this objective was intended to 
uncover poor managerial systems relating to normal day-to-day activities, which in 
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general result in driven failures, not random failures (Tweeddale, 2003), with focus being 
on the system as opposed to the traditional person centred view (Reason, 2000). 
The topics investigated were agreed prior to any analysis by the Trust as posing the 
greatest unaddressed perceived risk. The scope of the analysis was limited to 
operations characterised by pre-specified routines and generally accepted norms 
(Ramanujam and Goodman 2003). In all cases a multi-professional focus group was 
formed within each Trust, which consisted of those with experience based on the 
technology and managerial systems in use, and the environment that the system was 
operated within (Aven & K0rte, 2003; Backlund & Hannu, 2002). 
For each focus group the researcher acted in a process consultation role (Schein, 1997; 
Schein 1998; Belton & Stewart, 2003), mindful of the main influencing criteria that could 
effect the group's assessment of risk (Cook & Slack, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2000), whilst actively encouraging the participants to challenge 
their collective risk assessments so as to gain confidence in the robustness of their risk 
scores (Armstrong, 1985). 
In recognition of the failure of the standard criticality grid to adequately facilitate the 
assessment of risk when applied to a managerial system, due to the inability of people to 
accurately predict the percentage probability of an outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Conrow, 2003), a series of utility functions was developed (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; 
USA Department of Defence, 2002). The assessed risk scores resulting from the 
process were graded into the standard traffic light system of red, amber and green. This 
methodology created an almost instantaneous 'negative feed-back loop', from the 
model's initial outputs to the Trust's managers and back into the process to adjusUfine 
tune the assumptions. 
In all cases the results from this research objective were readily accepted by each of the 
31 Trusts, as a reasonable representation of 'where they were', in relation to 
conformance to the NHS national and local acceptable standards. The success of this 
part of the process hinged on a combination of factors, all being brought together into 
one package, underpinned by academic research, and where the inputs and outputs 
were created by local people addressing local needs. In the main, these factors 
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consisted of a structured and common approach agreed by all of the Trust's senior 
managers, via a multi-professional team, before any data gathering or analysis began. 
This in itself created an atmosphere that allowed the smooth transition of emphasis from 
a perceived estates' problem, into one of a Trust responsibility. This focused the various 
stakeholders onto taking personal responsibility for the issues raised. 
The simplicity of the model aided an understanding how the model worked by all 
concerned. This together with the active encouragement to test various 'what-if-
scenarios', with an almost instantaneous 'negative feed back loop', and creating a 
repeatability of assessed risk scores through the use of utility functions, played a major 
contribution to the model's acceptance in the opinion of the researcher. When coupled 
with the model's ease of use, its robustness, ease of interpretation of outputs, together 
with its clarity in terms of inputs and outputs from Statute law and regulations, down 
through national guidance to local needs, all combined to produce a unique parcel of 
techniques, and created an exceptional managerial tool. The acceptance of the process 
by all of the Trusts involved, and their willingness to redistribute their limited resources 
based on the output is testimony to its success. 
This recognition was further reinforced by the inclusion of the research instrument 
design created and employed within the first research objective within the demonstration 
project for excellence in the construction industry, following the recommendations within 
the Egan report, entitled Rethinking Construction (Egan, 1998). The report was 
commissioned by the Deputy Prime Minister and published in July 1998. The main 
theme of the document was that through the application of best practices a collective 
improvement in performance could be achieved. This led to a series of demonstration 
projects to exemplify some of the innovations advocated within the report. Project 
number 234 publicised the redevelopment at the Royal Hospitals Phase 1, Northern 
Ireland, and the use of the methodology developed within this research. The web site 
gives a background to the redevelopment and describes the methodology employed to 
assess the hospital estate department's operational engineering maintenance risks. The 
report then shows the output risk profile as developed as part of this research 
(Constructing Excellence Limited, 2007). 
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As evidence of this achievement the greatest accolade that could be bestowed was the 
request from the Trusts to rerun the exercise some 18 months later, to revisit their risk 
profile, confirm their progress towards closing the identified gaps and to facilitate and 
guide their strategic planning process i.e. an extension of the' negative feed back loop' . 
An example of the output from such a series of exercises is shown in Figure 65 below. 
This shows the movement from the left to the right of the risk profile as the Trust 
concentrated their limited resources to closing the gaps within the red zone from the 
year 2001, through years 2003, 2004 and finally 2006. The style of the presentation of 
Figure 65 is not strictly correct as the x-axis should be multi-layered, but this method of 
presentation has found favour with the Trusts because of its simplicity. 
The results have shown that in all cases where the research instrument within 
the first research objective was used it uncovered numerous unknown latent 
conditions of non-conformity within the Trust's managerial systems. These 
deficiencies ranged from minor to those posing substantial lintolerable risks. 
Figure 65 The reduction in risk over the years from 2001 to 2006 presented as 
a sketch for the Belfast Royal Victoria Hospital Group. 
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Critical Elements 
The first research objective process was specifically designed for use within NHS Trust 
estates departments. However because of its popularity its use has been extended into 
the areas known as 'soft facilities' . These consist of such topics as cleaning, catering, 
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transport, pest control, waste management, etc. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
discuss the use of the research instrument developed as part of the first research 
objective into these other areas further, except to note that due to the robustness of the 
academic work underpinning the model's design, repeatability, auditability and simplicity 
of use, the concepts were readily transferred into other areas, and have the potential for 
further expansion. 
These results and their acceptance by each organisation appear to confirm that: the 
managerial system of internal control within the NHS does not give adequate assurance 
that NHS healthcare building services engineering day-to-day maintenance activities 
conform to the national guidance. This confirmation led the research to address the 
second, third and fourth research objectives. 
5.3 Second research objective 
If the Trust considered that the numbers of identified managerial gaps were small, and 
the managerial and technical skills needed to close the gaps were also small and not 
complex, then the organisation did not partake within this second research objective. But 
if the number of identified gaps was large, and required a considerable managerial 
resource and complex level of technical skills to close these gaps then the research 
instrument developed as part of this objective was employed; which occurred in the 
majority of cases. This methodology was designed with reference to the construction 
industry and standard project management techniques, as no definitive literature was 
found that directly addressed the problem of assessing the manpower, budget and 
timeframe needed to close the managerial gaps uncovered. As such the Trust's focus 
groups were presented with a Gant Chart (designed by the researcher) that they 
populated. This guided them to take each gap in turn, break it down into tasks, sub-tasks 
and in some cases sub-sub-tasks; with each having the manpower and 
managerial/technical skills assessed alongside their respective estimates of days 
needed for completion. Again, an almost instantaneous 'negative feedback loop' from 
the output of this objective to the Trusts' managers and back into the process was 
created. This allowed those populating the framework with data to quickly adjust/modify 
the assessments until acceptable. 
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Estimates of levels of confidence were assigned to the manpower levels and budget 
needs, which related to a probability distribution. From this a Monte Carlo simulation was 
run to 'fine tune' the overall estimate. Following this, approximations of time scales to 
close each of the gaps were made. A natural output from this objective was the creation 
of small work packages that could be graded in order of priority, and assigned to 
individual estates officers to complete as part of the Trust's/department's strategic 
objectives, and/or their Personal Development Plans (PDP's), and/or Personal 
Objectives. Throughout this objective the researcher again practised the art of 'process 
consultation'. Teaching the focus groups the techniques developed as part of this 
research, allowed them to apply their new skills to areas outside of the scope of this 
thesis (Saaty 2001). Testament to the success of this objective is again from Trusts 
prioritising and reallocating their limited resources by being guided by the outputs from 
this objective. 
5.4 Third research objective 
The output from this objective was a profile that depicted the Trust's assessment of the 
effects of varying the maintenance revenue resources with respect to the assessed risk 
(Standards New Zealand, 2005). Continuing the theme developed within previous 
chapters, Figure 66 shows how this effect was formed via the electrical trade group 
within site H. 
As the available man-hours were increased the simulated risk fell and eventually began 
to stabilise at a minimum level. Any further increase in resource was found to have 
negligible effect on the risk being generated. The shape of the graph is a virtual copy of 
that predicted within the Australian/New Zealand risk management standard (Standards 
Australia, 2005). Prior to this research the creation of this graph had never been 
achieved for an actual NHS site. From the development of Figure 66 it would appear 
that, for the first time in the 60 year history of the NHS estates departments, they were 
now able to assess the effect of varying resource levels with respect to risk. This in turn 
would suggest that they could be guided to the optimum level of manpower for their 
organisation. But as highlighted within the literature review, the words 'lead towards' 
were used by Sherwin to emphasise that the optimum level was a moving target 
continuously influenced by new data/environments (Sherwin, 2000). That said, the graph 
does give a very good indication of the current resource needs. From the researcher's 
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experience (and that of the Trusts), the rate of change of maintenance need that would 
effect the 'judgement call' relating to this predicted optimum level of man-power resource 
was slow. Therefore the graph has been considered by all as a very useful tool. 
Figure 66 An estimation of the total risk as the resource (manpower) varies. 
1.2.---------~------~--------------------------------------------------------_. 
O. 8 I ""'" t=~"'-..~~=== ~ 0.6 I 
0.41 ~ 
~I ~ 
O+I----------r---------.----------r----------,---------,----------.--------~ 
-3 -2 -1 Existing 
Man-power (WTE) 
2 3 
Like the previous two objectives, the methodology designed gave an almost 
instantaneous negative 'feed back loop'. This again encouraged the Trusts (and the 
researcher) to probe and question their assumptions and to learn how the processes 
between resource levels and assessed risk were intertwined. This ability to rapidly 
question the counterintuitive inputs and outputs of the simulation model and hence 
overcome the resistance to previous policy decisions, owes much to the speed of these 
feedback loops. As Sterman discusses in detail, 'learning in and about complex systems 
is a feed back process' (Sterman, 2000). 
The simulation model demonstrated the dynamic non-linear complexity of the real world 
that reacts in both anticipated and unanticipated ways. It allowed the participants to 
develop and conduct controlled simulation experiments that would be unethical to 
conduct in practice. Sterman goes on to argue that prior to developing a systems model 
(such as that developed within this third research objective), organisations would be 
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making decisions with limited information, misperceptions and flawed cognitive maps, 
leading to unscientific reasoning, judgmental errors and biases, all within an environment 
of personal defensive routines and interpersonal impediments to learning, that leads to 
the inevitable implementation failures. His detailed arguments supporting such a stance 
are too lengthy to reproduce within this thesis. With over 30 years of personal 
experience operating in a senior managerial capacity within the NHS, the researcher 
supports these statements. 
5.4.1 Data gathering 
In all cases this part of the exercise uncovered some serious latent deficiencies within 
the existing planned preventative maintenance schedules. The reasons why this large 
and important part of the organisation's workload and responsibility had been left to 
disintegrate to such a state that it had to be rewritten, are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. But the researcher suspects that it was as a result of the removal of the detailed 
external scrutiny that accompanied the NHS Labour Management system (Ramanujam 
& Goodman, 2003; Reason, 2005). However this need for external review does support 
all of the findings from the outputs from the first research objective which uncovered 
large areas of latent defects within the managerial systems of estates departments. And 
it demonstrated to each Trust the need for them to re-design their respective monitoring 
procedures. 
Again in all cases the researcher realised that to push the planned preventative 
maintenance reviews forward he had to intervene and act as a catalyst to lead the 
estates officers through the process; but being careful to practice the 'process 
consultation' techniques as discussed earlier (Schein, 1997; Schein, 1998; Belton & 
Stewart, 2003). It was during these review meetings that the researcher gained the 
distinct impression that he was teaching the younger members of the managerial team 
the fundamental aspects of how to construct the planned preventative maintenance 
system and the philosophy behind the techniques. 
5.4.2 Assessment of impact and probability 
The researcher considered that of all of the tasks that could cause a variance in opinion 
within the third research objective, it was the assessment of impact and probability 
assigned to each planned preventative maintenance task which would do so most often, 
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and that if agreement could not be reached, then the entire design of the research 
instrument would have to be abandoned. In all cases the researcher's concerns were 
shown to be ill-founded. 
During this exercise extensive reference was made to the risk criticality grid descriptors 
within NHS guidance already mentioned. These were readily understood by the group as 
a whole, as they had the experience to make qualified judgements relating to the likely 
impact levels; as such this section passed without major discussion. The researcher 
expected that it would be the effort to reach agreement about the probability profile 
shapes that would cause the greatest problem. But each group started slowly, 
questioning themselves and each other, discussing in detail each situation, until a 
consensus was reached (US Army Corps of Engineers, 2000; Bilal, 2001; Keeney & 
Raiffa, 1976). Throughout each of the focus groups were comforted in the knowledge 
that they had the opportunity to review the profiles selected after the initial simulation, 
and to observe the effects and significance of any changes. Throughout, the researcher 
consciously restricted his comments and opinions, practicing the art of 'process 
consultation', and periodically advising the participants of his role,. 
As agreed, the involvement of other professional senior managers within the process 
was restricted until the estates officers were confident with the base data and simulation 
outputs. Therefore it was the estates officers that initially assessed the planned 
preventative maintenance need and the values of impact. Following the successful initial 
simulations, all planned preventative maintenance tasks and assessments of impact 
were discussed with the Trust's technical and clinical advisors, their counsel sought, and 
the simulations re-run. Thus the final output was from the joint consultation and 
agreement of a Trust multi-professional team, as explicitly required by the relevant 
national guidelines (NHS Estates 2002). It was the outputs of these final simulations that 
were presented to the Trust Boards, who under their corporate governance 
responsibilities, decided the resources to allocate to the subject of day-to-day 
maintenance, and consequently the level of assessed risk that they were willing to 
accept. 
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5.4.3 Examination of the results created from the simulation 
Following the successful simulation of the raw data the researcher found that he was in 
total agreement with all of the academic publications cited within this thesis relating to 
the modelling of systems, in that it is only when a model is created and used that true 
knowledge begins to be developed of the processes being investigated. 
Sterman argues that no simulation model can be validated or verified, as verify indicates 
truth and valid implies being supported by truth. He then goes on to quote various 
leading figures that have over the years agreed that, 'all models are wrong and are 
simplifications of the real world'. Therefore the researcher looked for multiple points of 
contact between the real world and the model, so as to determine the model's limitations 
(Sterman, 2000). This approach consisted of testing the integrity of the modelling 
process and the sensitivity of results to uncertainty in assumptions. 
The integrity of the methodology was checked against the basic principles of good model 
design, as recommended by numerous publications for such simulation models, but 
mainly the comprehensive work by Sterman and Vose discussed earlier. As such the 
model was designed and used to promote enquiry, without any preconceptions about the 
output values, or including hidden assumptions. It was used by the widest community 
possible and supported multiple viewpoints, within focus groups and with direct 
participation in the process. The flexibility of the model was such that it supported 
sensitivity and policy analysis, and throughout the empowerment of the Trust managers 
was promoted to challenge the model's outputs. 
Without doubt the simulation model allowed the estates managers (and others), to 
observe and question the effects of the assessed risk generated from varying resource 
levels. This enabled them to use evidence based information in their discussions with 
the other professional groups throughout the Trust, and to advise the Trust board of the 
consequences of any variation to the existing estates' artisan complement. This in turn 
allowed them to qualify their decisions with risk based evidence when allocating 
resources to their day-to-day maintenance activity. 
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5.4.4 Using the model 
As the researcher became familiar with using the model, a common pattern quickly 
began to emerge when analysing the outputs. For each trade/site the first set of risk 
profiles that was analysed was for the two test files numbers 1 and 2, to confirm that the 
program had operated correctly. From hereon in the researcher and the Trust estates 
officers were confident that the remaining files would give a reasonable representation of 
the true risk that would be experienced from available man hour variations. Of the 
various output files, the most common to initially focus on were those that reflected the 
amber and red risk zones (A & R) for the medium level of WTE. From this starting point 
all other files were examined. In none of the Trusts examined was it found necessary to 
extend the simulations beyond the extreme boundaries of plus or minus 3 WTE. 
The researcher actively encouraged the individual estates officers to create various 
personal 'what if scenarios', so that they could learn from the model the effects of policy 
and procedural decisions. In one case the model was used to predict the likely man-
power needed for a site that was to reduce in physical size by approximately 25 percent, 
due to a clinical rationalisation programme intended to close various buildings. This 
'game playing' assisted in gaining confidence with the model in readiness for the 
presentation of the results to the other senior managers within the Trust. 
Once the Trust estates officers were confident with the outputs, preparations were made 
to present these to the other Trust senior managers outside of the estates function. 
These presentations were given with much of the technical detail removed. The main 
output for this was the simulated risk profile that assisted the Trust to make a 
'Judgement Call', based on the acceptable level of risk to accept in relation to the risk 
generated from the day-to-day activities from their directly employed labour staffs. An 
example of such a profile discussed previously is given below in Figure 67. 
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Figure 67 Example risk profile showing the Red & Amber zones 
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Based on outputs such as these, the Trusts made a 'judgement call' , and decided to 
accept the level of risk generated by the existing directly employed labour resource, or 
not. In order for them to have the confidence to make such a decision they had to be 
assured that the simulation model was robust and reflected what would probably occur 
in practice. This necessitated that the simulation outputs were shown in detail (on 
request) from the base data onwards. In parallel with this their robustness had to be 
demonstrated, by including all of the assumptions and variables that could affect the final 
result. 
In all cases the researcher advised the Trusts not to accept the outputs of the model as 
the definitive projection of risk, and not to immediately implement policy changes. 
Caution was advocated, so that any change to the existing arrangements should be 
gradually based on factual information, as opposed to that predicted by the model. It was 
suggested that small incremental changes be made, and their effects observed and 
cross -checked against those anticipated. In this way any unknown error within the 
simulation process would be small and quickly contained. This recommendation was 
readily accepted by all participating Trusts. 
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5.5 Fourth research objective 
As previously stated the implementation of the methodology related to the development 
and design of the generic monitoring regime created as part of this research has not 
been implemented into a Trust, due to the time constraints imposed for the completion of 
this thesis. But work is now underway to put the system into practice at Trust N, the 
agreed date for total completion for the estates maintenance department being 
December 2008. 
5.6 The four research objectives 
The previous sections questioned the integrity of the process and the sensitivity of 
results to uncertainty in the assumptions. Through this procedure confidence in the 
processes was achieved by the consistency of the results and outputs, being in concord 
with the collective experiences of the focus groups, regarding the likely effects of the 
variation of resource with associated health and safety risks in the real world. 
One important flaw inbuilt into the whole process was that it only assessed the individual 
health and safety risks associated with each planned preventative maintenance task as 
a disparate unit. Those risks that were considered were summated into a total risk score. 
This developed a detailed insight into the separate components that create the risk, and 
guided managers to concentrate on those areas of concern to develop risk reduction 
measures. But no estimation of the financial or legal prosecution risks was taken into 
account. Also the model deliberately ignored the possibility of the risks combining in 
unforeseen ways and creating an unexpected and greater risk (Tweeddale, 2003). This 
problem of merging risks has been recognised by the nuclear, petrochemical, 
aeronautical, offshore platforms and defence industries in their use of Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment systems, as previously discussed (NASA, 2002; National Patient Safety 
Agency, 2005; Marx & Sionim, 2003; Wreathall & Nemeth, 2004). 
Therefore the simulation model's output could only claim to represent the minimum level 
of assessed risk in terms of health and safety issues, and indicate that the true risk 
exposed by the organisation would be greater than this. In the knowledge that all 
simulation models were inherently flawed, and the limitations of the model determined, 
the forgoing did give assurance to the Trusts and the researcher that the natural 
tolerances displayed by the model were acceptable for the environment in which the 
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model was to be employed . Thus the model was a useful tool to be used within their 
strategic planning process. 
Two unpredicted issues began to emerge during the discussion of the four research 
objectives. These were: the method of funding the day-to-day maintenance activities of a 
Trust's maintenance department; the second concerned the possibility of creating 
synthetic input data for use within the research instrument within the third research 
objective. In order to protect the integrity of the 'story line' relating to the history of this 
research programme these two topics are presented within this chapter of the thesis. 
5.6.1 Revenue Budgets 
Traditionally the day-to-day maintenance activities have been funded with a fixed, as 
opposed to variable, revenue budget. But as this research has shown, the level of risk 
generated from a Trust's maintenance activities varies throughout a calendar year; as 
the reactive maintenance needs increase, the available man-hours to complete the 
planned preventative maintenance tasks decrease, and the risk rises in consequence. 
This process is shown within Figure 68 below. This constant interaction and variation 
between the three waveforms of reactive and planned preventative maintenance needs, 
and the available man-hours, generates a risk profile that also varies. In order to contain 
the assessed risk within pre-set levels of acceptability the resource budget must be 
flexible. 
Figure 68 A simple cogitative diagram showing the effects of increasing the 
reactive maintenance needs, or available man-hours on the assessed risk 
generated. 
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5.6.2 The development of synthetic data 
Following the successful use of the simulation programs, the researcher began to 
question whether the simulation process could be 'reverse engineered', to assess the 
trade group needs for a Trust, which had no robust man-hour and/or reactive waveform 
input data. In order to address this question each component of the raw data obtained 
to-date was analysed 
The raw data developed as part of this research consisted of three sets, the planned 
preventative maintenance, reactive and man-hour waveforms. The addition of the 
planned preventative maintenance waveform to the reactive waveforms creates the 
man-hour waveform needs for a site. The planned preventative maintenance waveform 
is peculiar to each Trust, as each site is individual in terms of its building configuration, 
layout and building services. Therefore for any simulation this waveform should (and 
could) be built up from first principles for each individual site, as described within the 
Methodology Chapter. This left the two unknown waveforms for reactive maintenance 
needs and the man-hour availability to be created synthetically. In order to develop such 
a 'reverse engineering' process, the naturally occurring parameters of the two 
waveforms were sought. 
5.6.3 Development of the reverse engineering process research instrument 
The base information relating to the reactive maintenance needs for a Trust follow 
simple requirements. These were itemised by AI-Zubaidi and Christer (1997), as being 
such tasks as repairing dripping taps, changing light bulbs, etc, and discussed earlier. 
The researcher considered it acceptable to assume that the rate of generation of these 
defects and the man-hour needs for their correction would be common from Trust to 
Trust. This then assumed that a performance indicator could be developed for reactive 
man-hour needs/m2/year. 
The reactive data from the Trust X for each of their two acute sites had been financially 
audited via the national NHS Labour Management System. This information then formed 
part of the yearly published statutory accounts for the Trust. Therefore the researcher 
used this data to form a performance indicator set. 
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The defect hour waveforms appeared random in nature, as observed by AI-Zubaidi and 
Christer (1997) who recorded these tasks over a three month period. In this research the 
observation period was extended to three years , and appeared to confirm their findings 
of the apparent randomness. This led the researcher to assume that a synthetic reactive 
waveform could be developed with a random type shape. 
It was assumed by the researcher that over time the available man-hour waveform 
would follow a similar random type pattern to the reactive waveform. 
An important part of the analysis was to determine if there was a relationship between 
the reactive and available man-hour waveforms. Figure 69 below shows graphically 
these two waveforms for the Trust X electrical trade group on site H as an example. 
Figure 69 The original available man hrs and defect hrs waveforms for the 
Trust X electrical trade group in site H. 
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A covariance test was undertaken on the two waveforms for each trade group within 
Trust X. This test determined if large values in one data set were associated with large 
values in the other data set. If this were so then it would give a large positive covariance. 
The reverse would be true if large variations in one data set were matched with small 
variations within the other data set; then a negative covariance would be computed . If 
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the covariance were zero than it could not be assumed that there was any relationship. 
The results of the covariance tests are shown within the table below. 
Table 28 The covariance between the waveforms for reactive and available 
man-hour waveforms 
Site Trade Covariance 
H Electrical 592 
H Mechanical 15 
H Semi-Skilled 19 
C Electrical 171 
C Mechanical 294 
C Semi-Skilled 364 
The results within table 28 show that the relationships for each of the respective trade 
groups indicated a positive weak relationship only. This supported the view that the two 
waveforms could be synthetically created from random type data. 
Any synthetic waveform must reflect the same parameter limits as the original waveform 
that it was designed to mimic, and to affect the output of the simulation model to a 
similar degree. The simulation model output was the 'judgement call' made by the 
Trust's multi-professional group in relation to the staffing level, and the resultant level of 
assessed risk posed to the Trust, staff, patient, public and other stakeholders. This was 
a qualitative issue that referenced the level of risk generated, as opposed to a 
quantitative value. Therefore in order to give a robustness and reliability to the 
experimental data, the researcher again chose to measure the effect on the total level of 
assessed risk, summated from the last 10 years of the 20 year simulation model. 
As a first step in creating synthetic data it was necessary to describe the original man-
hour availability and reactive waveform shapes mathematically, to determine the 
parameters of the synthetic waveforms. The mean and standard deviations of the 
original data were computed as a simple aid to describe their properties. From reference 
to the Trust X data, the waveforms for the two sites and six trade groups Table 29 were 
generated. The planned preventative maintenance waveform data was included for 
completeness. As discussed earlier the researcher suggested that it was not necessary 
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to synthetically create this waveform as in all cases it could be formed from the data for 
the site being analysed. 
Table 29 The mean and standard deviations of the three original waveforms. 
Trade Standard Deviation Site Mean as a percentage group 
of the mean 
Man- Reactive planned Man- Reactive planned 
hours preventative hours preventative ! 
maintenance maintenance 
H Mechanical 242 147 88 17.0 56.8 25.6 
H Electrical 307 202 62 21.6 34.4 56.8 
Semi-H Skilled 377 191 138 17.3 30.5 27.9 
C Mechanical 240 144 166 22.9 33.7 36.6 
C Electrical 227 134 73 22.1 33.8 24.6 
C Semi- 249 108 131 32.1 Skilled 22.9 48.5 
In order to test the suggestion that synthetic waveforms could be formed and used to 
simulate the effects of varying resource levels against an existing or future work load 
scenario, it was necessary to create the synthetic waveforms, test for covariance, 
simulate their effects, and to plot the outputs against the original waveforms for the 
reactive and man-hour figures. If the synthetic waveforms generated a level of risk 
similar to the original waveforms, and created the same 'judgement calls' relating to the 
acceptable level of resource/risk ratio, then it would suggest that synthetic waveforms 
could be used. 
As any synthetic data must reflect the natural parameters of the original waveforms, the 
figures within table 29 suggested that for a given mean value of reactive and available 
man-hours the synthetic waveforms should lie within the following given parameters: 
Standard deviation 
The standard deviations of the synthetic reactive waveforms should span 
between 25% and 60% about the mean; similarly the synthetic available man-
hour waveform should be between 15% and 25%. 
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Shape 
From the work conducted previously it was shown that there was little covariance 
between the reactive and available man-hour waveforms, therefore the shape of 
these could be created synthetically. 
5.6.4 Procedure 
From the foregoing, four synthetic waveforms were created, simulated against each 
other and their outputs from the last 10 years of the 20 year simulation, compared to that 
of the original waveforms, as shown within Table 30 for all risks within the red and amber 
zones. In line with the previous presentations, site HRI and the trade group electrical are 
shown as an example to aid the discussions. 
Table 30 
Defect 
SD60 
and 
Av_hrs 
SD25 
2078 
972 
370 
159 
20 
0 
0 
Simulated and original summated risk for the last 10 years of a 20 
year simulation for the red and amber zones. 
Defect Defect Defect Original SD60 SD25 SD25 
and and and Defect WTE And Av_hrs Av_hrs Av_hrs Av_hrs SD15 SD25 SD15 
2096 5141 7127 4801 -3 
985 2651 3563 2405 -2 
459 988 1086 827 -1 
216 226 155 171 Acceptable 
59 13 3 9 1 
1 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 3 
By normalising the figures within Table 30 the graph in Figure 70 was formed. This 
shows the variation in predicted risk for various levels of man-hour resource for the 
synthetic waveforms against that generated from the original waveforms. 
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Figure 70 Change in assessed risk for a variation of resource availability for 
the red and amber zones. 
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Where the 'judgement call' accepted the generated level of risk for a given resource 
WTE, the simulated waveforms gave a close approximation to that generated from the 
original waveforms for reactive resource need and man-hour availability. As the resource 
was reduced this closeness of fit against the original began to splay out. 
These results again suggest that synthetic waveforms could be used to estimate the 
effects of varying the resource against the assessed risk generated. But in order to give 
confidence to the assessments a range of waveforms must be simulated and their 
outputs must converge to a closeness of fit around the acceptable resource predictions. 
When the tests were repeated with an increased mean the summated risk increased 
dramatically. Similar results were obtained for the reactive maintenance waveform and 
for other groups. Thus, from this series of experiments the researcher was confident that 
synthetic waveforms could be produced, where no covariance exists between the two 
waveforms. These results gave a high level of confidence to produce the final graph and 
output from this, an estimation of the value of risk with respect to a variation in resource 
levels. 
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5.7 Follow-up studies 
As with any research it is important to devise follow-up studies to confirm (or otherwise) 
the success of the exercise. The research instruments from the first and second 
research objectives are being successfully expanded into other non-clinical areas within 
the NHS. In the case of the third research objective research instruments, such a follow-
up process is planned. But unlike the follow up studies for the previous two objectives, 
the naturally long timescales involved with the implementation of this objective could not 
be completed until at least two years or more beyond the time frame for this thesis, and 
thus before any definitive conclusions could be published. The fourth objective relating to 
the monitoring system is currently being developed for implementation into two NHS 
Trust estates departments, with the anticipation that further designs will be created for 
other NHS departments over the forthcoming years. 
This problem of follow-up studies was recognised by Sterman (2000), when attempting 
to ask, "whether the modelling process helped change the system for the beUer", as it 
was difficult to determine if it was the model, the process or a combination of external 
factors that changed people's mental pictures and beliefs. 
5.8 Selection of sample Trusts 
In the year 2000 financial support for this research was refused by the NHS; the only 
way that it was allowed to precede was if it was 'self-funding'. In other words only if 
Trusts were willing to pay for the studies to be conducted within their sites, then the 
research could continue. Since then this research has survived on this basis up until the 
present day. 
This funding arrangement and the sample of Trusts participating within this study have 
not affected the validity and/or success of the academic approach to the methodologies 
employed throughout each of the four research objectives, or their results and 
contributions made to mankind's 'body of knowledge'. 
But without doubt it cannot be stated that the results truly represent a random type 
sample of NHS Trusts. That said, in all cases the methodology has uncovered previously 
unknown latent conditions that their own multi-professional managerial teams 
(comprised of their most senior managers) have categorised as Substantial/Intolerable. 
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When these results are viewed alongside the Department of Health publication in the 
year 2000 condemning the fact that the NHS is directly responsible for approximately 
850,000 adverse events and wasting about £28 in the process (Department of Health 
2000); and the National Audit office report in 2003 that cites the Commission for Health 
Improvement (CHI), where this organisation found that, in a third of the organisations 
CHI had reviewed, there was a 'Iack-of-connection', between the policies that the board 
had approved and what was actually happening in the wards, departments, etc (Audit 
Commission, 2003); then a disturbing picture of inadequate internal control procedures 
emerge. 
5.9 Discussion summary 
This Chapter considers the research cited within the Literature Search Chapter, the 
techniques employed as created within the Methodology Chapter, and the robustness of 
the outcomes as tested within the Results Chapter. Following the successful analysis, 
discussion and conclusion of the procedures the researcher then summarises the 
findings. 
The outputs from the first research objective were shown to uncover previously unknown 
latent gaps within the managerial systems. In some cases these gaps were judged by 
the relevant Trust senior managers to be generating serious/intolerable levels of risk to 
their organisations, patients, public, staff and stakeholders. The output from this 
objective allowed the Trusts to refocus their limited resources to 'where they would do 
most good', Testimony to the value of this output was received by the Trusts requesting 
follow up studies to confirm progress in closing the gaps, and through national 
recognition and publication. 
The outputs from the second research objective estimated the resources needed to 
close the managerial gaps identified. This gave a budget expenditure and risk reduction 
profile against a time line with which to project manage the closure of the managerial 
failings. 
The third research objective outputs allowed the Trusts to determine what revenue 
resources were needed to keep the risks associated with maintenance to an acceptable 
level. As a direct consequence of this research, it is now possible for the first time in the 
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60 year history of the NHS for evidence to be shown of the consequences of varying 
resource in terms of the effects on risk. 
The simulation model specifically developed for this objective shows that even for 
reasonably resourced organisation, peaks of risk naturally occurred within the red and 
amber zones with respect to time. This suggested that maintenance revenue budgets 
should be variable and not fixed year-on-year. 
The sensitivity of the simulation model was tested and this demonstrated that only 
negligible effects were experienced by: the use of interpolation in place of integration 
within the simulation software to speed its design; the sensitivity of the probability utility 
to the focus groups being particularly risk adverse; and the focus groups' judgement in 
assessing the ratio differences between the impact descriptors. 
This objective also questioned if the simulation models created could be 'reverse 
engineered', to assess the trade group resource needs of a Trust if they had no reliable 
raw data. 
This led to the development and use of synthetic data for available man-hours and 
reactive hours, and showed that it was possible to produce reasonable results from such 
information to within small tolerance limits of accuracy, when compared against actual 
values derived from original data. 
The fourth objective which was designed to monitor the day-to-day managerial activities 
was not discussed in depth within the Chapter, as it was not possible to implement the 
methodology into a Trust within the acceptable time scale of this research programme. 
249 
Chapter Six Conclusions 
6.1 Overriding conclusion 
This thesis has uncovered major systematic failings within NHS estates departments; 
whilst some of these failings were unknown, others were suspected to exist. This 
exposure has been achieved only by moving beyond the simple basic operational 
performance methodologies in common practice within the NHS, into complex and 
hitherto unused models of analysis within these types of organisations. 
This research began with the suggestion that NHS estates departments were not 
complying with the recognised NHS codes of practice. This led to the first research 
objective: 
Develop and implement a robust, transparent and repeatable methodology to 
assess if the managerial systems of internal control within the National Health 
Service (NHS) give adequate assurance that the day-to-day building service 
engineering maintenance activities conform to their respective national 
guidelines. 
The results of this research conclusively show that of the Trusts analysed as part of this 
research, not one had adequate managerial systems of internal control, and in all cases 
each Trust's own senior managers (comprised of multi-professional focus groups) 
considered that: 
The previously unknown systematic failings of their governance systems were 
exposing their organisation, patients, staff, public and stakeholders to substantial/ 
intolerable risk. 
These failings were not the cause of a momentary lack of focus, but had developed over 
a considerable period of time, creating a history of systematic failings. This research 
described the concepts of the performance management procedures specifically 
developed for this study. It has shown the underlying theory and background to the 
development of the processes, how they were applied, the results they produced and 
how this new found knowledge is able to feed into the decision making processes of the 
organisation. 
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6.1.1 Novel academic contributions to the subject area 
First research objective Use of utility functions 
The novel academic contribution of the research instrument developed and successfully 
employed is the use of utility theory into the subject of risk assessment of a managerial 
system compared to the standard criticality grids generally in use. The research has 
shown the ease of use, transparency, robustness and repeatability of the utility function 
methodologies employed, as the need to assess the percentage probability of failure has 
been removed and replaced with an assessment of percentage compliance, to assess 
risk of a partially compliant managerial system when assessed against national and local 
standards. This has been further enhanced by the adoption of the diagrammatic 
methodology within focus group situations and the speed of response compared to other 
risk assessment systems. Although the research instrument has been specifically 
developed for use within an NHS environment it is applicable to a range of managerial 
situations external to this organisation. 
Second research objective Use of typical construction project planning 
techniques 
This research has found that it is unusual to employ Gantt charts to break down a 
managerial deficiency into tasks, sub-tasks and .sub-sub-tasks, etc, assign probable 
levels of resource need in terms of man-power, budget and timescale. The design of the 
research instrument successfully used for the completion of this objective has formed a 
novel academic contribution to similar problems faced by organisations, as this 
technique has applications in a wide variety of establishments. 
Third research objective 
resource. 
Use of simulation techniques to assess risk vs. 
The novel academic contribution made through the successful development and 
implementation of the research instrument specifically for this third research objective 
has been made in the following four areas: 
Area one: The traditional algorithm for the assessment of man-power need 
for a typical maintenance department has been shown through this research to 
be fundamentally flawed, and to constantly underestimate the man-power need. 
251 
Area two: The design and use of a simulation model has shown the 
previously unknown relationship between risk and values of resource at a macro 
(week-by-week) level, where it has been shown that due to the random type 
nature of available resource and reactive maintenance demands, that the risk 
trespasses into the areas graded as intolerable/substantial and major risk zones 
(red and amber zones) even at high levels of resource. 
Area three: The high level output from the simulation shows for the first time, 
the relationship between the risks generated from a variation in resource for the 
maintenance function. Therefore it is now possible for senior managers to 
simulate their actions 'before' adjusting resource (budgets) in relation to the 
subject of building services, plant and equipment maintenance against their risk 
appetite. 
Area four: The outputs have conclusively shown that to match the levels of 
risk appetite from year-to-year an organisation must adopt a flexible budget 
allocation. 
Fourth research objective Use of a driver 
Although the research instrument developed specifically within this objective was not 
implemented during the timescale of this research, the unique contribution this research 
has made to the theoretical discussions has been the suggestion to the use of a driver 
within the monitoring system. This to govern the monitoring process through a web 
based system, which allocates managerial monitoring tasks to various hierarchal levels 
of managers both within and outside a department. 
Overall contribution of all four research objectives 
The uniqueness of the research is summarised within the combined presentation of all 
four objectives. As never since 1948 has NHS maintenance managers (or others), been 
able to show the seriousness (or otherwise) of their managerial systems when compared 
against national and local standards, nor have they been able to demonstrate the 
influence of resource changes with respect to an assessed risk against a patients safety. 
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6.2 Personal reflections (A history of managerial failure) 
Over the 60 years since the NHS has been formed, each decade has borne witness to a 
series of initiatives to improve its managerial systems. Since 1978 the engineering 
function has been subjected to review, where hospitals were placed into a 'league table' 
as part of a quality control measure of their maintenance activities (Department of Health 
and Social Security 1973). Additional information was created through the introduction of 
the self financing engineering incentive scheme, which was commonly referred to as the 
bonus scheme (National Performance Advisory Group 1997). But this latter information 
flow ceased when Trusts were formed and the incentive schemes were disbanded. 
Controls assurance was introduced into the NHS to improve the internal controls 
throughout the organisation as a single initiative, which attempted to develop an 
integrated internal control structure (Scrivens 2005). In 1998 an information strategy was 
introduced as a strategic approach to the use of information technology (Department of 
Health 1998). This was followed by the introduction of Corporate Governance around the 
year 2000, roughly in parallel with the publication that claimed that the NHS was wasting 
in excess of £2 billion/year, and which estimated that 850,000 adverse events occurred 
per year directly affecting patients (Department of Health 2000). At this time it was 
recommended that the NHS should take a systems approach as opposed to a person 
centred methodology to reduce this waste and number of incidents. 
In the year 2002 Trusts were forced to sign a Statement of Internal Control alongside the 
accounts of the Trust, with the aim of ensuring that the Trust Board was receiving 
regular assurances that its managerial systems were functioning correctly (Department 
of Health 2002). But in 2003 the observation was made that at the heart of many public 
service failures was poor corporate governance. The NHS itself went on to state that 
there was a 'Iack-of-connection' between the policies that the Trust Boards had 
approved and what was actually happening in the wards, departments, etc. From 198 
published clinical governance inspections, it was clear that half of the Boards evidently 
did not receive information from service activities (Audit Commission 2003). 
The Health Care Standards Support Unit was formed in 2004 to provide support to the 
Department of Health initiative on standards (Scrivens 2005). This organisation 
effectively operated in parallel with the NHS Litigation Authority, which was originally 
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formed in 1995 to handle claims of non-clinical and clinical negligence against the NHS. 
It is estimated that the current theoretical cost of paying all outstanding claims 
immediately would be in the order of £9.09 billion for clinical claims, and approximately 
£0.13 billion for non-clinical claims (NHS Litigation Authority 2008). In 2005 a call was 
made for new approaches to be formed towards an integrated audit (Scrivens 2005). In 
2006 new guidance was issued to ensure that the basic building blocks were in place for 
integrated governance by 2008 (Department of Health 2006). The year 2008 is now 
here, but despite all of the initiatives created, reports commissioned and published, 
guidance material issued and audits undertaken, this study has shown that: 
None of the Trusts taking part in this research had adequate governance 
systems in place to advise them (and others), that their estate departments were 
not performing to the national standards. 
6.3 The outputs from this research 
This research has successfully broken down this governance problem into fine detail to 
analyse the activities of a number of estates departments .. Central throughout the whole 
of the research procedure has been the identification of potential latent errors. Although 
these errors seldom create adverse consequences themselves, they do create the 
environments which make such outcomes more likely. 
It is from the techniques designed within the first research objective, that NHS Trusts are 
now able (for the first time in 60 years), to identify and assess their deviations from the 
predetermined and accepted national practice, and to gauge the level of risk that they 
pose, using a reliable, simple, repeatable and auditable method. Prior to this, Trusts 
were trying to apply un-calibrated ordinate scales of probability to a 5x5 criticality grid 
which was subject to personal and political bias, with no transparency of methodology or 
repeatability. 
In all cases the results from the methods developed as part of this research have 
uncovered previously unknown latent risks, that the Trusts own multi-professional focus 
groups have assessed as posing intolerable/substantial risks to their patients, staff, 
stakeholders, etc. This led directly to a redistribution of their limited resources to, 'where 
they would do most good'. But to enable this transfer, the resource needs to close each 
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of these managerial gaps in terms of man-power, cost and time had to be assessed; this 
need directed the research to develop the second research objective.. Prior to this, 
Trusts were attempting to assess their resource needs for such managerial tasks by 
applying little more than 'professional guesswork'. The output from this research gave 
Trusts the structured, detailed and auditable methodology to break down their 
managerial tasks into fine detail, assign levels of confidence to their assessments, and 
to produce estimates of need to acceptable levels of accuracy and auditability. This in 
turn facilitated the creation of future probable scenarios reflecting the reduction of 
assessed risk with respect to time, from various levels of resource specifically aimed at 
closing the identified managerial gaps. 
Whilst the outputs from the first two research objectives identified the latent conditions 
creating the risks, and estimated the resource needs to close the managerial gaps to 
reduce the risks to an acceptable level, they did not give any indication of the revenue 
consequences needed to keep the gaps closed in terms of the directly employed artisan 
shop-floor staffs. Therefore this research naturally followed on into this area, and the 
third research objective was created. 
Prior to this the, artisan man-power planning within NHS estates departments relied on a 
simple crude algorithm, that totalled the trade group yearly hours needed to complete all 
of the reactive and predictive maintenance work. The results of this research 
conclusively show that the heuristics supporting this simple model are false, and that in 
all cases the resulting resource estimates derived from the formula grossly 
underestimate the acceptable man-power need, and as a consequence create 
unacceptable levels of intolerable/substantial risk. This research has shown that this 
phenomenon is due to the previously unknown dynamic complex interchange between 
the levels of available directly employed artisan resource and workload. 
To prove that the simple algorithm was inadequate, it was necessary for this research to 
develop, design and use a simulation model, which followed the resource availability and 
need patterns, and work allocation processes. As the technique uses a Trust's actual 
data, the process captures the effects of the trade's staff being interrupted, and the role 
of novelty and the subsequent disruption caused to their normal work flow pattern, 
specific to each Trust site in question. Thus the model reflects the role of resource and 
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workload quantity. The simulation model also allowed numerous 'what-if-scenarios' to be 
explored, that would have been unethical to test in practice. The research within this 
objective also shows that if a Trust's specific data was either corrupted or unavailable, 
synthetic data could be created and used within the model for man-power availability 
and/or reactive workload waveforms. 
The outputs from this only predict the minimum level of likely generated risk, as no 
account is made of the increased levels created through a combined multiple component 
failure effect within the interactive and tight coupling of the healthcare environment. 
However, due to this research, it is now possible for the first time since the formation of 
the NHS in 1948, to predict to an acceptable and repeatable level of accuracy, the effect 
of varying a Trust estate's artisan staff's maintenance budget availability with respect to 
the resultant generation of risk. 
The first three research objectives have successfully designed and implemented 
techniques to identify and close the managerial gaps caused through previously 
unknown latent conditions within Trusts' managerial systems. The final and fourth part of 
the research process was to develop and design a generic methodology to monitor the 
day-to-day actual activities of an NHS estates department against the pre-agreed 
national and local maintenance standards. Although there is much NHS guidance 
literature suggesting that Trusts should implement such a monitoring system as part of 
their corporate governance procedures, there is no such documentation relating to the 
practical details of how to develop, design, implement and maintain such a structure. 
Throughout the monitoring system framework designed as part of this research are 
processes that incorporate both risk management and internal auditing, together with 
joining of risk management ideology with corporate governance tasks. This is in the 
belief that to be effective the framework must be underpinned with good information 
management and that this facilitates better risk management, that in turn creates the 
environment for better decision management. It is from this basic information that 
scenario planning can be developed to enable strategic and operational decisions to be 
taken that would cater for all plausible futures. 
256 
By creating such an integrated and dynamic assurance framework the need for a 
traditional audit cycle is eliminated, as information is reviewed regularly throughout the 
year, and the organisation's exposure to risk and, managers' concerns about risk are 
constantly being evaluated. This allows the organisation's managerial, technical and 
general audit functions to be targeted to where the need is greatest, as opposed to 
following a pre-determined historical calendar of tasks. It also creates the atmosphere 
for the audit function to move away from a simple process control investigation, into the 
areas of business processes relating to the generation (or suppression) of significant 
strategic and operational risk, i.e. the analysis of how the risks are being generated and 
managed. From such a structured approach the costs associated with operational 
processes and the associated need for monitoring, verses the impact of failure can be 
estimated, thus identifying the scope for, and facilitating the removal and burden of, 
unnecessary monitoring systems. 
The advantages from the design of the assurance framework developed within this 
research are created from combining the risk management and internal/external audit 
functions into one body, for the determination and understanding of strategic and 
operational risk, coupled with the individually designed monitoring outputs for each 
manager in turn, that span both the vertical hierarchal managerial structure of the 
department, and the horizontal information pathways to other interested groups 
throughout the organisation. This is achieved by capitalising on the individual actors 
desire to 'do well', and to improve the services that they provide, and from encouraging 
ownership by training them in the concepts of risk and governance topics. This enables 
them to each take an active part in the system's development, to create solutions to their 
problems. 
Due to the time constraints on this research no results were available for discussion and 
comment from this final research objective. However the researcher is currently 
developing, designing and implementing this monitoring system assurance framework 
into a major Trust across all facility groups, including their estates department. The 
anticipated time scale for completion for the estates section is September 2008. 
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6.4 Future research opportunities 
Although this research is focused towards the engineering day-to-day maintenance 
function within the NHS, all the research instruments created within this research 
programme have the potential to be expanded into other departments within the NHS, 
and into external organisations. Therefore the suggestions for further research building 
on this thesis inherently develop for this extension into other areas. 
The output from the first research objective has shown a demonstrable success story of 
implementing the system within 31 Trust estates departments (to date). Outside of the 
scope, but as a result, of this research programme the process has been successfully 
applied in the following areas within the NHS: catering, cleaning, transport, pest control 
and linen management. Further research could usefully be undertaken by applying these 
techniques into numerous fields, particularly the clinical areas of the NHS. This could 
highlight common managerial problem areas both within professional groups and those 
that appear across subject boundaries. 
The outputs from the second research objective assessed the resources required to 
close the managerial gaps identified from the first research objective. Further research 
could follow up the assessments already concluded and compare them with the actual 
tasks that were undertaken and the resources consumed in terms of man-power, cost 
and time scale. From this, useful 'performance indicators' could be developed for like 
tasks and circulated for general use throughout the NHS. Again this development and 
approach could be expanded into other professional groups. 
The simulation model created as part of the third research objective has the potential to 
be expanded into areas other than purely NHS estate artisan staffs, as other 
departments (inside and outside the NHS) will operate with similar routine (periodic), 
novel and non-novel tasks, all of varying quantities. A typical example would be within 
the domestic cleaning departments of hospitals. 
The simulation model currently only analyses the man-power requirement for the directly 
employed artisan staff groups. It does not attempt to simulate the activities of the 
department's managerial staffs. But NHS estates departments are no different from the 
majority of other organisations in terms of their managerial functions, in that they are 
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comprised in the main of routine (periodic) and non-novel tasks. Currently there is no 
recognised managerial man-power formula in use within the NHS to assess these day-
to-day managerial resource needs. As each organisation has its 'tipping point' beyond 
which the performance of the department rapidly collapses, it should be possible to 
construct a simulation model, similar to that within the third research objective of this 
research, to study the effects of varying resource and assessed risk relating to the 
managerial function. From the experience gained from the model's development, design, 
construction and use, it should be possible to expand this approach into other 
managerial departments. 
This research is continuing with the development and implementation of the fourth 
research objective assurance framework into a large acute hospital's facilities 
department, with the expected completion date being April 2009. Discussions are also 
underway to pilot the system within a clinical area and beyond. Whilst the current focus 
is within the NHS, there is no reason why the system could not be expanded beyond 
these confines. 
By combining the four research objectives when analysing the day-to-day man-power 
needs for the management function, it should be possible to create indicators that would 
signal when the available resource level is likely to reach the critical level before the 
'tipping point' is breached through a quantity induced crisis, as this type of event may 
provide an early warning system through an identifiable 'temporal signature' created 
from the interaction of certain performance indicators. 
The outputs from all four objectives are designed around a 'judgement call' made by a 
multi-professional focus group comprised of the Trust's senior managers. Their 
individual and combined risk taking/adverse attitude would influence the decisions taken 
relating to their acceptable resource/risk ratio. Understanding the group's (Trust's) 
behaviours, attitudes and beliefs would prove useful to those wanting to understand and 
influence their behaviour. Of particular interest would be to know if there were any 
relationships between this acceptable resource/risk ratio and the Trust's financial control. 
Expanding this research still further, an analysis could be undertaken to ascertain if this 
acceptable resource/risk ratio changed as a result of the passing of the Corporate 
Manslaughter Act in April 2008, or any other external influence. 
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Throughout the research information has been collected, analysed, computed and 
produced to inform the decision making processes employed by the Trust. The richness 
of this valuable information may be enhanced through the use of 'Fuzzy Numbers', to 
give a breath of variance to the final preferred option. 
6.5 The possible future 
April 2008 saw the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act come into 
force, which means that Trusts are now criminally liable for any deaths where there is a 
'gross breach of the relevant duty of care' in the way that their activities are organised or 
managed (Parliament, 2007). It is the opinion of this researcher that this single act of 
legislation will do more to force good governance into the NHS than all of the efforts over 
the last 60 years, as each person on a Trust board will be seen publically as responsible. 
Although outside the scope of this research the resulting techniques for each of the four 
research objectives can be used for any department within the NHS to assist in the 
development of good governance systems. The researcher is convinced that it is this 
four part process that is the bedrock from which good corporate governance systems 
can be built within the service, and it is what the NHS has needed since 1948. 
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